WHITHER CHRISTIANITY

EDITED BY

LYNN HAROLD HOUGH

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Prayer is pure mysticism"

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LYNN HAROLD HOUGH

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An Intimate Word of Introduction

One day a couple of years ago Miles Krumbine and Reinhold Niebuhr were sitting in my office in Detroit. We had been speaking of such pieces of group thinking as those so productively conducted by Canon Streeter. The suggestion was made that a group of men on this side of the Atlantic was quite ready for this sort of enterprise. The conversation became animated. We agreed that the type of experience represented by men in the pastorate who had with persistent determination kept in close contact with contemporary forms of thought ought to be expressed in such a fashion as to be available to all who might be interested.

What began as a half-serious conversation soon became a definite plan. Men about the United States and in Canada who were intellectually aware and who had proved themselves in the pastorate were selected. There were three meetings of as many members of the group as could arrange to get together. One was held in Detroit, one in Buffalo, and another in Montreal. These meetings were times of very unusual and happy intellectual fellowship. However, it soon became evident that men scattered over so wide a geographical area could not meet for such close and intimate group thinking as would make the book the definite utterance of an integrated interpretation of religion. The chapters were mailed to

various members of the group and there was a happy interchange of ideas. All this disclosed a very notable community in many matters. But in the last analysis each man is responsible for what appears under his own name and must not be credited with responsibility for the statements of any other man.

Miles Krumbine has given so much time and skillful direction to the enterprise that I would feel happy had he consented to have his name appear with mine in the editorial capacity. And now the book must speak for itself and I have only to express my happiness in working with the men who have had a share in its preparation.

LYNN HAROLD HOUGH.

July 22, 1929.

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I

The Heroic and Reconciling Word

By Lynn Harold Hough

IN A memorable passage in the chapter "The Need and Promise of Christian Preaching" in the volume *Das Wort Gottes und die Theologie,* Karl Barth pictures the preacher standing in the pulpit. "Before him lies the Bible, full of mystery, and before him are seated his more or less numerous hearers, also full of mystery—and what indeed is more so? 'What now?' asks the minister."[1] The preacher is always facing an infinitely strange and challenging experience in contact with the human personality which he confronts. And an age of acute and critical study of the documents scarcely adds to the stark and bewildering mystery of the moral and spiritual fire which leaps from the pages of the Bible and comes to glow in human hearts. The preacher's problem is always as complicated as life and experience. It is never more baffling than life itself. It is always his task to utter the heroic and reconciling word.

Life is always coming to a state of tension. Life is always finding a fashion by which this tension is wrought

[1] Translation by Douglas Horton, *"The Word of God and the Word of Man,"* The Pilgrim Press p. 104.

into harmony. In this is the preacher's bewilderment. And in this is the preacher's opportunity. At its best life is always like a Gothic cathedral whose arches and flying buttresses achieve their poised harmony not in static stillness, but in the dynamic stillness of such integrated tensions that sometimes if you strike a column in a Gothic cathedral it will give forth a musical note.

The thinker of today needs profoundly to realize that this state of tension which could be made into harmony has been characteristic of every vital and seminal age in the life of man. There is no more odd and naïve notion than that which regards the present as the first age when men have felt the clash of the clenched antagonisms of supremely difficult mental struggles. Perhaps no man alive today faces so subtly difficult a situation as that which confronted some of the most sensitive spirits of the Italian Renaissance. Each age while it lasts seems the age of supreme crisis. Only the man with the rare gift of historic imagination in the things of the mind can realize how desperate the strain and how heroic the victory has been age after age.

At the very beginning of our study we will view quickly, but I trust not superficially, some of the great historic tensions of the mind of man and the fashion of their resolution into harmony through a commandingly heroic and reconciling word.

I

By the time fifth-century Athens had lived its life, spoken its restrained yet living words, created its works

of art, asked its probing questions, and given its clear-edged answers, the world as far as it was ready to follow Hellenic leadership had been taught the meaning of life as harmony. That highly integrated loveliness, that sense of "nothing too much," that "passionate pursuit of passionless perfection" which we associate with the Attic spirit, had given the deepest and most commanding sanctions to every mind upon which Athens had cast its spell. But all the while—at least since eighth-century Jerusalem—something else had been going on in the world. A group of grim and passionate men with a blazing fire in their hearts had looked upon life and had drawn back with a kind of bitter and tortured pain at the sight. Their only hope was in moral reconstruction. Their only happy expectation was in a God who could say, "Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow." The Greek saw in life a flower ready to bloom, with astonishing capacity to respond to the gardener's care. The Hebrew saw in life a flower stunted by some malignant disease which robbed it of the loveliness of bloom and the allurement of fragrance.

It was a decadent Greece and an Israel of waning spiritual vitality in which the two interpretations met. But meet they did, and meet they must. For the Greek and the Hebrew are always doing battle for the possession of the mind of man. Perhaps the deepest tension among all the disturbances which have strained the muscles of the minds of men is this fundamental battle between the Greek and the Hebrew view of life.

It was Jesus himself who spoke the heroic and recon-

ciling word in respect of this tension. And here, as so often, he was more interested in the reconciliation as a matter of vital experience than as a matter of formal dialectic. His own clear mind with its gift of coolness amid the hectic thoughts of men could not fail to appropriate the central insight of the Greeks. "Ye are the light of the world," he said to his disciples. Here he was speaking Greek pure and undefiled. The light which calls forth latent possibilities, the light which illuminates and shows everything clearly in its true nature, is to come with all its gracious ministry to men. There is an unseen harmony which light will call forth. The way of Jesus was to fulfill the Greek hopes which by this time had become dim and wistful in as far as they were noble hopes. He himself was to be the light of the world.

But he was also profoundly aware of that dark and tragic moral clevage which rent its way across the life of man. He was aware of hard and bitter elements in man's experience which Greek eyes had not quite dared frankly to face. There were strange depths of moral passion back of the cool surface of his understanding. He was too honest to refuse to face the decay of the roots of goodness in the lives of men. "Ye are the salt of the earth," he said to his disciples. Here he was speaking pure Hebrew. He saw in the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah a picture of his own supreme achievement. He put a cross in his heart even while the sunlight was shining in his eyes. He used strange, abrupt, and baffling phrases to tell the tale of his own spiritual grapple with the corrosive poison at the heart of human life. He saw himself

as a Prince of Rescue even as he was a Prince of Light. But the very point of it all is that he was both Greek and Hebrew. It was not a matter of salt or light. It was a matter of salt and light. If the Greek and Latin theologies entered upon divergent paths, they surrendered what had been united in the life of their master. He was perfectly Hebrew in order that he might become perfectly Greek. He dealt with the malignant diseases, but bloom and fragrance were always glorious in his expectation even in the hour of grim suffering. "For the joy that was set before he endured." The Prince of Rescue was indeed the Prince of Light.

II

In the later days of the Roman Empire a new tension came into being which was profoundly concerned with the Christian religion itself. The new religion had become so powerful that it was not possible for the sword of persecution to kill Christians as fast as new Christians were made. It became evident at last that Christianity was the most potent force in the Empire. Constantine, part pagan, part shrewd politician, part dimly reverent spirit in the presence of unseen realities, decided to utilize the mighty forces held by the new religion for the purposes of the state. The Roman eagle itself surrendered to the cross, not, however, without danger to the cross upon which the Roman eagle was now to perch. Christianity was to be a religion of action dominating and giving unity to the life of the world. But within the church another and very different movement was going

on. Athanasius in his *Life of Anthony* and in his personal interpretation had introduced monasticism to the West. And monasticism was an escape from the world in lonely and fruitful spiritual meditation. "Good-by, Proud World; I'm Going Home." Egypt was dotted with its homes of spiritual quiet to which men fled from the evils of life. The life of lonely and brooding thought in the presence of the great God of the inner life became the dream and aspiration of multitudes of the best spirits among men. Not only in Africa, but all about the West, monasteries sprang up.

Here there was a new tension in the church itself. On the one hand, Christianity was seen as a force in action mastering the world. On the other hand, it was seen as a proud spirituality in retreat from a world condemned to sterility and death. It was Augustine who spoke the heroic and reconciling word in respect of this tension. On the one hand he was a great churchman. The stately and lordly leadership of Ambrose in Milan had had much to do with his capitulation to the Christian religion. When Rome shuddered and was about to fall he saw the City of God—*De Civitati Dei*—permanent and potent over against the fragile and falling city of man. If the Christian church was ready to take the scepter from palsied Roman hands, to tame the Barbarians, and to create modern Europe, it was that high view of the church above all human lordliness which captured men's imagination and made this achievement possible. On the other hand, Augustine knew the strange vicissitudes of the inner life. He had spent years with the Manichæans who

felt with unbelievably dramatic consciousness the contrast between good and evil. The battle had waged fiercely in his own soul. The Augustine of the *Confession* understood every spiritual experience which made monasticism possible. So the great churchman was also the prophet of the inner life and understood the experiences of the lonely soul when it escaped from evil into the presence of the friendly and forgiving God. The tree branches apart in centuries after Augustine, but he is the trunk with divergent tendencies, one in a great unity of life and purpose.

III

By the eleventh century another tension was making itself felt. The Roman Empire had gone the way of empires—even the greatest—and chaos had spread about the earth. The old Roman roads fell into decay and there was lawlessness everywhere. The recovery of civilization seemed to be the matter of most urgent importance. Little groups of weak men gathered around strong men, giving loyalty in return for protection and leadership, and so feudalism was born. Leaders gave loyalty to stronger and mightier leaders and so feudalism became a far-flung power in the world. The recovery of civilization was well on the way.

But there was a higher and indeed an eternal loyalty which insisted upon making itself heard. The passionate and ferocious feudal leaders had their own lawlessness, even though they were journeying in the direction of the reign of law. And the high and commanding sanctions

of religion often fell athwart their selfish plans. Why should God be allowed to stand in the way of a feudal lord. "Because," said Anselm, in effect, "God is the greatest feudal lord of all—the greatest of overlords" and in *Cur Deus Homo* he used the very sanctions of feudalism to establish the verities of religion. So he spoke the strong and unifying word. So he made religion authentic and potent in the days of feudal authority.

IV

By the sixteenth century two other principles had come to clenched antagonism. On the one hand, there was the conception of life as a surrender to high authority. On the other, there was the conception of life as a personal spiritual adventure. The clash was seen in a way in the twelfth century, in Abelard's *Sic et Non*. A preliminary reconciliation seemed to be achieved in the *Summa* of St. Thomas in the thirteenth century, but the tension continued, and by the sixteenth the stage was set for a world-wide battle. The conception of an institution more real than any of the individuals who gave their loyalty to it had the distinguished support of the realistic philosophy of the Middle Ages, which traced its ancestry to Plato himself. The sense of the individual as an entity with a life of his own came to vigorous expression in Nominalism and this conception, too, traveled into the Middle Ages from a remote part. So religion as authority and religion as personal adventure entered the lists for deadly combat. Oddly enough, when we remember how he

seemed to be the leader of one group, Luther himself uttered a reconciling as well as an heroic word in this time of tension. In the living God and his word of grace the reign of authority was to continue. In the vast adventure of the individual spirit accepting the divine grace each man was to find manifold ways of liberty. So freedom and authority met in a kind of beautiful wedlock.

v

The seventeenth century revealed a tension having its own far reaching significance. The court of Louis XIV was the most distinguished expression of social grace and dignity the modern world had seen. All Europe felt the allurement of the new social grandeur. Life became a gesture of noble grace in France and every court in Europe tried to attain the authentic movement of lofty dignity bending into curves of lovely charm. It was an age of splendid and glittering externals. And over against this there was the sense of life as a matter of moral and spiritual power. Within the lovely shell the voice of the infinite sea insisted on sounding. An age of politeness instinctively shrank from that august reality which had a way of revealing the tinsel in what had been supposed to be gold. In France, such distinguished preachers as Bossuet essayed to speak the unhesitating and unifying word. They embodied the very powers of social grace and distinction upon which the age prided itself. But the ancient moral and spiritual grandeur of the Christian religion spoke in their voices. "Thou art the

man" cried a distinguished court preacher pointing an accusing finger at the Grand Monarch. "The preacher has done his duty. It remains for us to do ours," said Louis, quietly, while the court listened breathless. To give a body of grace to ancient austerities and to give a soul of moral grandeur to lovely social amenities was the lofty endeavor of the great court preachers of Louis XIV.

VI

In eighteenth-century England the tension came upon a new quality of stress and strain. The world-wide empire was being won and an expansive individual prosperity was giving color to the life of the nation. Secular enterprise sat on the throne of men's minds. Great navies moved over the Seven Seas. Great battles were fought far in the East and far in the West. The merchant princes moved toward places of power. Deep religious feeling became a thing from which men shrank. The manifestation of enthusiasm was thought to prove that a man was not a gentleman. God ceased to be a dominant motive in men's thoughts and their actions. The age of triumphant and capable secularity had arrived. Yet over against this there were the stirrings of a deep spiritual longing and the masses swept into the glow of a tremendous religious experience. That quality which the builders of the eighteenth century had rejected claimed to be the very head of the corner. Preachers like Whitefield turned words into swords to smite the consciences of men. The very age of triumphant secularity became the

age of great storms of spiritual passion which swept over the life of the nation. And it was one of the leaders of the Evangelistic movement who spoke the harmonizing word. The sound practical mysticism of Wesley joined the shrewd sagacity of the secular temper of the age to a deep and throbbing experience of the things of the spirit. The age which produced political empire-builders had produced an empire-builder of the spirit. So Wesley takes his place among the massive men of the British tradition and the spiritual rulers of the race.

VII

The years of empire-building produced a temper which was capable of an entirely material expression. There was a grim possibility that the empire which Englishmen were building might be a gigantic body without a soul. Some of the empire-builders had small enough interest in the things of the spirit. But the deeper elements which had entered into English life were moving in quiet and fruitful fashion beneath the brilliant surface of the achievements of the age. Wyclif and the Lollards had not lived in vain. Puritanism had not lifted its white banner only to draw it down in defeat. The eighteenth-century revival had not spent its force. All these influences and many another drew together to oppose the hard materialism which might have made an empire without a soul. In the midst of the clash and the alarm of the Napoleonic era when England was girded for one of its most terrible conflicts—the twenty years' struggle with the little Corsican—the heroic and reconciling word was spoken by

those who inaugurated the modern missionary movement. Every step in the building of a political empire was to be paralleled in the building of a great world empire in the realm of the spirit. The Kingdom of God was actually seen as an empire embracing all mankind.

VIII

The nineteenth century saw the coming of Darwin and Spencer and the emerging of the masterful principle of the reign of law. The tension became astonishingly acute. For over against the conception of the reign of law the personal view of life armed to do battle for the conquest of the mind of man. As the contest raged there were often more sound and fury than light and understanding. All the while the brilliant generalization of evolutionary science marched forward supported by an increasing body of facts. And all the while the profound personal experiences of men made a place for themselves in a world whose physical uniformities were seen to be so wide-lying and potent. The heroic and reconciling word managed to get itself uttered in the conception of an ultimate person as the source of the order of the universe. And the laws of nature were conceived of as the habits of God.

Of course there have been many more tensions during the passing of the belligerent years than those to which we have referred. But at least it has become evident that life is very largely an experience of successive tensions and their resolution into an inclusive harmony.

IX

It is not, however, entirely a matter of the past. Contemporary life and thought confront us with a strange and baffling series of tensions.

The study of the biological process has made us familiar with very lowly origins and very long processes of development. The delight in following the tenuous trails of investigation which lead to an understanding of the long biological process has given a deep satisfaction to many minds. Such study and such knowledge have almost claimed to be ends in themselves. On the other hand, there are the great sanctions of the Kingdom of God, sharp and clear and spiritual, standing forth with august claims in their own right. In certain minds the tension between the two views becomes extreme. In this regard the harmonizing word must reveal the biological process as itself on the road to the great moral sanctions of the Kingdom of God. The long journey has its end in the triumph of these very sanctions. As Professor Simpson has put it, "Jesus Christ is the goal of the evolutionary process."

Another tension in contemporary thought has to do with the interpretation of life as behavior and the interpretation of life as intention. No end of brushwood of the mind seems to be cast aside if we refuse to be beguiled by dark metaphysical mysteries and set about observing behavior as we find it, classifying the types of action and so coming to a clear picture of experience as it lies all about us. On the other hand, the view of life

as intention determining the direction which we give to the will refuses to be put out of court. The sense of life as intention is so fundamental that even the most brilliant catalogue of types of behavior seems oddly empty without it. So the tension becomes acute and we wait for the unifying word which finds behavior in the last analysis an expression of intention, and in intention the instrument by means of which we may give direction to behavior.

A somewhat similar tension grows out of the thought of life as an experience in the conservation of values, and that of life as an experience involving the action of creative personality. Here again the approach to life through values temporarily simplifies our problem very much. We do not ask baffling questions. We seize upon values as they emerge, accept them for their own worth, and view life quite happily as an experience in the conservation of values. On the other hand, the sense of creative personal powers insists on securing a hearing. Just when we have made our neat classification of values the powerful person arrives and upsets all our carefully built structure. The tension becomes intense enough. We wait for the reconciling word which sees that values emerge only in personal relations and declares that personality finds its ultimate fulfillment in the expression of values.

Then there is the grim tension between those who find the meaning of life in a study of the subconscious and those who find the secret of life in conscious decision. The subconscious is a treasure house full of priceless possessions. It is also a deadly den full of wild and poison-

ous things. And emerging from the subconscious are influences which have the most far-reaching effect upon our lives. On the other hand, men of destiny have a way of being men of will. Triumphant volition has a history which is the best story in the life of the race. So the two interpretations of life join in battle array. The unifying word must declare that there is a cold and grim will upon which the subconscious often has deadly revenge. There is also a joyous and creative will which rules the subconscious with its own unhesitating power. If we fight our way through to joy in a good decision the subconscious ceases to be a menacing foe and becomes a friendly slave.

In our time there has come to men a new vision of the great society. Social wrong has fallen with a vast shock upon the minds of men, and that social order in which ancient wrongs will be righted has commanded the enthusiastic allegiance of multitudes of noble men and women. In the thought of many of them the individual has been almost lost in the dream of the great society. On the other hand, the appreciation of the strong and creative individual has insisted upon its own place in the thought of powerful men. The perception that the great and commanding and creative individual is the finest flower of civilization has made itself felt with vigorous insistence. So the age of Socialism has been the age when Nietzsche has won a wide hearing and the tension between the two has become menacing. The understanding and unifying word must declare the day of the powerful and creative individual using his high

endowments for social ends and the great society flowering perpetually into lives of individual distinction as well as producing a lifted level of common good.

There is a type of spirituality in every age—our own included—which comes at last to be a denial of life. Its fear of evil becomes a fear of vital experience, and its loftiness comes at last to be a withdrawal from the full experience of life. On the other hand, in our own time there is a passionate assertion of the desire to taste life fully, to follow the body as well as the spirit—especially the body—to the very limit of every intense and passionate experience. The tension here may seem to be final and capable of no resolution into a higher harmony. Yet here, too, there is a heroic and reconciling word. The perception that the body is the instrument of personality, that the material is the vehicle of the spiritual, may lead to a sacramental view of life where it is seen that the body helps the soul even as the soul must dominate the body. Things are not to be in the saddle and ride mankind. Things are to wear the proud livery of the spiritual Kingdom.

The development of one aspect of contemporary psychology and philosophy leads to the emergence of another tension. That universe of values of which we have already spoken is easily taken as a final goal. Over against it the call for personal fellowship rings clear and imperative. On the one hand, there is a world of values without fellowship. On the other, it is possible, temporarily at least, to have a world of fellowship without values. The harmonizing word with respect to this

tension speaks in the name of fellowship with a conscious and loving father in which the very meaning of the fellowship comes to light in the values which emerge as we become conscious of the quality of the character of that loving Father who is the Lord of all.

It is easy to see that each of these contemporary tensions moves about great matters which are central for religion and fundamental for Christianity. Perhaps the hints we have already thrown out at least suggest that, in this complex situation in which Christianity deals with contemporary intelligence, it will be able to speak the understanding and unifying word.

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II

Religion as a Heritage and an Adventure

By Albert W. Palmer

HE WHO would understand religion must remember that it is both heritage and adventure. To recognize that it must ever be an adventure is to be delivered from a mere antiquarian interest in its past; but, on the other hand, to understand something of the past may save the adventure of the future from wasting energy adown blind alleys already abundantly and fruitlessly explored. In other words, the docket of religion must necessarily include a "reading of the minutes of the last meeting." But it must not stop there! By yet more imperative necessity it must pass on to "new business."

That religion is a heritage is graphically demonstrated by its clinging to ancient architectural forms and elsewhere superseded language, dress, and symbols. We inherit not only the religion of the New Testament, but all that the passing centuries have contributed to its enrichment. We inherit it plus mediæval thought and art and aspiration. We inherit it plus St. Francis and Giotto and Dante and Fra Angelico. The Gothic architecture has greatly influenced our religious life and emotions in spite of the fact that Jesus never saw a cathedral. The

"Te Deum" and the "Stabat Mater" are a part of our heritage, along with the "Sistine Madonna," even though they are not found in the New Testament.

Moreover, to us in the Protestant tradition, religion has been still further enriched (and, alas! also impoverished at certain points) by the Reformation. Luther and Calvin, *Pilgrim's Progress* and the English Prayer Book, the Pilgrim Fathers and the Westminster Confession, are in our heritage. Also the Wesleyan awakening and the modern missionary movement with Carey and Judson, Morrison and Livingstone, John R. Mott and E. Stanley Jones.

But religion didn't begin with the New Testament. Back of that lie Hebrew religion and Semitic tribal institutions, and so on back to primitive man kneeling on some high place and offering a sacrifice beneath some sacred tree.

With a little group of students I walked one day through Chartres Cathedral, beneath the lofty arches and below the glorious windows, the atmosphere laden with incense and echoes of sonorous chanting. As we came out into the cool gray day once more, one of these young people said to me, "That almost makes me wish I were a Catholic!" To which I could only reply: "And so you are! It all belongs to us—every bit of it we can appreciate is ours. The people who think they are in control of this cathedral just now might not recognize it, but it is all ours, nevertheless! When you joined the church at home you did not join a local church alone, but also the holy universal church."

Not only does it all belong to us, but a knowledge of this religious past of ours is immensely valuable in a proper understanding of our own day. If you know, for example, something of the symbols of the Christian centuries—the altar, the cross, the candle-lights, the ritual, the vestments—you will have at least a richer insight into the human needs and yearnings to which all these have ministered. Emotional demands and instinctive cravings are fairly constant. Drive pageantry out of the church and it comes back in the lodge-room! Strip your minister of robe or stole and he emerges in a Prince Albert coat and a white tie! To know the past and to be free to utilize its experience in meeting present needs saves much extemporizing and lost motion.

But the past is not only a property-room from which we can equip ourselves to play our part. It is something vastly more precious than that. It is a treasury which we hold in trust for better men who shall come after us. If we transmit it to them undimmed, they may see things in it and do things with it far beyond our present powers of comprehension. We must not impoverish future generations by cutting off the past.

When we come to evaluate this heritage we find some of it is inexpressibly precious. Just as in sculpture some things have been done forever—no one expects to excel the sculptures of the Parthenon—just as in Gothic architecture the great thirteenth-century cathedrals stand peerless and unsurpassed, just as the binomial theorem is a permanent achievement of mankind, so in this religious heritage of ours there are some things which approximate

finality. They are the permanent spiritual treasures of the race. The Ten Commandments may be expanded but are not likely to be superseded. The twenty-third Psalm, the noble statement of religion in Micah, "What doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly, to love kindness, and to walk humbly with thy God," the sixth chapter of Isaiah, the thirteenth of First Corinthians and the twelfth of Romans, and many others which each devout soul will bring forth out of his spiritual treasure, represent a permanent high standard of religious verity. Preëminently is this true of Jesus. We may need to adapt his gospel to a world of corporations and democracies, battleships and giant cities, but we are not going to retire the Beatitudes or cease to pause in humility and shame before the high clear call of the Sermon on the Mount.

Nor did this high religious achievement stop with the New Testament. The noble heritage of Christian music, the wealth of ritual enrichment, the order and organization of Christian churches, the ideals of religious freedom, the symbolism of Christian architecture, poetry, and philosophic thought—yes, and some things in the architecture, poetry, and thought of non-Christian religions, too—all these are part of an inexpressibly precious religious heritage.

But we must also face this sobering and bitter fact: that another part of our heritage is to be frankly and definitely rejected. Religion has come down to us mixed with magic, superstition, bad science, and worse theology, and this part is to be discarded. Old Trader Horn is credited with saying: "The first thing education teaches you

is to walk alone. Aye, you can sure stand on your own spear when you've learned the word 'Good-by' and say it clear!"

We need to say good-by to certain parts of our religious heritage because of the inevitable and rather wholesome agnosticism of our modern world. Very frankly, we do not know certain things about heaven, hell, and purgatory, for example, which traditional theology has assumed it knew. If we are capable of learning any restraint and intellectual conservatism from the scientific method, we will hesitate to rush into speech or print with assertions for which no adequate or convincing evidence exists. Let us not ascribe to God motives and purposes we cannot possibly know. Let us frankly admit the large areas of our ignorance about the authorship and literary processes of the Bible and the elements of unsolved mystery about the life of Jesus. A religion which is modest in its assertions and emphases, characterized by an open mind rather than an omniscient dogmatism, will best win and influence a scientific age.

It must be perfectly obvious that one thing to be discarded in toto is the crude cosmology and unscientific notions of biblical days. Modern geology, astronomy, biology, and physics have completely superseded ancient and mediæval science whether in the Bible or out of it. The poor soul who suggested to me recently, "But couldn't the world originally have been made flat, as the Bible says, and then changed into a sphere?" well illustrates the depths to which we plunge when we try to harmonize biblical cosmology and modern science.

Again, our changed conception of the Deity from that of a spectator God sitting outside and only occasionally breaking into the world by a supernatural event called a miracle, to that of a resident indwelling Soul of the universe ever immanent in his creation, completely changes the whole idea of the miraculous. If you fail to sense God's presence and power in the blossoming of a rose or the evolution of a bird, then no little transitory miracle rather dubiously recorded in the dim and distant past can greatly matter. While we may not dismiss the miracles, because we may find reasons for understanding them and explaining them, we do discard them as first-line credentials of religion.

The awakening social conscience of our day also makes much ancient good uncouth. We are perfectly clear about the evils of polygamy and child sacrifice, on which the Old Testament wavered as the stories of Jephthah's daughter and the sacrifice of Isaac plainly show. Industrial exploitation, alcoholism, and war stand even now before the judgment seat. Religion can have no compromise with these things, however deeply imbedded in the Bible or in hymnology and ritual. An age which has glimpsed the ideal that punishment is justifiable only to reform the evil-doer and protect society cannot worship a God who tortures people endlessly and hopelessly in hell, accomplishing no good result by an eternity of suffering.

But if some of our religious heritage is frankly to be rejected, more of it needs a subtler and more constructive treatment—it needs to be reinterpreted. This transition age needs to learn that all great ideas, indeed all words,

are at bottom only symbols which constantly need interpretation and revaluation. Take the word "person," for example. To us it means a distinct individual soul, as complete an entity as a human being can be. But anciently it meant a part which one assumed in a play. The actor's mask was his "per-sona," literally the thing which he "sounded through." The doctrine of the Trinity receives new light and meaning when "God in three persons" is seen no longer to mean three separate gods, three separate individuals, but rather a God in three characters, revealing himself in threefold ways. That the doctrine of the Trinity may have great value in emphasizing the superhuman depth and richness of the divine personality, we all can see. But not at the expense of unity. A great personality must be a unified personality. God is not a committee!

So, great words like "salvation," "heaven," "hell," "atonement," "inspiration," "divinity," are best understood as symbols, not stiff and narrow little pint cups of definition. What they mean, if they are to mean anything useful or dynamic, each age must interpret for itself anew. Everybody makes such interpretations, whether consciously or not. Every great revelation comes in the name of the past as well as of the future. Luther felt he came to restore the Pauline doctrine, and Jesus said he came not to destroy but to fulfill. But the fulfillment is always by a nobler and enlarging interpretation.

Let us now turn to religion as adventure. An adventurous element has, indeed, already been anticipated in

the necessity for a free attitude in appraisal of the past. How adventurous such an appraisal may become he will soon learn who tries it! But is religion only to read and discuss the minutes of the last meeting? Historically, Christianity, at least, has a strain of yet bolder pioneering in its blood. Jesus must have seemed to the scribes and pharisees a most perilous adventurer when he said, in spite of all his reassuring words about coming only to fulfill the past, "Ye have heard that it was said to them of old time . . . but I say unto you. . . ." In like manner, Paul with his middle wall of partition broken down, the Pilgrims with their free worship, John Wesley with his outdoor preaching, and General Booth with his big bass drum, have carried on the great adventure of a growing religion which refused to remain in the set forms of the *status quo*.

Old Testament scholars tell us that our version of the Ten Commandments is the product of a long evolution. When men first began counting off laws upon their fingers the laws had to do with ritual acts more than with moral ideals. In such an earlier primitive version of the Ten Commandments, to be found in Exodus 34:14-26, for example, the emphasis is on feasts and sacrifices and comes to what is, for us, a curious anti-climax in the Tenth Commandment: "Thou shalt not boil a kid in its mother's milk!" Only later did the Ten Commandments come to a dominantly ethical emphasis.

But if our Ten Commandments of Exodus 20:1-20, with their high standard of personal conduct, are a product

of evolution, has that evolutionary process stopped? Not so! Do we not find in the quickened conscience of our own day a new social ten commandments growing up to supplement, not to supersede, the individual code of the past? Put into vivid concrete form are not these new social commandments something like this:

I

I am the Lord thy God, but thou shalt remember that I am also the God of all the earth. I have no favorite children. The Negro and the Hindu, the Chinese, Japanese, Russian, and Mexican, are all my beloved children.

II

Thou shalt not measure a city's greatness by its population or its bank clearings alone, but also by its low infant mortality, its homes, playgrounds, libraries, schools, and hospitals, and its low record for bootlegging, prostitution, robbery, and murder.

III

Thou shalt remember that no civilization can rise above the level of its respect for, and ideals of, womanhood.

IV

Thou shalt remember thine own sins and therefore build no prisons for revenge and punishment, but make thy courts clinics of the soul and thy jails hospitals for moral diseases.

V

Thou shalt remember that the end-product of industry is not goods or dividends, but the kind of men and women whose lives are molded by that industry.

VI

Thou shalt press on from political democracy toward industrial democracy, remembering that no man is good enough or wise enough to govern another man without his consent, and that, in addition to a living wage, every man craves a reasonable share in determining the conditions under which he labors.

VII

Thou shalt outlaw war and make no threatening gestures either with great navies or vast military preparations against thy neighbor.

VIII

Thou shalt honor men for character and service alone, and dishonor none nor handicap them because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

IX

Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor by malicious propaganda or colored news or by calling him contemptuous names such as Dago, Chink, Jap, Wop, Nigger, or Sheeney.

X

Thou shalt remember that when thine own ancestors were savages and barbarians, other men brought to them the saving and civilizing Christian gospel. Now that thou art rich and prosperous, beware lest thou export to Asia and Africa only thy science and efficiency, thy warships, goods, and moving-picture films, and forget to export the Christian message and the Christ-like spirit also.

The adventure of social Christianity, even as outlined in such a fragmentary decalogue, is no holiday excursion, as Washington Gladden and Walter Rauschenbusch, Bishop McConnell, and Sherwood Eddy could readily bear witness. The church is not going to move forward to this advanced ground without great pioneer souls to lead the way.

But is there not room for adventure in religion, not only in the organization of society at large, but in the organization of the church itself? What about Christian unity? How shall protestant Christianity, at least, recover from its tendency to scatteration and achieve an effective brotherhood?

Clearly, union is not to come through surrender to any one body claiming a divinely given monopoly of all valid spiritual service to humanity. In this day of the free spirit only men under the spell of mediævalism will care to argue for the supernatural authority of any special ecclesiastical tradition. To us of the modern spirit all forms of organization are permissible, so far as they are

wise and good, and the only true successors to the Apostles are new apostles preaching truth in the language of their own day. Not by any claims of legal inheritance or tactual succession can Christian unity be brought to pass.

Still, the rivalry of competing churches, many of them only slightly different, if at all, in message, ritual, or government, is a scandal of inefficiency and a reproach to the spirit of brotherhood.

What then? One answer is: Let those unite who can and will unite. Let the different kinds of Methodists and Presbyterians get together. In Canada they have demonstrated that this process can go further and Presbyterians, Methodists, and Congregationalists have come together in one United Church. On the foreign field, notably in China and South India, such unions have proved possible.

But there are limits to this. In Canada some more rigid and scrupulous Presbyterians could not be persuaded to go into the new union—they remain as the "continuing" Presbyterian Church of Canada. Many a Congregationalist, having become such by glad escape from creedal requirements and ecclesiastical hierarchies in other denominations, would hesitate to surrender his freedom from creed subscription and the autonomy of the local church even for so great an apparent gain as a united Protestant Church. And if such surrender were made by one generation, would not the urge for spiritual independence produce a new crop of free and self-governing churches in the next?

Possibly, after all have united who happily can unite (and stay united), another principle must come into play —the principle of a unity of spirit without necessarily identical organization. Such a unity finds expression in federation whereby denominations coöperate and avoid friction and competition without any surrender of those points of spiritual freedom on which they feel they must bear witness to the world.

In any case, if there is ultimately to be a closer union, may not federation be the vestibule where different communions may come to understand and trust each other, gain practice in coöperation, and possibly learn from one another special gifts and graces which they hold in trust for our total Christianity? Is not this the basic test of the spirit of Christian unity in any denomination, that, at the very least, as an earnest of its sincerity and its spirit of mutual aid, it joins heartily in such federations, local, state, and national, as leave it free within while giving it an effective coöperative life without?

Until the denominations are willing to create really effective, serious, hard-working federations to handle common problems like religious surveys and the location of new churches, evangelism, religious education, civic righteousness, world peace, and inter-racial good will, how can they possibly hope to unite? When they have attained sufficient Christian grace and conscience to federate in face of these great tasks, possibly new light will break upon the problems of organic union.

But, after all, may it not be that religion's greatest adventure today is in the back-country of thought even

more than on the frontier of social conduct? We face a world which thinks different thoughts and thinks them in different ways than the world has ever thought before. The old religious formulæ partly because they are cast in the vocabulary and thought forms of an outgrown science and a superseded psychology, speak with little meaning and no authority to modern men. One might as well try to send the *Leviathan* across the Atlantic with the engines that propelled the *Clermont* up to Albany as to move the man who really knows our modern world of thought by appealing to the doctrines of the Christian church, at least in their traditional form of statement. If you know astronomy and biology, if genetics, psychiatry, and behaviorism are part of your mental world, if rationalization, mob psychology, and economic determinism have come to your attention, then you are practically certain to be bored to tears by disquisitions on the ten lost tribes or the second advent or the fate of non-elect infants or the position of eucharistic candles on the altar. Modern thought has simply moved out into another continent of ideas and mental interests, that's all. And the question is: Can religion survive on the high plateaus of this new mental continent? Has it any vital message and unquestionable place there? Or is it to be left behind as a mere survival among such belated stragglers as do not yet live in the twentieth century—except physically?

The greatest adventure of religion, therefore, today would seem to be, first of all, the discovery and revelation of God as a contemporary. No antiquarian God of the long ago will meet this age's needs. Either we must find

a God who can be worshiped in a laboratory, who is adequate for a universe millions of light years in diameter, who is no mere finite God, struggling against chaos and fate in the presence of some inscrutable Veiled Being in the background, but who includes the Veiled Being also, who is supra-personal rather than sub-personal, who comes to men with a commanding moral power to evoke their reverence and adoration, who gathers to himself the Ultimate Mystery beyond all knowledge—either we must come to some great present God, or the little Jehovah of our tribal inheritance, noble as was the picture of him on many a Bible page, will fade out of all practical influence on modern life even as Zeus has faded out or Thor or Unkulunkulu!

I do not think our age will fail in this adventure. The universe is too filled with reason and pervaded by intelligence not to have a supreme Mind working through it. The starry heavens above and moral law within are no less wonderful to us than they were to Kant. A universe which has produced personality with its hopes and dreams and creative purposes cannot be drifting aimlessly down an eternal chaos. Surely we must say of our flickering little tapers of personality—

> "They are but broken lights of Thee,
> And Thou, O Lord, are more than they!"

Out of a new appreciation of God as a contemporary reality, must not religion inevitably go forth to a new adventure in mysticism? For, after all, prayer is pure mysticism. If we no longer pray that the sound of our

voices may be heard by an anthropomorphic Zeus upon Olympus or caught by Sandalphon, the angel of prayer on the battlements of heaven, why pray at all? Does not prayer rest upon a stupendous assumption—namely, that we are a part of a spiritual ocean of which God is the great deep? Or, to use a more modern analogy, that our personalities are part of a great radio system of which God is the great central station instantly sensitive to our agitations, constantly broadcasting power, guidance, comfort, peace to all who will learn to put themselves in tune with him? Prayer then becomes no attitude of body or ritual word, but an activity of spiritual yearning and desire. Is a purely subjective interpretation of prayer adequate? May not prayer open the way for spiritual contacts and reinforcements from without? Is man's spiritual life an orphan, a sporadic lonesome thing in the universe, a blind alley of emotion, or does it correspond to a greater reality at the heart of things? Mysticism maintains that it does, and if religion is to be a potent living force, must it not venture in this direction? At the last only a religion of contemporary reality and reproducible experience can command the loyalty of men.

Another great spiritual adventure before this age has to do with immortality. We are in sad danger of losing out of modern life all sense of personal survival. Spiritualism after its brief flare-up following the war seems to be an extinguished rocket. With materialism in the saddle, at least in popular thought, only materialistic evidence appeals to the characteristic temper of our age, and

this materialistic evidence the mediums have not satisfactorily produced. We read about "ectoplasm," but up to date none of it has reached any reliable scientific laboratory.

What then? Shall we say, with Matthew Arnold,

> "Long fed on boundless hopes, O race of man
> How angrily thou spurn'st all simpler fare!
> Hath man no second life? Pitch this one high!"

To do so were noble and stoical and better than whining or surrender to Circe and her swine, but it is not all the human heart desires. Can we put a faith in personal survival somewhere above the mere category of wishful thinking? Can we justify it before the higher court of a reasonable interpretation of the nature of the universe? Can we find it demanded by the nature of the human personality? Are there arguments for it in the moral necessities of a universe where justice is to be taken seriously and goodness ultimately vindicated? Out of the mass of fraud and the confused voices of psychic phenomena is there at least a residuum which survives and points to a survival of the soul beyond the death of the body? Surely here is the highest of all adventures. And we must hasten about it. Tennyson said of the man of his day

> "He thinks he was not made to die."

But may not that sense of deathlessness be lost? Is it not already fading? Who shall touch this age again with

immortality and rebuild it in the music and the dream of a day beyond tomorrow? "Thou hast set eternity in our heart"—ah, but it may take a high spiritual adventure to keep it there!

One more adventure and we have indicated enough to challenge the boldest pioneer! Where shall authority be located? If the Pope is only a ghost of the Roman emperor and the Bible only a record of other men's quest for spiritual reality, if the best we know is to be overshadowed by the vague faint-praise of "relativity," if conscience is but the whisper of repressed desires, where shall a plain man turn for a voice which shall speak to him with authority, "This is the path, walk ye in it"? Anarchy is but a brief interlude between two authorities. And we are perilously near moral and spiritual anarchy today. Either we must find and make clear to men some authority which is reasonable and true or they will in their desperation bow down to false gods again. It has been a great achievement to free man from Giant Pope, and Giant Biblical Infallibility but these may only be superseded by Giant Nationalism or Giant Self-indulgence unless the spiritual leadership of our day can make clear the sources of underlying moral sanctions in the scientific interpretation of the universe and in the experience of man himself. A religion which ceases to say "thus saith the Lord," and mean it, will be given scant hearing by the people. It should be noticed of Jesus that "he spoke as one having authority and not as the scribes." A recovery of an authoritative note based on something deeper than tradition, the call to moral and

religious standards and ideals buttressed by the observable facts of the universe and proclaimed with passion and conviction is surely one of the great adventurous tasks before the religious teacher of our age.

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III

Wheels and Systems

A PLEA FOR ANOTHER THEOLOGY

By Richard Roberts

I

ONE can hardly rise from the reading of Whitehead and Eddington without wondering why we allowed ourselves to be browbeaten so sadly by "science" all these years. By *we,* I mean we preachers and teachers of religion. Materialism is as dead as Queen Anne. The discovery of a "principle of indeterminacy" in the physical world knocks the bottom out of all determinisms and behaviorisms whatsoever. And now that science has, in honorable obedience to its own first principles, reached the point at which it is readily admitting that it is not "the only pebble on the beach," the admission is so obvious that it seems positively absurd that we should have been so incontinently scared into an apologetic posture. We have spent unconscionable energy in defending religion, in making it look intellectually respectable; and now it seems that we were only beating the air. The enemy was not there. We might have saved our breath; or perhaps, rather, we should have been well advised had

we spent it in affirming and asserting religion, in telling the "good news" to all comers without a hint that anybody doubted or denied its truth and value. If we could only have foreseen!

Two things seem to have happened. The first is that it has become clear that the concern of physical science is with the measurable and the ponderable. It has built up its edifice by a technique of "pointer-readings." It has in this way gained immense knowledge of the *structure* of the universe. But of the content of the universe it finds itself unable to speak. It can tell us all about the frame; but it cannot see the picture. It can give us the specifications of the frame in elaborate mathematical formulæ; but it is admitting that the insights that are needed to see the picture are different from those by which it has gained its information about the frame.

The second thing is this: When we were first introduced to the mysteries of science, we were taught that the fundamental things in the universe were Time, Space, and Mass. Our teachers were quite sure that these three terms described absolute rock bottom. But we know now that these are in reality only derivatives; and the modern physicist has left them behind. Just what the status of Time, Space, and Mass is at the present time, it would require too long and elaborate a discussion to explain; and the information is easily available to the intelligent reader. But they hardly figure in the scheme of definitions by which physical science is doing business today. The modern physicist begins with "point-events"; from point-events he deduces "intervals"; and from intervals

he at length deduces "potentials." Eddington gives a humorous account of the process. "The definitions of physics proceed according to the method immortalized in 'The House That Jack Built.' This is the potential that was derived from the interval, that was measured by the scale that was made of the matter, that embodied the stress, that. . . But instead of finishing with Jack, whom, of course, every youngster must know without need of an introduction, we make a circuit back to the beginning of the rhyme '. . . that worried the cat, that killed the rat, that ate the malt, that lay in the house, that was built by the priest all shaven and shorn, that married the man . . .' now we can go round and round forever." It is not necessary for us just now to grasp all this, but to observe that Eddington says "we can go round and round forever." Physical science is operating today with counters of thought which are defined in terms of one another and which therefore make a firmly integrated water-tight system, as it were, a circle. "The three hundred years of building up exact science really amounts to doing what the dictionary compiler did when he defined a violin as a small violoncello and a violoncello as a large violin." Physics does its business with a method of "cyclic definition."

So that science is a system of nature not so much because it finds a system in nature as because it reads a ready-made system into it. This system is indeed in the first instance suggested by perceived phenomena and is abstracted from them. Science imposes its scheme of definitions on the sensible universe and arrives at certain re-

sults; and these results hang together with some consistency partly because the definitions hang together in the first instance, and partly because science has already excluded everything from its field which it has left out of its abstractions. It seems that from the neo-mechanist point of view, biology is the body of knowledge which we acquire about life when we study it merely as an affair of mechanics. We read mechanism into life, and the result is biology. We read mechanism into human conduct, and the result is behaviorist psychology. No doubt, by approaching the phenomena of life and conduct as manifestations of mechanical responses to stimulation, we do acquire a body of true knowledge of *something* that is there; but the knowledge is not knowledge of *everything* that is there. To put the matter in a homely way: Science isn't everything when you are looking at a flower. When the botanist and the biochemist have told me all there is to be known about the flower by their methods, they have left a great deal untold. What is it about a flower that sometimes startles a man into poetry, and now and again starts emotions in all of us for which we cannot find words? Upon what deep psychological truth have the florists stumbled when they bid us "say it with flowers"? The scientist cannot answer these questions any better than you or I. But until these questions are answered, we do not know the whole truth about a flower.

What science can speak of is that aspect of reality which is accessible to its own methods of approach; and the illusory aspect of finality in its findings is due to a certain artificial perfection in its system of definitions. That it

employs this "device of cyclic definition" is not the accusation of its critics, but the admission of its exponents. Yet more than a century ago one of the critics of science did charge it with this very thing. William Blake has lain in an unknown grave in old Bunhill Fields these hundred years; but he had even then detected the cyclic character of the scientific thought of his time.

"For Bacon and Newton, sheathed in dismal steel, their terrors hang,
Like iron scourges over Albion, Reasonings like vast serpents
Enfold around my limbs, bruising my minute articulations.
I turned my eyes to the schools and universities of Europe,
And then beheld the Loom of Locke, whose woof rages dire,
Washed by the water-wheels of Newton: Black the cloth
In heavy wreaths fold over every nation; cruel works
Of many wheels I view, wheel within wheel, with cogs tyrannic
Moving by compulsion each other. . . ."

This passage suggested the title of this essay. How Blake did it is not clear; but by some amazing insight he had discovered the cyclic character of contemporary science and had anticipated what scientists are now themselves confessing. Blake has a good deal that is uncomplimentary to say about "systems"; and it is not to scientific and philosophic systems only that he applies the (to him) contemptuous epithet of "wheel." He speaks of a "wheel of fire" which devoured everything in its wild fiery course; and this turns out to be the "wheel of religion," and specifically of natural religion which Blake identifies with Deism. One wonders at Blake's restraint in using

the singular number here, for every Deist seems to have had his own private "system." But it is evident that the "wheel of fire" is meant to include all religion which had become an affair of settled creeds and stereotyped disciplines. Blake saw that there was a circular movement in all rational systematizations. In his tractate, *There Is No Natural Religion,* he says, "If it were not for the Prophetic or Poetic character, the Philosophic and Experimental would soon be the Ratio of all things—and stand still, unable to do other than repeat the same dull round over again," like a wheel.

In my young and cocksure days I remember saying —with a fine air of having made a great discovery— "If a man must have a theological system, he should keep it open at one end." I did not then understand that you could not have a system under those conditions. If it is open at one end, it is not a system. A system cannot, or ought not, to tolerate any loose ends; and in order to avoid loose ends, it has to keep a blind eye to the things that won't fit in. That, I suspect, was the ground of Blake's objection to "systems." The "system" claimed to be true because it was self-consistent; it fitted in all round; but Blake saw that this consistency was achieved by the simple expedient of ignoring inconvenient details. You cannot have a system without using abstractions; and abstractions are simply generalizations under which we unify our facts. But in any given generalization, you gather up only one aspect or element which is common to all facts in the group; and you have to exclude their differences. And yet every single fact is different from any

and every other fact. You can only "abstract" the element or attribute common to a set of facts if you are to achieve your generalization. When you are looking at a collie, a setter, a Pomeranian, a chow, a poodle, a wolfhound, you may gather them all up into a class—they are all *dogs*. You may describe the quality common to all of them as, say, "dogginess." But this generalization ignores whatever it is that makes a collie a collie and not a poodle. This is what Blake says, in his own queer idiom:

"For Art and Science cannot exist but in minutely organized Particulars,
And not in generalizing Demonstrations of the Rational Power;
The Infinite alone resides in Definite and Determinate Identity."

The reasoning power would build up its conception of reality upon a hierarchy of generalizations from perceived facts; but to Blake's mind, reality was to be discerned, by those who have eyes to see, in every minute particular:

"To see a world in a grain of sand,
And a heaven in a wild flower,
Hold infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour—"

which seems to have a curious likeness to something that Whitehead has been saying, that every volume of space has reference to the whole of space; and every moment of time refers both to the past and to the future. (In-

cidentally, I imagine that Blake would have approved of Whitehead; for Whitehead has spoken of God as "a principle of concretion"; for that means that the world *is* concreted in a grain of sand; and the wild flower somehow holds in itself all being.) The essential defect of all systems is that they inevitably ignore the rich complexity of life and experience.

II

What emerges from all this is that the universe not only may, but must, be apprehended under an indefinite number of systems. Science has abandoned its claim to a monopoly. Science originated in *one* of the human insights into reality, and there are other insights, no less valid. I put it to myself somewhat after this fashion. I live on the North American continent. My interest in it makes me curious to know something about it. As it is a tract of the earth's surface, I will naturally look at it —among other ways—in a map. But I discover that I can have more than one map of it. There are a political map, a series of historical maps, a railway map, a geological map, a contour map, an economic map, maps to illustrate the distribution of flora and fauna, and so forth. And except that they have a common coast line, all these maps are different; and each gives me a different view of this continent.

But here we have a fairly well-explored and mapped continent. It was not always so. In some ancient maps you will find spaces described as "terra incognita," and an old quip comes to my mind even as I write:

"Geographers in Afric maps,
Are at a loss to fill the gaps;
And o'er uninhabitable downs,
Place elephants for want of towns."

Now we can have maps of the universe; but only of the part of it that comes within our experience. Beyond that is "terra incognita"; and sometimes we are in our own way tempted to put in "elephants for want of towns," anything to fill in, so to speak, that we may have a map that looks complete. But it is very disastrous procedure to fill the blanks in our science, our theology, our philosophy, with conjectures however intelligent, merely for the sake of completeness. Baron von Hügel in one of his essays tells how George Tyrrell and he, in their discussions, agreed "that we should guard against too much tidying up, against all shrinking from leaving many a problem open." This principle—of "holding our horses"—is sound policy for all theological and philosophical system-builders. But we can have provisional maps, and indeed we do have them, of that part of reality which has come within our experience. There is the scientific map—the kind of map that Whitehead and others are now so magnificently making; there are also the maps of the philosophers, countless in number, for each philosopher

"says his say,
His scheme of the weal and the woe."

There is also the poetic map. (I saw the other day a charming map of Fairyland; and Mr. Chesterton would say, "Why not?" And so, for my part, would I.) Then

there is a fat atlas of theological maps. In all of these the universe seems a different thing; yet they have all a certain kinship, for they are maps of the same universe contemplated from different angles. But even yet these maps are no more than provisional—the area of our ignorance is still so much greater than the area of our knowledge. Some day—very far off—mankind may have a complete set of final maps of the whole universe; and perhaps a synthetic map which will include all truth. For the moment we have to make the best of a few imperfect maps of a small part of the whole. These maps are imperfect, for actual facts of experience are, as Dr. Whitehead says, "distorted in the scientific analysis." But in their own way the theologian and the artist distort the facts, too. They see them only partially and from their own angle. But I suspect that the theologian will have the last word.

Are we, then, to throw up our hands and say, "This is high; I cannot attain to it"? Can we get no nearer to the truth than this? The answer is that, though the process is slow, we are getting nearer to it all the time.

> "Our little systems have their day;
> They have their day; they cease to be. . . ."

but this is not a full account of the matter. For one system only dies when it has given birth to another, a better and more adequate one. The Ptolemaic system led up to and was superseded by the Copernican. The Newtonian system served its day and has given way before the relativity theory. Dalton's atoms worked well until they took

us past themselves to the electrons. In religion, as St. Paul says, "the law was our schoolmaster to lead us to Christ." And so it goes on. Our systems are stepping-stones to better systems; the light is slowly growing, pushing back the darkness. It is not for us to throw up our hands, but to carry on, to hand on the torch to the ages to come.

III

This leads us to another point, and I go back to Blake once more to illustrate it. In spite of his hostility to systems, he could not do without a system of his own, and he admits it. "I must create a system or be enslaved by another man's." He did, in fact, create a fearful and wonderful system of his own, which no one has ever fully understood except himself, and he went about creating it in the same way as other creators of systems. He laid down a quadrilateral of abstractions, Imagination, Reason, Energy, Desire, which furnished the foundation of a huge and bewildering mythology. And his Urizen, the apotheosis of Reason, and his Los, the apotheosis of Imagination, are for all their personalized form, as abstract as any of the abstractions which Blake himself condemned. If Blake's "system" has not added perceptibly to the sum of human understanding, it is precisely because he was contemptuous of other systems. He, too, had blinkers on. Like all other systems, his could only be built by a process of selection and exclusion.

None the less, he was right in creating a system; and it is our duty to create systems. There is no harm in systems so long as we do not regard them as perfect and

final. That they are from the nature of the case only partial and provisional does not exempt us from creating the best systems that we are capable of. Every honestly conceived system which starts out fairly from actual experience—be it of whatever kind, religious, scientific, metaphysical, or other—is an additional stepping-stone in the wide river that still separates us from the Promised Land of perfect light.

And the reason why we should go on creating systems is simply that without a system we have no means of living a coherent life. "From the moment of birth," says Whitehead, with obvious truth, "we are immersed in action and can only fitfully guide it by taking thought. We have, therefore, in various spheres of experience, to adopt those ideas which seem to work within those spheres. It is absolutely necessary to trust to ideas which are generally adequate, even though we know that there are subtleties and distinctions beyond our ken. Also apart from the necessities of action, we cannot even keep before our minds the whole evidence except under the guise of doctrines which are incompletely harmonized. We cannot think in terms of an indefinite multiplicity of detail; our evidence can acquire its proper importance only if it comes before us marshaled by general ideas." Lecky once wrote a book which he called *The Map of Life;* and a map of life is indispensable if we are to steer a course through life. Otherwise we drift without direction, and life peters out through a maze of small happenings to nothingness. It would be impossible to assess how much the undoubted strength and the great achievement

of the Scottish people are due to their possession in the past of a "map of life" of singular breadth and adequacy. There is no need at any time to apologize for the Westminster Confession—the greatest of all confessional instruments; and the Shorter Catechism which inoculated every Scots child with the strong massive theology of the Confession furnished it with a system of ideas which enabled it to see life as a whole and to live purposefully and effectually. And the same thing is true in its measure of Wales and of New England.

Yet mighty as Calvinism was and is, it plainly did not cover all the facts of experience; and the revolts from it, notably Arminianism, show up its inadequacy. But Calvinism itself sprang out of the inadequacy of a previous system. Baron von Hügel, in his anxiety to save Father Tyrrell from succumbing to a threatening anti-metaphysical drift of thought and taking up a position of anti- this or that, reminds him in a letter of the "anti" character of the systems of the Socins and Calvin. "Both these systems are throughout antitheses, and hence through and through dependent upon the systematic full-blown scholasticism which they oppose step by step." Into the point at issue here I am not now concerned to enter. I am merely trying to show the paradox of inevitability and inadequacy that is involved in any system. It had to be; yet it could not be what its makers meant it and believed it to be.

This inadequacy arises from more than one source. The first is that we are living in a living and therefore changing world—and a growing world, to boot; conse-

quently, experience and knowledge are never static. New facts emerge; old facts reappear in a new light; new events occur; the scene is always changing. This perpetual movement plays havoc with cut-and-dried systems. A system can only preserve itself by developing an infinite adjustability; failing that, the system must break up under the impact of inevitable novelty. There is an ancient story about new wine and old wineskins which is to the point here.

Second: Systems are apt to reflect moods and tempers provoked by momentous events in the external world. The effect upon Greek thought of the varying phases of Greek history is one of the commonplaces in the history of Greek philosophy. With the loss of independence in the Greek states—to take one instance—the former interest in politics and metaphysics, as in Plato and Aristotle, gave way to "a predominant interest in ethics, as if the practical interests of the individual were of paramount and absorbing importance; and all other departments of inquiry, whether logical, metaphysical, or physical, were cultivated only as subsidiary to the one great object of obtaining a theory for the regulation of the individual life." Doubtless other influences beside the political changes in Greece were at work; but the virtually simultaneous appearance of Stoicism and Epicureanism with their practical individualism seems to be accounted for chiefly by the disappearance of the state as a primary object of interest. Germany at the present time shows a similar condition with respect to its religious life. The defeat of Germany in the war and the collapse of the

German hegemony have deflected interest from the corporate and institutional aspects of life; and German religion is marked today by the recrudescence of an intense evangelical individualism as against both institutional religion and a "social" gospel. Even so socially-minded a thinker as Troeltsch was, as von Hügel says, in his later years "all but completely mastered" by an excessive individualism. Of this the moral is simply that it is perilous, though it may be unavoidable, to allow nearby events, however momentous, to fill the stage and to settle the direction of our thinking. Our safety lies in remembering that there is such a thing as history.

Third: Whitehead makes the acute remark that "every philosophy is tinged with the coloring of some secret imaginative background, which never emerges explicitly into its trains of reasoning," and von Hügel, speaking of Plotinus, insists that if we are to understand him, "we have resolutely to attend to, and sympathetically to seize, not the logic of his system, but the specific temper and the implications of his *emotion,* and to trace these back, not necessarily to that system, but, where necessary, to his deepest experience as these may show themselves alongside of, and in spite of, his own analysis and theories." Back of our most solid thinking there are phantasmal and elusive visions and moods which we ourselves hardly identify, but which unconsciously color and steer our thought. Our most massive intellectual constructions stand upon a more or less artificial foundation, which in its turn rests upon the subtly changing ingredients of an experience in ceaseless flux. It is, to be

sure, the individual system-builder who is chiefly exposed to this particular condition, though this habit of building on unconscious and undisclosed assumptions may distort and mislead the thought of an age. And here our main safeguard lies in what may be called "social" thinking. It is rarely that solitary thinking escapes eccentricity; and the eccentricity springs usually from assumptions that are hidden from the thinker himself. Group-thinking, frank, candid, orderly, pitiless in analysis and criticism, seems to be our only hope of discovering and eliminating the hidden things that may insinuate themselves into our logic and become elements of disintegration. Even then we are never safe, but it is our business to be as safe as we can.

IV

Theology has, of course, never been under obligation to say "By your leave" to science. The findings of the exponents of the "new" physics have, however, the effect of leaving a handsome right of way to theology. The religious insight can, on the new view, claim at least as much validity as the particular insight that lies at the root of physical science. The one is as native to our minds as the other. It is therefore laid upon us, urgently, to set about once more drawing a religious map of the universe, to build up a theology. And if it is replied that we have theologies enough and to spare, my answer is that we never can have enough. There is always one more needed. In any case, we have come to an age of the world when the existing religious maps are more or less obsolete; and

we must needs set about to make a map which shall be more adequate to the new situation in which we find ourselves today. I am not now pleading for a "modernism" in the common meaning of that unfortunate word. Yet modern our theology must be, as every theology has been in its day. It is pure nonsense to say that religion can ignore science; it never has done so. The very confessions in which religious beliefs have been formulated reflect what kind and degree of science was in the world at the time of their birth. The question—a purely scientific one—whether it was the sun or the earth that moved around the other was regarded at one period as being of enormous theological importance, and no one can look with understanding upon the physical and living universe that modern science displays to us without recognizing its significance for religious thought. Not, indeed, that the specific subject-matter of science enters directly into our theologizing. It is, however, an important element in the environment in which our thinking must be done. The theology of today will, like all its predecessors, reflect the cultural environment in which it is constructed.

We have, however, to overcome a certain prevailing prejudice against theology as such. The tendency of the man who is in revolt against a particular theology is to throw bricks at all theology. But we have in the course of this paper seen that we have—if we are serious—willy-nilly, to build some kind of system to take the place of the one we have discarded. The error of religious liberalism is that it has made a religion of its liberalism. But that is to misconceive the nature of liberty. Liberty is

not an end, but a means and an occasion. To be free from tradition is to be under obligation to create a better tradition. To be emancipated from a creed is only the opportunity to formulate a truer and a finer creed. The perpetual peril of the liberal is to live from hand to mouth, when he should recognize his freedom as an opportunity and an obligation to build more spacious and more enduring mansions.

There is another kind of prejudice against theology which is more serious. I noticed a little time ago that that noble Japanese, Nagawa, is reported to have said, "I have grown to hate the word theology." This is a familiar mood; a mood of impatience with the seeming dilatoriness of the church in the great business of the Kingdom of God. But you can't hate theology without being in the act a theologian. The doctrine of no-theology is itself a kind of theology. None the less, Nagawa's impatience is worth attending to. For there can be no valid Christian theology where there is no active Christian life. A theology divorced from religious living is mere fine-spun and gratuitous guesswork. It is well to remind ourselves of von Hügel's insistence that religion has always three necessary elements—the mystical, the institutional, and the intellectual. It cannot live and grow without prayer, a living fellowship, and thought. The nurture and discipline of the interior life, the embodiment of that life in a society, and its interpretation of experience in a theology—these are the indispensable elements of a healthy and vigorous religion. A living, working faith

in a living, working church constitutes the prerequisite of a sound theology.

The signs are that the coming theology will be a theology of "comprehension." I am—happily for me—a minister of the United Church of Canada; but I consider the United Church of Canada only as an early "concretion" of a spirit which is abroad throughout the religious world; and there are others to follow. Here in this church we have inherited two theological traditions, Calvinism and Arminianism. The latter rose as a reaction from the former; and its very existence points to some defect in the system against which it protested. But equally, just because it was a protest, it was disabled from doing full justice to the strong and abiding elements in Calvinism. In both cases, we may say that the defect was an excess of virtue or perhaps of logic. But here we are—if one may use the terms of the Hegelian dialect—with the *thesis* and the *antithesis* on our hands; and what under heaven for if not to discover the *synthesis?* We have in the basis of Union a skillful compounding of antecedents. It makes a first-rate starting-point. But at its best it is simply a part of the raw material out of which the living theology of the church has to be worked out.

And if anyone demurs and asks, "Why drag in Calvinism and Arminianism at this time of day? are you not flogging dead horses?" If any man tells me that Calvinism or Arminianism is a dead issue, my answer is simply that he is making a foolish noise. We may grant at once that there are details which have become obsolete, that both systems need to be restated in a more modern idiom;

but each in its broad intention and outline is still an authentic, if partial, map of reality. Back of the two systems is a common Christian experience. But the Christian experience is a very complex thing; and the systems differ because the one and the other so stressed different elements of that experience that they stood out in an antithesis which was not justified by the facts. Calvinism allowed too little for man; whereupon Arminianism insisted on too much. And here is the crux of theology still, the relation of God and man. Our inheritance of these two systems in the United Church of Canada constitutes a duty to effect a synthesis.

And what comes to us in this specific and definite way in the United Church is simply an instance of a general task imposed upon Christian thinkers by the necessities of our time. We have reached a point at which we seem to have covered the whole gamut of the special emphases that called the various communions of Protestantism into being; and the hour is come at which we should gather them all, so far as we may, into a single testimony. It will be our business to construct a catholic as opposed to a sectarian theology; and that implies the belief that there is a principle to be discovered and formulated by means of which all religious thought, past and present, that has its roots in life and has enriched life, and all the hopes that spring out of the revelation of God in Christ, can be gathered up into a system of theology at once catholic and evangelical. We are the heirs of the *whole* Christian tradition; and it is for us to gather up the

broken lights, the scattered experiences, the partial emphases which make the Christian thought of our time a sort of crazy and bewildering patchwork into a living unity. It is an enormous task; but the world is young.

But we shall probably have to build and to discard many a system of theology before that day comes; and if we can only get this fixed in our minds, the world will be saved a good deal of trouble. The harm of a system begins just at the point when we come to consider it final; and that is the occasion of that *odium theologicum* which has not only discredited religion, but has strewn endless error into the mind of man. But a system is never the end of the road. It is rather a wayside inn, a bivouac. I have a dream of a church which will never fear to formulate its discoveries, its thoughts, its visions, in which theology will be a staple industry, the faith of which will be (in Sir Henry Jones's words) "a faith that enquires," and which will consider no knowledge and no beauty alien to Christ, since all knowledge and all beauty are of God. And when it sets about drawing out its Confession of Faith, it will lay down some such preliminary articles as these:

1. It is the duty of the church to define from time to time the content of its faith and its testimony in a Confession of Faith.

2. The church's Confession of Faith shall be reviewed, and if necessary, revised every thirty years, and at such other times as the church in its wisdom shall determine.

3. The Confession of Faith shall be accepted in its gen-

eral substance and in the spirit rather than in the letter; and if any minister of the church finds himself at any essential point at variance with the substance of the Confession, it shall be left to his honor to take action, and to his conscience to dictate what action he shall take.

IV

The Right to Believe in God

By Miles H. Krumbine

I

MORE than thirty years ago William James struck off his now famous phrase, "The will to believe." Gifted with a rhetoric that was uncommonly stirring, James exploited the formula with great persuasive power. "The will to believe" seemed to enfranchise the religious yearning of man in an age gradually being overtaken by the spirit of secularism; it seemed to vindicate the creative significance of religion just when it was being made a bit of beautiful embroidery on a life of gain-getting, "a decent formula," as Whitehead says, "to embellish a comfortable life." The attempt finally proved to be futile. "The will to believe" was parodied into "the will to make believe." Pragmatism ended in paralysis.

The reason isn't far to seek. The devastating attitudes of men of unquestioned learning, dominated by the interests of modern intelligence, have made us suspect our right to believe. Dewey's avowed atheistic naturalism and Croce's vigorous insistence that religion is simply a lower form of philosophy and as such is bound to disappear for people intellectually able to think philosophically are

cases in point. To have a less weighty intellectual assure us that religion will remain but God must go is no less depressing. The will to believe is inhibited in a world that remains uncertain of its right to believe.

In a certain sense, of course, we have a right to believe anything. That is one of the annoying perquisites of personality in a democratic world. The kingdom of intelligence, however, remains strictly untouched by the spirit of democracy. In it, "one wise man's verdict still outweighs all the fools." Moreover, the reverence for fact, which is one of the main characteristics of the spirit of science, has begotten a growing passion for intellectual respectability. Conscious though we are that we may believe anything, we really feel that we have no right to believe that which is incompatible with mental excellence. Contemporary intelligence, though difficult to define and not always easy to recognize, holds a strange and intimidating power over us. We cherish a constant sense of uneasiness lest we think wrong thoughts, believe wrong conclusions, and feel too composed and comfortable in our beliefs. Wherefore, many who have the will to believe feel distinctly that their right to believe is being threatened.

The right to believe in God is another of those "inalienable rights" which, like the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, we consider innate. It is not a privilege to be acquired, but a right to be asserted. We have always so regarded it. That accounts very largely for the murmur of resentment against contemporary intelligence among people religiously disposed. They feel

that an innate right is being challenged at the very moment when intellectual respectability is gaining ever greater authority over us.

This murmur of resentment does not imply any definite conviction that the findings of modern knowledge are against the fact of God; that science has ruled out the Deity. Such, of course, is not the case. It would be difficult indeed to collect any sizable list of first-class names in the world of science to attach to a sweeping denial of our right to believe in God. The issue is more subtle. What the religiously disposed mind feels is that at any time some authority outside the realm of religious experience may, in the name of contemporary intelligence, rise to deny that right. We are inclined to assume that science, for instance, could deny our right to believe in God if it cared to; that the scientist has available, in his assortment of conclusions, not one but several weapons, as it were, with which to waylay us and take it from us. We feel, in short, that we go on believing in God by the leave of the scientist; that, moreover, he grants that leave because he is a gentleman, civilized and kindly disposed. His countenance questions, but it does not threaten; his hand is withheld. Wherefore, the great satisfaction with which we cling to the skirts of an Eddington like scared children and forthwith grow very bold and outspoken.

The fear is false. Contemporary intelligence has no dogmas lying about with which some predatory intellectual can rob us of our cherished right. Religious experience may assure itself on that point. It may walk abroad with the dignity of a man who dwells in security. The

complacent atheism of Haeckel is as thoroughly antiquated as the riotous optimism of Browning. "We all know that there are regions of the human spirit untrammeled by the world of physics. In the mystic sense of the creation around us, in the expression of art, in a yearning towards God, the soul grows upward and finds the fulfillment of something implanted in its nature. The sanction for this development is within us. . . . Science can scarcely question this sanction. . . . Can we not leave it at that?"[1] "The progress of science," says Whitehead, "must result in the unceasing codification of religious thought," but, happily, "to the great advantage of religion."[2]

True, "naturalism," as Sorley has pointed out, certainly cannot admit "the validity of the ideas involved in religious experience."[3] But naturalism is not science. It is a philosophical theory endowed with a fortunate title. By virtue of its title, it has acquired much of the prestige accruing to the achievements of natural science. "The negations of naturalism have been mistaken for the conclusions of science."[4] The result is confusion. In that confusion reasonable men have considered themselves shut out from "participation in the spiritual ideals on which mankind has been nourished."[5] The hand of Esau has enabled the voice of Jacob to win the birthright. We have yielded our right to believe in God because we

[1] Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World,* pp. 327-328.
[2] Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World,* p. 271.
[3] Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God,* p. 473.
[4] Sorley, *Ibid.*
[5] Sorley, *Ibid.*

have been tricked. To discover the trick is to take the first step toward the recovery of the right.

II

"He who is gifted with the heavenly knowledge of faith is free from an inquisitive curiosity."[1] The Council of Trent is no more belligerent than Luther: "If outside of Christ you wish by your own thoughts to know your relation to God, you will break your neck. Thunder strikes him who examines."[2] "I venture," he continues, "to put my trust in the one God alone, the invisible and incomprehensible, who hath created heaven and earth."[3] Many centuries before Luther, Chrysostom met the insistent intellectual curiosity of his time with the frank dogma that "he insults God who seeks to apprehend his essential being . . . a comprehended God is no God . . . God is incomprehensible because he is blessed and blessed because he is incomprehensible."[4]

The modern temper is frankly impatient with such comprehensive formulas, especially when joined to the far-reaching metaphysical conclusions they imply. It is distinguished by marked "inquisitive curiosity" not primarily because it is ungifted with the "heavenly knowledge of faith," but rather because it is more certain that truth is its friend.

When Matthew Arnold sat on the window-seat of his hotel at Dover and compared the subsidence of faith to

[1] Quoted by Lippmann, *A Preface to Morals*, p. 14.
[2] Quoted by Lippmann, *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[3] Quoted by Lippmann, *Ibid.*, p. 53.
[4] Quoted by Lippmann, *Ibid.*, p. 52.

the "melancholy, long, withdrawing roar" of the receding sea, he was sad—sad and serious. Skepticism has again achieved that sad seriousness. Lippmann assures us that the modern man does not "wantonly reject belief, as so many churchmen assert. His predicament is much more serious. With the best will in the world, he finds himself not quite believing." [1] Joseph Wood Krutch in *The Modern Temper* with bitter surgery bares the soul of modern man to reveal, as its only "hope," the discovery of new ways of despairing. He seems certain that "ours is a lost cause and there is no place for us in the natural universe, but we are not, for all that, sorry to be human. We should rather die as men than live as animals." [2] Under the heel of this skepticism, religion, like some plants in our gardens, smells sweetest when trodden upon.[3] Against "the freezing reason's colder part," the heart still seems to stand up like a man—and perhaps in wrath.

Then why the current perplexity? Why this impotence of the will to believe, especially in God? Three difficulties, mainly, beset the modern mind.

Religion, for its purposes, needs a God that can be painted by the artist. Hitherto it has had such a God. The Old Testament abounds in pictures of God so vivid that a child can see them. The gigantic God of battles strides across its earlier pages no less certainly than the regal national Deity across its later ones. Jesus' conception of God as fatherly, again, is warmly intimate enough

[1] Lippmann, *A Preface to Morals*, p. 56.
[2] Joseph Wood Krutch, *The Modern Temper*, p. 249.
[3] The *Saturday Review of Literature:* article on Matthew Arnold by C. E. Montague, issue of May 12, 1928.

to ravish the imagination of us all. The extraordinary authority the Protestant Reformation conferred on the Bible lent a force to these pictures more convincing than their inherent power to evoke emotional attachment. Religious experience could and did flourish because God was obvious and certain. Man carried his image in his mind when he did not visualize it on canvas or in stone. True, Neo-Platonism read other meanings into the pictures, but it remained a minor, if important, force in the prevailing practice of religious devotion. Men thought pictorially and were at peace.

The rise of science brought with it a passion for exactness and accuracy. When that passion was turned on God, the pictures of him vanished. The Old Testament pictures, so dear to Calvinist hearts, are gone beyond recovery. Even "the fatherhood of God," valid as the concept seems, is spoken of with diminishing assurance in an age that is growing conscious of diminishing uniqueness in the social preëminence of the father in family life. The old patterns have lost their meaning. Our age has not yet proved itself able to erect a satisfying image of God.

It would be a grave mistake to suppose that modern intelligence was out primarily to prove that religion alone is cherishing misplaced pictures of reality. Modern intelligence is impartial. The physical scientist's inherited pictures of reality are also found to have been misplaced; and the historian's. Moreover, an artist would find it quite as difficult to paint a picture of Einstein's physical universe as of Whitehead's God.

This is the first difficulty confronting the modern man when he sets out to exercise his right to believe in God. Seeking pictorial images, he is offered the opportunity of conceptual thinking. But God defined as "the principle of concretion" is more apt to yield a blank stare than to evoke emotional ecstasy. The rational interpretation of experience has, temporarily at least, paralyzed the imagination.

The second difficulty seems more imposing than it is. It grows out of our rather recent acquisition of the data of history. We now can and do trace the history of an idea to its origin. Other ages—"the ages of faith," for instance—were not afflicted that way. Ideas came to them strictly unencumbered by any embarrassing ancestral inheritance. We look back in pity at their *naïveté,* while we envy their ability to take a childlike delight in great and fascinating ideas.

The idea of God we see now in the light of a long and interesting history. We trace it back through Egypt, Greece, and Judea to a tribal habit of deifying the factor yielding the greatest good to the tribe, whether it be the bull or the river or the war lord. Smitten with humility by the homely origin of the idea, we are apt to suspect its validity. We have "specialized in origins" so effectively that we are inhibited before its emotional appeal. This is the burden of Krutch's sad complaint.

That the idea of God can be traced back through an interesting series of manifestations only stresses its importance as a fact in consciousness. It is such a fact. Psychology may and ought to investigate it. Such investigation

leaves the issue of its validity as strictly untouched as the validity of mathematical judgments remains unaffected by the history of their formation and the exhibition of their origin in crude tribal customs of counting. The great and ruling ideas of science can be traced back to origins quite as humble as are the origins of the ruling ideas of religion. To press their humble origin as an argument against their present validity would prove disastrous in spheres other than religion, and with equal force. But would it be evidence of unique mental insight?

The third and main difficulty remains to be considered. The idea of God emerged in human consciousness as a series of "vaguely conceived potencies." The process of its development reveals a constant mental striving by man to envisage the divine in terms that would define those potencies. Among some primitive peoples the eagle, the bull, or the lion seemed to express more adequately than any other conceivable being the particular might and powers associated with the thought of divinity. Plutarch justified the Egyptians in their worship of the beetle on the strange ground of its unique power of self-production. Judaism proclaimed the momentous dogma that God made man in his own image. That formula rules our minds today. Michelangelo adapted it conveniently to the purposes of art: "Nor hath God deigned to show himself elsewhere more clearly than in human forms sublime."[1] We, in turn, are bending the same assumption to the contingencies of daily living. The development of the idea of God, in short, has turned on man's

[1] Farnell, *The Attributes of God*, p. 26.

effort to find satisfactory terms with which to qualify that idea. These terms the theologian calls attributes, and the poet, "the shadow of a magnitude."

The philosopher says quite frankly that religion will have to renounce its unfortunate habit of paying God metaphysical compliments.[1] Religion cannot make that renunciation, not if it means divesting God of those qualities which we know as inherent in personality. "An impersonal religion, a religion based on the idea of impersonal divinity, divine love, or power or order, even an 'eternal not ourselves that maketh for Righteousness,' may be a source of strength to some rarely endowed thinkers, but has not yet played a vital part in our religious history or appealed with any force to the popular mind." [2] "The utterance of the Indian sage, 'the worship of the Impersonal laid no hold on my heart,' appeals to us as the voice of all real religion." [3] Here is our difficulty. The force of religion turns on its power to put forth its ideas so convincingly as to gain immediacy of assent. The mood of contemporary intelligence is such as to make that extremely difficult. To proclaim God omnipotent in a world ruled by the thought of law gains not the immediacy of assent for which Whitehead yearns, but the awakening of every modern critical reaction which he so dreads.[4]

Indeed, the attribute of power sustains the brunt of the

[1] Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World,* p. 258.
[2] Farnell, *The Attributes of God,* p. 20.
[3] Farnell, *Ibid.,* p. 251.
[4] Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World,* p. 274.

attack on the idea of God. The whole concept of divine sovereignty seems imperiled by our convinced adherence to a universe conceived as governed by clearly specified law. God seems as one who lives in the gaps of our scientific knowledge, whose position, therefore, every conquest of science renders more precarious. Thus many, in the name of modernity, are courteously bowing God out of the universe.

The religiously disposed modern is not so rash. He rethinks his concept of power. He regards law not as a token of divine impotence, but as a revelation of the ways in which divine sovereignty is exerted. Law violates not sovereignty, but a conception of sovereignty as capricious, for good or ill. It nullifies not power but anarchy. He admits quite frankly that in its inherited form the attribute of power has to be abandoned, but he does not admit that, therefore, God must be given up. Not until intelligence proves the universe to be unamenable to law will the religiously disposed modern yield the sovereignty of God. Meanwhile, he will continue to feel that law rather than abolishing sovereignty defines and magnifies its character. True, if religious experience insists on a God who will exercise physical power arbitrarily and act capriciously, it will continue to be embarrassed in the world of modern intelligence. Again, if it insists on identifying itself with an idea of God, qualified by non-religious and pre-scientific views of the universe, it will feel less and less at home in our world. Unfortunately, too much current popular religion must be described as "high

spiritual polytheism tempered and restrained by the Athanasian Creed." [1]

It is extremely difficult to rise to Jesus' sublime conception of God as a spirit. Less worthy conceptions are so much more manageable. We are all overtaken by moods in which it is comforting to think of God as acting just as we would act if we were omnipotent. To give up that thought of God is disturbing and unsettling. Contemporary intelligence insists that it must be given up. To personify unworthily that power in reality which we call God has wrought too much havoc in the history of the race to permit its greater range. "That is why an epoch in human progress dates from the suggestion, perhaps first made by St. Paul, that instead of picturing God in their own image, or in the image traditional in a particular community, men should picture him in the image of Jesus Christ. Historic Christianity has never quite risen to this conception. Hitherto it has always compromised; its teachers have lacked the insight or the courage to reject out and out certain elements in the conception of God derived from earlier beliefs." [2] Here at least is one attempt, and a notable one, to personify the divine in a way that is not unworthy. Until we can rise to the dignity of that conception, we will continue to engage on more or less futile attempts to reconcile omnipotence with goodness, omniscience with history. Meanwhile, modern intelligence will continue to insist that we dare not think any longer of the Eternal as "some weak prince . . . prone, for his favorites, to reverse his laws."

[1] Farnell, *The Attributes of God*, p. 101. [2] Streeter, *Reality*, p. 138.

Religious experience is a series of facts. Contemporary intelligence will seek to organize those facts into a coherent system. In the interests of coherence, it will rethink its concepts constantly. But the facts are stubborn. The man at prayer conceives his deity as all powerful and benevolent. Coherence is difficult at this point. It may well be that Lotze was right: "Let us say that, where there is an irreconcilable contradiction between the omnipotence and the goodness of God, our finite wisdom has come to the end of its tether, and that we do not understand the solution which yet we believe in."

III

God is a discovery; the idea of God is an invention. Religious experience turns on the discovery of God. The constantly changing ideas of God may be said to be the inventions by which the meaning and significance of the basic discovery are made available for life. Electricity is a discovery; the incandescent lamp is an invention. It is an invention made to play upon everyday life the meaning, significance, and value of the basic discovery. Steam is a discovery; the locomotive is one of the many inventions made to utilize steam for practical purposes. The Hertzian waves are a discovery; the radio is one of the inventions designed to adjust life significantly to those waves. Similarly, God is a discovery. Any given idea of God is the mind's design to make effective that discovery. Religion is the discovery of God; theology, in all its varying aspects, is the result of man's inventive genius to make that discovery meaningful.

A discovery is something man comes upon as he explores nature, either within himself or round about. Though it requires some mental ingenuity, that is not its main and outstanding requisite. Daring, enterprise, the willingness to run risks, may be said to be primary requirements. Discoveries sometimes are made under our very noses and yet we never saw them. The moment they are made, we lay hold of them appreciatively. Many a boy before James Watt saw the lid dance merrily on the teakettle, but he hadn't "noticed" it. Many a man before Franklin may have suspected the significance of lightning, but he may not have cared to run the risk of flying a kite. For invention, one needs, primarily, ingenuity, skill, mental dexterity, logical thinking, and highly developed reasoning powers. Moreover, the successful inventor who serves humanity best never cherishes his invention too greatly; he keeps his mind open constantly for new possibilities. He is always seeking to improve his invention. It is of the very nature of inventions that they change. By the same token, it is of the very nature of discoveries that they remain constant.

It is entirely valid to press the formula of discovery and invention as applied to God and the idea of God. Religious experience comes upon the fact of God as a discovery. Contemporary intelligence is always refining the idea of God as an invention. "The evolution of religion," Whitehead thinks, "is, in the main, a disengagement of its own proper ideas from the adventitious notions which have crept into it by reason of the expression of its own

ideas in terms of the imaginative picture of the world entertained in previous ages."[1] The story of religion in the growing life of mankind is essentially the record of a constant and unceasing effort to refine the idea of God which would finally be written in its creed, preached from its pulpits, and sung in its hymns. The effort proceeds apace. Indeed, the very zeal with which earnest and thoughtful people are putting forth their ideas of God in our time, rather than being a sign of perversity, is a definite token of religious vitality. "Dear boy," said Goethe to Eckerman, "what do we know of the idea of the Divine; and what can our narrow conceptions presume to tell of the supreme being? If I called him by a hundred names like a Turk, I should yet fall short and have said nothing in comparison to the boundlessness of his attributes."[2]

Metaphors, the inventions we make to explain our experience, are to the mind what lattice-work is to climbing plants, artificial constructions out of materials at hand on which growing things may flourish. Like climbing plants, our minds are constantly exhausting the reach of the metaphor and putting forth shoots in this direction and that, exploring ever more daring advances of growth, only to fall back upon the basic support of the metaphor. Metaphors suggest but do not define; reveal but do not prove. Again, like climbing plants, our minds succeed betimes in making the leap from one humble metaphor

[1] *Science and the Modern World*, pp. 270-271.
[2] Quoted in Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 158.

to another more exalted, only to repeat the performance all over. The history of the idea of God is largely the record of the mind's leap from metaphor to metaphor, or, to speak more theologically, from symbol to symbol. Religion, more akin to art than it is to science or philosophy, taxes the imagination more than it does the reason.

Obviously, this is far from saying that man worships fictions. He does not, like Ixion, embrace a cloud for a divinity. He clings to symbols not as bits of poetic fancy to cover up the harsher aspects of reality, as flowers cover the grave, but as instruments of the intellect with which to lay bare its deeper nature. Man is organic to the universe. He can and does interact with it. The process of that interaction is not a fiction, but fact. Moreover, reality betimes responds helpfully when man approaches it in certain ways. That power in reality which responds helpfully, too, is a fact. Man calls it "God." In view of the personal nature of man, he ascribes to that power qualities he knows as inhering in personality. He then taxes his imagination to find figures vivid enough to make that fact ever more meaningful and significant. He never makes the mistake of yielding the fact when the figures become exhausted and insipid. He does not confuse a failure of the imagination with a seeming supremacy of reason.

Man is prompted to seek helpful responses from reality because basic in his consciousness is the fact of his ultimate absolute dependence. This is the first point at which the discovery of God may be made. Macintosh has put it exactly: "What is meant by the term 'God' is the supreme

power in reality, that upon which we are all ultimately dependent. Such a power undoubtedly exists. We cannot escape the consciousness of our ultimate dependence. Obviously, too, this object of our absolute dependence is in some sense cosmic," for "it is through our relation to the universe that we become aware of our ultimate absolute dependence."[1]

Rudolf Otto has exploited this aspect of consciousness with massive learning in *The Idea of the Holy.* Otto insists that that feeling is an absolutely primary and elementary datum of consciousness quite irreducible to any other mental state and unassociated with any instinct such as fear. To describe a feeling which can be discussed but not defined in any strict sense, Otto coins the word "numinous." Man's feeling of ultimate dependence is a numinous state of mind which is at the innermost core of every religion. It is "creature-consciousness" or "a sense of creaturehood" as against "a sense of createdness." But even that phrase is not "a conceptual explanation of the matter. All that this new term 'creature-feeling' can explain is the note of self-abasement into nothingness before an overpowering absolute might of some kind."[2] "Its antecedent stage is 'dæmonic dread' with its queer perversion . . . the 'dread of ghosts.' It first begins to stir in the feeling of 'something uncanny,' 'eerie,' or 'weird.' It is this feeling which, emerging in the mind of primeval man, forms the starting-point for the entire

[1] *My Idea of God,* p. 138 f., edited by Newton.
[2] Otto, *The Idea of the Holy,* p. 10.

religious development in history." [1] The development of religion is a refining and deepening of this numinous feeling into an attitude of reverence and obedience before a loving God.

God is "the wholly other." Man's sense of dependence is so complete that it erects a"sundering unworthiness" between him and God. Religion is the attempt to satisfy man's longing to bridge that chasm. A mere reference to the Christian doctrine of the atonement will suggest at once the central significance of this fact.

So universal is man's sense of absolute ultimate dependence that it led Descartes to ask which of us can guarantee his own continuance in existence from one moment to another. Just as universal, therefore, is man's opportunity for the discovery of God.

IV

Professor Pringle-Pattison, in a vivid passage, has laid bare the nerve of the modern mood: "When man confronts the world with his standard of value, his attitude is not that of a suppliant, but that of a judge. He does not appear as one who craves a kindness, but as one who claims a right." [2] No philosophical view of the world that fails to honor that right can finally hold our allegiance. Our sense of value is not a matter of temperament or personal preference; it is a fact of consciousness.

Standards of value vary. So do standards of mathematical judgment. Social custom constantly qualifies, through

[1] Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 15.
[2] *The Idea of God*, p. 41.

the enrichment of experience, our judgments of value, just as increasing knowledge qualifies mathematical judgments. Just as the fact that we can and do make mathematical judgments disposes us to assume an objective reference for them, so we assume objective validity for our judgments of value, and for the same reason. Social custom could gain no authority over us did we not recognize the validity of value-judgments as such. Reality, it has been said, is an experience, not a theorem. Values are a part of that experience. The major problem of philosophy is to find a view of existence as a whole that will accommodate our experience of value. Cast athwart the realm of experience that man, a cognitive being, knows, is a realm of values no less real that man, as more than a cognitive being, experiences. Indeed, truth itself would not be sought with so much ardor were it not a supreme value more than a logical abstraction.

Prompted by this instinct to make value-judgments, man sweeps the universe and—unlike Laplace, who also swept it, but with a telescope, and did not find God—finds God. His intense need for some objective reference for goodness, truth, and beauty sharpens his wit to the point of happy discovery; or, if not happy discovery, then at least a belief that God is. When William James was asked in a questionnaire, "Why do you believe in God? Is it from some argument?" he replied, "Emphatically, no." "Is it because you have experienced his presence?" To that question his reply was, "No, but rather because I need it so that it 'must' be true." Confronted with the fact of his ideals, man will continue to insist "it must be

so";[1] let philosophy make of it what it can. Assured that "the certainty of the moral law is not affected by anything that lies hidden among the unexplored recesses of the starry heavens,"[2] or, for that matter, in the newly explored caverns of the unconscious, but grows out of man's experience, he insists on his right to believe in God as the fulfillment of that certainty. "The things that are most important in man's experience are also the things which are most certain in his thought."[3]

V

Edmund Burke describes the majority of mankind as "those whom Providence has doomed to live on trust." The modern mind is not inclined that way. It prefers to take nothing on trust. It wants to know for itself. It will not make the quest until it is assured of its right to make it. So far as the quest of God is concerned, it has that right. Only its own willfulness can thwart it—its own willfulness or the lure of other interests.

Knowledge has a curious habit of gathering about our dominant interests. Man's dominant interest right now can hardly be said to be God. Casual concern brings only casual satisfaction. Signs are not wanting, however, that the suffocating abundance of things is reducing man to a state of surfeit. The spirit is asserting itself anew. Like certain plants that run along the ground for a few years, only to rise a half dozen feet in a single season to bear flower and fruit, so the spirit of man may be on

[1] *The Letters of William James*, vol. ii, p. 213.
[2] Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 460.
[3] Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value.*

the verge of a new season of fruitfulness, at the very moment when it seems doomed to dreary prostration. When it does rise, it will be by the aid of that friendly power in the universe which we call God.

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V

The Bible

By Russell Henry Stafford

OUR fathers were men of one book, and their one book was the Bible. To be sure, some of them had many other books, and read them. But all read this book, simple and learned alike. To it they turned for light on the great problems of life, and for guidance in life's perplexities. Their consciences were impregnated with its principles, their imaginations were stirred by its stories, their speech was formed upon the model of the sonorous simplicity of the Authorized Version. This held true in large measure both of people in the church and people out of the church. It would be hard to overestimate the formative influence of the Holy Scriptures upon the mind and conduct of the generations whose heirs we are.

But we are not people of one book. It is almost as true of believers as of unbelievers in our day that the Bible is known chiefly by hearsay. With the passing of this ascendancy of the biblical norm of thought and speech much that is sweet and strong is gone, which the thoughtful among us may with good reason regret. How has this shift from attention to neglect come about?

It is doubtless due in some degree to the harried pace

at which our minds as well as our bodies live. There are probably a hundred books today for one of a century ago. The printing presses deluge us with new material in unprecedented abundance, and we feel a need to keep abreast of our times by devouring as much as possible of this current output. In consequence we have—or at least we are under the impression that we have—little leisure for quiet and thoughtful perusal of any books older than the year before last. Moreover, our tastes, even among the educated classes, are largely colored by the mechanical and objective preoccupations of this century of science in a hurry, so that poetry and eloquence of the old school, dealing deliberately with matters which lie below the surface of immediate experience, are no longer congenial to the average mind. It is to be noted that the decline of late in Bible-reading goes along with a like decline in the reading of other classics. It is exceptional today, and is even reckoned a bit quaint, to read Homer and Demosthenes, Virgil and Cicero. For it appears to the aggressive and impatient modern temper that springs of culture which have been running since antiquity must by now have run dry, and can have little if anything to contribute to the furnishing and stimulation of our intelligence.

Signal though this reason be, however, for the diminished place of the Bible in current estimation, it by no means accounts for this diminution in full. After all, men of any depth of insight will sooner or later perceive the shallowness of such self-confident modernity, so that revivals of interest in the classics will probably continue

to recur in the future as they have occurred in the past. A further reason, probably of much greater weight, is that people in general are aware of a new attitude toward the Bible on the part of biblical scholarship, without fully understanding what this attitude is, so that they are prone to suppose that the Bible no longer retains, in the estimation of thoroughly informed students, those divine values which men of earlier time believed that they discovered in it. It was not classical scholars only who read the Bible in our fathers' days, but all men; for they were convinced that in the Bible they had the word of God, as modern as today's sunrise, though it were also as ancient as Moses. If we still held that conviction, we should still be readers of the Bible, as they were, whether or not we read other classics. In the changes wrought in popular opinion by the advent of a new view of the Bible we have probably the most penetrating explanation of its decreased importance in our usage.

And yet it is not that new view itself, but an inadequate understanding of it, which is at fault. Biblical scholarship of the modern type is as a whole just as reverent, just as enthusiastic in its loyalty to these ancient oracles of the Most High, as ever scholarship has been. What we need, in order that the Bible may be restored to that recognized preëminence over all other books which will bring its sweetness and strength again into the consciousness of mankind, is fully to grasp what the new view is, and what are its implications.

The old view is of course one with which we are, in general, well acquainted. It maintained that the Holy

Scriptures constitute the actual utterance of God, recorded by his servants at his direct instance without error, declaring a revelation perfect in all its details on all subjects to which reference is made therein, and consequently absolutely infallible. It is to be observed that this is a mechanical view, which, rigidly interpreted, excludes all natural and human values from the Bible in a way in which its most earnest advocates would hardly concur.

But this mechanical view, belonging in essence to the long infancy of European culture through the Middle Ages, was inevitably impugned by the rise of textual criticism at the Renaissance. For a thousand years before, St. Jerome's Latin version, called the Vulgate, had been regarded as infallible. But of course the Scriptures were not originally composed in Latin. And at that period of the revival of human culture the Greek language was at length rediscovered by Western Europe; while Hebrew was presently introduced also to supplement Latin and Greek, as one of the three languages indispensable to a full classical education. The resultant detailed study of the extant Hebrew and Greek manuscripts of our holy writings—those to which St. Jerome had had access, and many others as well—eventuated in the discovery of many minor variations among them, and of many apparent corruptions of the original diction of their writers, with the consequence that such literalism as would base a doctrine upon a single word or phrase is debarred, because we can never be sure beyond doubt that the word or phrase in question was a part of the passage in which it occurs as its writer composed it. This by no means invalidates these

writings. But it throws us back upon their general sense and direction, away from the mere legalism of abject dependence upon isolated expressions. In other words, we have to turn from the letter to the spirit. And that is a clear gain; for in the Bible itself are to be found repeated admonitions, confirming our own natural judgment, that the spirit, not the letter, must in all religious matters be given primacy.

A next step in the development of biblical study upon this basis was the application to the Scriptures of those methods of literary and historical investigation which had come to be applied to the classics of Greece and Rome. This type of investigation, seeking from the writings themselves, and from contemporaneous sources when available, exact information as to the time, place, purpose, and authorship of these works, is called the higher criticism, to distinguish it from textual analysis, collation and emendation, which are known as the lower criticism —both terms being borrowed, in this sense, from the technical vocabulary of secular classical research. Now certain opinions as to the authorship of the books of the Bible had been accepted through the Middle Ages without question; as, for instance, that Moses wrote the Pentateuch. Many of these opinions have been found, as a result of honest testing by competent methods, to be untrue. To cite the same instance, the Pentateuch is now known to be a composite of at least four documents, which was given its present form not earlier than the fifth century before Christ. But, to be sure, the Pentateuch does not claim Moses as its author. Most of the

opinions as to authorship which were long regarded as of the substance of faith are foreign to the text itself of the Bible. Nor is the authority of one man especially to be preferred to that of another, whoever he may be, provided we find in the work before us evidence to justify the belief that it is indeed inspired.

This brings up the problem of inspiration. Wherein does it consist? The old view was that inspiration amounted to dictation, so that every word of the Scriptures was to be accepted, on God's own authority, as of equal truth with every other word. But that is a view of inspiration entirely peculiar to the Bible as its object. When we apply the methods employed upon other literature to analyze and evaluate the Bible, we can hardly avoid applying likewise that standard of inspiration which holds with regard to other works—namely, that those passages, and those only, are felt to be inspired which still have power to inspire the sympathetic reader, which impart life to his spirit. This standard allows plenty of room for the idiosyncrasies of style and viewpoint which characterize various biblical writers, to the point of marked contrast among them. It also removes all scandal to our faith from the discovery, inevitably disclosed by thorough examination, of not a few historical misstatements, and still more scientific errors, in the Bible. Obviously, the mistakes were not inspired; for they do not inspire us. Similarly, we fail to discern inspiration in the genealogical tables and the compilations of statutes, once of moment to Israel, but now of no conceivable significance to anyone, which occur in this sacred library of

our religion. On the other hand, however, this standard of inspiration bids us open our hearts to every spiritual influence these pages may convey; and he is a strangely obtuse and recalcitrant student of the Scriptures, with a mind blinded by prejudice to truths which else he could but admit as rendering his own intuitions explicit, who does not find such help and illumination for modern living in this old book as prove in a veritable sense that the Bible is inspired.

Associated with the question of inspiration is that of revelation. Men used to believe that God had revealed his truth to the writers of the Bible from outside, as it were, and in an absolute fashion, without reference to their moral state or spiritual attitude. So they were obliged to yield the embarrassing concession that God had frequently contradicted himself—revealing himself, for instance, in some Old Testament passages as a jealous tyrant, and in the New Testament as a loving Father, the one representation being radically incompatible with the other. As a result of the new approach to the Bible in accordance with the canons of general literary investigation, we have come, instead, to believe that God reveals himself through the subjective processes of the religious consciousness, his revelation being conditioned in kind and degree by the state of the soul of the man to and through whom he makes himself known. We hold that a man to whom a concept of God has been vouchsafed which is more harmonious with the principles of righteousness than that current among his contemporaries, has experienced a genuine, though a partial, revelation. We seek

the explanation of the fact that certain revelations seem mutually contradictory, in the warping limitations which the measure of a man's receptivity places upon the revelatory action of the Holy Spirit. And we look in the Bible to see whether perchance we shall find evidences there of an unfolding revelation, progressing in accordance with the slow development of God's human instruments out of barbarism into integral humanity, and coming to a climax in the high and stirring doctrines of his Son, conveying supernal truth through the medium of a perfect human life. And, looking for this process, we find it. We feel, even in the darkest passages of misrepresentation of the divine nature in the Old Testament, a stretching out after him who in Christ is made known as the Father of all men. We have achieved a doctrine of revelation which meets the facts of the Bible as no other can, and which at the same time is of promise to our own hearts, as authorizing the hope that God will reveal himself in and through us, by the operation of the same Holy Spirit who made him known in days gone by, in proportion to our voluntary susceptibility to his influence.

This conviction of the progressive nature of revelation, which is a structural aspect of the new view of the Bible, has led to an interesting and advantageous change of relative stress within both Testaments. Of old, the most important documents in the Old Testament seemed to be the historical books, so called. The prophets were not overlooked entirely, but prophecy was identified with prediction, and, aside from its predictive element, was judged to have played no commanding rôle in Israel. Today,

we no longer think that prophecy means chiefly prediction. There are, to be sure, predictive elements of the prophetic writings, which it is extremely hard to explain apart from some special influence of the Holy Spirit, so that doubtless we must postulate such an influence in some, at least, of these instances. Nevertheless, it has become clear that the prophets were not primarily concerned with the foretelling of future events, but rather were the preachers, as contrasted with the priests, of the Church of Israel. They were the men who kept alive, and who developed, a sense of the immediate urgency of the divine requirement of righteousness, as being infinitely more imperative than any ceremonial obligations. The prophetic spirit, down through the centuries, was the vital core of Hebrew religious experience; many of the writings of the prophets which survive are considerably older than the historical books, some at least of which were once supposed to antedate them all; and in the fertilizing stream of prophecy we find an indispensable preparation for the ministry of truth through him who is supremely Prophet, Priest, and King.

Similarly, in the New Testament, though men have always read the Gospels, yet in our fathers' days it was upon the Epistles and sometimes the Apocalypse that most attention was centered. For here are found those mighty metaphors and metaphysical abstractions which underlie the imposing structure of orthodox Christian theology. But these no longer seem salient to us. For they are fundamentally the reflections of men, no better and presumably no wiser than some good men who live in

our times, upon the sacred memory of the human life of Jesus. These reflections attest much insight, and, more significantly, especially in the instance of St. Paul, a magnificent spiritual awareness and achievement which must ever command our grateful reverence. And yet we hold ourselves free to revert for ourselves to that sacred figure upon which the Apostles reflected so fruitfully, and to do our own reflecting independently of them. We do not believe that the Epistle to the Romans, for instance, sublime though it be, gives the last word in explication of our faith. Rather, we will draw the material of new epistles from the Four Gospels. It means little that some of the Epistles are doubtless earlier in date than the earliest of the Gospels; in mode and viewpoint the Gospels enjoy a primacy beyond challenge. It further appears that, among the Gospels, we must distinguish the first three, which are called the Synoptic Gospels, from the Fourth Gospel, which is clearly dependable only in a very limited sense as an historical source, though it is probable that it affords authentic insight into the psychology of Christ as St. John had observed it, and long afterwards explained it to his own disciples.

Thus the new view gives us, in place of a book uniformly inspired, many books of varying inspiration, the gradation of which must be determined by our own reaction to their teachings. In place of arbitrary objective revelation, we find a record of the way in which God made himself known to men of many types within the limitations of their mentality and character. In place of the centrality of the historical books and the Epistles,

we lay major stress upon the Prophets; upon the Psalmists, whose heart-searching lyrics reflect the prophetic spirit in celebration of the saving presence and grace of the Most High; and upon the Gospels, especially the Synoptic Gospels, telling simply the august story of him in whom Israel's awareness of God reaches a point so high that it becomes a dynamic ideal communicable to all mankind. This is, if you please, a different Bible from that which our fathers knew. But is it in any way less noble? Will it repay any the less our devout study, for the demands it lays upon our own powers of discrimination, in place of the erstwhile solace of alleged inerrancy to our indolent preference never to think for ourselves? Let us answer these queries by a summary of what the Bible affords us, in the new view.

First, and least important, though by no means to be overlooked, the Bible remains a great and varied literary classic, with an atmosphere of serene gravity such as we breathless denizens of the twentieth century deeply need. And, in the Authorized and Revised Versions, faulty though they be as renderings of the rough and artless style of most of the original writings, we have an incomparable monument of the finest period of English prose, upon which we should do well to remodel our slovenly modern speech.

Second, we have in the Bible the record of a racial experience of God, unfolding through many generations, which is without parallel in history. For here we find God, not as an abstraction of the intellect, beyond good and evil—the guise which he wears for Hindu and Greek

speculation—but as a Force for righteousness so immediate in his imperative appeal to individuals and in his firm and unfailing governance of the affairs of peoples that we can almost describe him as concrete, even in the Old Testament; while in the New Testament he does in fact take concrete form, in the incomparable beauty and strength of the character of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Third, we have in the Bible the shrine of Christ. It is in this context, and none other, that he appears who is the hope and desire of all nations. Every part of this context, even to the genealogical tables and compilations of statutes, is a part of this shrine, and touched with the glory of his indwelling presence—though some of these parts would seem to stand to the whole in the relation of the monstrous or comic gargoyles on a mediæval cathedral to the awful splendor of the glorious God-informed edifice.

Fourth, we have in the teachings of Christ, projected against the colorful background of the Prophets, illustrated by his life, and enforced by his ever-living spirit, principles of right relationship between man and God which are no mere figments of fancy, impracticable under the exigencies of the daily round, but which prove out in practice, verifying the grand truths of the Holy Scriptures by communicating to the souls of men that peace, that power, that buoyancy which still, as of old, make of every man who is in Christ Jesus a new creature.

We can hardly regret the passing of the old view of the Bible. It was narrow, cold, artificial. It was not on account of that view, but in spite of it, that our fathers

found, as they did find, the best things in life under the guidance which its pages afforded. But we ought to regret, so deeply as to strive to correct the error, the fact that the new view of the Bible is so often misunderstood, and that in consequence modern Christians have moved so far away from that habitual recourse to its teachings which gave their fathers comfort and aid. On a just understanding of this new view, we can still say, as men would have said long ago, that if we were to put all of the other books in the world on one arm of the scale of enduring value, and the Bible on the other, the Bible would outweigh them all. To learn the Bible for ourselves and to teach it to our children, line upon line, precept upon precept—this remains, as it ever has been, the secret of vitality in the profession of the Christian religion, and the hope of the future for an increasing conformation of human society with the will of God until we attain to the Kingdom of Heaven on earth.

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VI

Jesus and the Spiritual History of Mankind

By Charles W. Gilkey

THE American Philosophical Society, which has recently announced its purpose to undertake an "intellectual stock-taking" of our modern life, has just made public the views of six of its most prominent members as to what they consider the chief intellectual needs of the modern world. President Angell of Yale University replied:

"I should say that perhaps the most pressing intellectual need is such poise as comes from a genuine coördination of the great subdivisions of thought. These subdivisions have become so highly specialized, so separatistic, and so self-conscious, not to say self-complacent, that the genuinely philosophical outlook on life and its problems, an outlook which presupposes inclusive vision and genuine insight, has become utterly impossible."

Nor is the philosophically trained educator the only one of the six who senses the same need. Dr. Alexis Carrell of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research declared that the world

"imperatively needs the advent of great intellectual leaders who know the requirements of spiritual life as well as the

sciences concerned with inanimate and living matter. . . . A better coördination of scientific and social effort would render a distinctive service in preventing some of the bad effects of specialized knowledge. When only one aspect of a problem is taken into consideration, the solution is generally ineffective."

The study of religion in human history and experience has developed as fast and ramified as far during the last century as that of most of the other great fields of scholarly research; and it has not altogether escaped the same tendencies toward departmentalization and specialization, and the same resulting inadequacies of outlook, against which both the philosopher and the scientist thus warn us. The curricula of most theological schools that have kept within sight of the progress of modern knowledge and about religion, are abundant evidence of the extent to which this process of theological specialization has gone. It would take the larger part of a mature lifetime for one student to pursue all the courses that are offered in any one of our leading seminaries, each one given by a specialist in his own field.

The task of synthesizing these various and important contributions toward the understanding of religion into a comprehensive and consistent outlook on religion as a whole—and all the more into an adequate *Weltanschauung*—is one, the difficulty and yet the necessity of which is increasingly felt by the theological students and younger ministry of today. Among their teachers there are wide differences of opinion, not only on questions of detail, but also in the larger matters of principle and

perspective. The institution which sends them out to preach or teach, no longer feels under any necessity of reconciling or deciding among these various views; and only now and then takes much responsibility for the formulation of that "view of Christian doctrine" with which its graduates face not only their ordination council once and for all, but their flock twice a Sunday. In the struggle to work and live his own way through to some personal selection and synthesis out of all this inherited and transmitted mass of religious data, until it fuse into a religion of his own that is worth sharing, comes to many a modern minister one of the great discoveries of his own religious experience—that in these matters each one of us has to seek and find his own way, and that to such seekers the Master's promise is still fulfilled. The synthesis comes, not in any summary from a class-room, nor yet in any creed written out on paper, but in the developing experience of a life that is lived religiously.

There is one large and central area of critical religious concern in which this task of constructive synthesis has become at once more difficult and more urgent in our own generation, not only for theologically trained ministers, but hardly less for laymen who are thoughtful about religion. The place of Jesus in Christian life and thought has been central ever since the apostolic age itself; and recent Christocentric movements in theology, that have given up the attempt to patrol in force the far-flung frontiers of the older orthodoxy, have massed their forces the more strongly at this center of loyalty. But meanwhile

the theological student who tries to make his own way toward that same central citadel, finds his journey interrupted and his credentials examined at a succession of outposts that mark the respective limits of theological disciplines that do not always seem to be contiguous. He takes courses in the theology and psychology of the Hebrew prophets who were plainly the spiritual progenitors of Jesus; in the history of New Testament times and the eschatology of late Judaism that set the complex background for Jesus' life and thought; in the primitive Christianity that expected the speedy return of its Risen Lord upon the clouds of heaven; in the Christian thought that has elaborated its doctrines of the person and work of Christ into a complicated system; in the religious education that seeks to win and train the younger generation for "Jesus' way of living." And meanwhile he does special reading or takes a course on "Problems in the Life of Jesus," that faces him with the fact that our sources of dependable information about Jesus himself are too meager to permit of any adequate or comprehensive "Life" in the usual sense; too meager even to provide a decisive answer to many of the questions we are most eager to ask about him. Thus he finds Wrede, on the one hand, arguing that Jesus never held himself to be the Messiah at all; and Schweitzer, on the other hand, interpreting him exclusively from the messianic and eschatological point of view. It is small wonder that he finds no little difficulty in putting together these various glimpses from different viewpoints into one clear and convincing portrait of his own.

The thoughtful layman who tries to keep some personal contact with the swelling stream of books about Jesus that pours from our contemporary press finds himself in difficulties less technical perhaps, but hardly less perplexing. Famous writers offer him a best seller, done in the orthodox Catholic or the American journalistic or the German biographical manner, as he may prefer. Jesus is summed up for him as a small-town man, or a young rabbi, or one of the prophets, or a man of genius, or a poet: and while any one of these diverse portraits may strike him as illuminating some one of the features of the "Great Galilean" with new vividness, he finds the very variety of them difficult to understand as drawn from a single original. When experienced biographers as well as learned doctors disagree, who shall decide?

That nothing is to be gained in this situation, either by shutting one's eyes or turning one's back, is the most obvious direction that points forward toward real progress. The scholarly mind of our time will not be satisfied until it knows all that can be ascertained about the Jesus of history, and the complicated process by which he somehow became the Christ of faith. This search involves so many ramifications and requires so much of the specialist's technique that division of labor and multiplication of agencies are inevitable. It is no less inevitable, in view of the nature and the scantiness of the sources, that there should be wide differences of opinion among competent scholars; and even more, between those who approach the study of Jesus from different sides. The English literary critic, Murry, writing on *Jesus—Man*

of Genius, with his keen eye focused on the marks of greatness in the personality of Jesus himself, and the American scholar, Case, writing his *Jesus: a New Biography* after decades of research into the background of New Testament life and times, have recently given us not only volumes, but methods of approach, each of which valuably supplements the other. The slow, cross-checking consensus of decades and even of generations will be necessary to sift out the vagaries, and confirm the insights, of both of which Jesus has been the inevitable occasion.

Meanwhile—and this is the burden of this present chapter—that need for poise and comprehensiveness of outlook, for "inclusive vision and genuine insight," which President Angell declared to be the most pressing intellectual need of our own time, is doubly urgent if we are to make our way forward to any clearer view of Jesus, and any fuller understanding of his significance for the present and the future. It is the special responsibility of the Christian mind and heart not to curb or hinder its specializing scholars, by whose labors its own faith has been and will be progressively purged of those elements which are found to be incongruous with our growing knowledge: but rather to keep vivid in their experience and its own those insights and those energies which Jesus more than any other figure in human history has brought to mankind and to individual men.

The path toward such an outlook has already been struck into, and followed a little way, at least, by one of the characteristic insistences of modern scholarship in its

search for the Jesus of history: that he is to be best understood and appreciated when we approach him, not as an unrelated irruption from some other plane of existence that ignores all the relationships of life as we know it, but as an individual born out of a definite human heritage into an actual historical situation, in which he became in turn the initiator of certain powerful influences that operate to this day upon a wider scale than ever. The historical research of the last century, applying the critical methods of investigation and the social methods of interpretation that have yielded such large results in other fields, has related Jesus with new clearness to the life behind him, around him, and after him—even though it has by no means yet been able to penetrate the depths of his personal inner life where so many of our unsolved problems lie. It has showed him to us as a child of his Jewish heritage, entering into and carrying forward the great succession of the prophets; as a man of his time, at the focus of its religious, social, and political problems; becoming then after his death the Risen Lord of a religious movement which in the course of generations has become worldwide.

Now it is proverbially easy, in any study of the trees in a forest, to lose one's bearings in the wood as a whole; in poring over the detailed maps of a region, to forget its larger relations to other counties and other countries, which only maps of less detail and more inclusiveness will show. The best remedy for the latter is the deliberate use of maps on various scales; for the former, the personal and frequent exploration of the whole wood.

It is equally important to keep reminding ourselves that Jesus' relation to the life which produced him and sprang from him is not limited to the political conditions and eschatological interests of the late Judaism and early Christianity which were indeed his immediate environment. He is a culminating figure in humanity's religious history, and religion has always been and remains one of mankind's major concerns. In that long history the relation of the individual to his fellows has tended to emerge into a larger and larger place: Jesus completed this process by practicing as well as teaching a completely ethicized and socialized religion, in which, as the Parable of the Last Judgment so clearly shows, the love and service of man are the true path to the knowledge of God. It has been a history, therefore, in which the individual human being has come to hold a more and more important place in and for his own sake: Jesus completed that process also by living as well as teaching the faith that the individual is of infinite value to God, and ought to be so held by man. It has been a history, likewise, in which ethical and religious obligations have tended to widen their scope beyond the limited confines of family or racial relationship: Jesus completed that process also by universalizing these relationships into a new order of things which he called "the Kingdom of God," constituted by love to man and trust in God, for whose speedy coming he lived and died.

Granted at once that he did not think or speak about these great matters in any such laborious and lifeless language as we all use when we try to think clearly about

them. His was the vivid language of his own race and time—and of his own Orient, where these things are always put pictorially into parable and poetry, rather than philosophically into propositions; and his was that vivid language where it most closely touches universal human experience, out of those elemental relationships of men to each other and to nature that are worldwide. Jesus put profound truths of universal human concern into simple and unforgetable speech; and neither the mind nor the conscience of humanity has been able since then to forget them—or him. We are not dealing here with a thinker or a genius whose field was or is of interest only to a few; but with one whose chief concern was with the meaning and value of human life itself, and whose assurances have proved themselves convincing to all sorts and conditions of men of many races and in all subsequent generations.

This general appeal of Jesus, this age-long response to him, have sprung from something deeper than either the nature or the form of his teaching alone, or from both of them together. It has come also from some profound and essential connection between the things he taught and the life he lived. Among all the insights that make J. Middleton Murry's *Jesus—Man of Genius* (whether or not one agrees with his opinion on this or that particular question) one of the most significant and illuminating books about Jesus which our generation has produced, these sentences from the closing two paragraphs of his chapter on "The Teaching of Jesus" penetrate very deeply into his secret:

"If a single word must be found to describe his teaching, it shall be this word 'spontaneous.' . . . Jesus' teaching is, and is eternal because it is a teaching of life. Life cannot be taught, it can only be lived and known. Those alone understand the teaching of Jesus who know that it is not teaching at all, but simply the living utterance of one who had achieved rebirth into a new condition of life. Its purpose is to create this new life in others, and in those who have ears to hear it new life is immediately born. Whether Jesus himself spoke, or the author of the fourth Gospel imagined them, the secret of Jesus' teaching is in the words, 'I came that ye might have life, and have it more abundantly.'"[1]

It is just at this point that much of our contemporary pessimism over our inability any longer to write a "Life of Christ" in the traditional sense easily loses its way. Robert Keable, for instance, leaves the impression in the preface and first chapter of *The Great Galilean,* that we do not know enough about "the historical Christ" to say very much about him or get very much from him, and then devotes the rest of the book to showing how much the Jesus of history has to teach us that we greatly need to hear and still more to put into practice. Like many others who are struggling to get out of the shadow of the orthodoxy which they have outgrown or revolted against, and who carry, consequently, into all their thinking about religion the scars, or better perhaps the inhibitions, of what we might almost call a "negation complex," he implies in his earlier pages that the value of Jesus' life for us hangs upon our ability to answer the conventional biographical questions that produce a newspaper

[1] From Jesus.

obituary notice or a sketch in *Who's Who.* But there is nothing more striking or significant in contemporary religion than the fact that some deep and powerful inner relation between what Jesus taught and what he himself lived and therefore *was,* is at least as strongly felt by the most radical of modern critics as by the most conservative among the orthodox. The former may greatly reduce the *quantity* of our dependable knowledge about him; but in what remains they sense a spiritual *quality,* an utter congruity between his convictions and his career, that is in any case the real source of his spiritual power over mankind. That inner harmony and radiant energy may be sensed alike when Murry and Simkhovitch, Bundy and Bowie, sketch for us in black and white the Jesus of history as they see him, no less than when Papini paints for us in bright Latin colors the orthodox Christ of the Catholic creeds. The genius of Beethoven shines as clearly in the first few measures of the Allegretto from the Seventh Symphony, as in the whole of any of the others; and Leonardo, with his few small canvases, does not suffer alongside Rubens with his many large ones. In religion as in creative art, it is not quantity, but quality, that is important.

And it is one of the amazing facts about the life of Jesus, that he continues to give evidence of this supreme and creative spiritual quality in our own time as well as in more credulous ages, or a critical no less than a traditional interpretation. Whether one agrees with Middleton Murry's views on a dozen moot points in the life of Jesus or not, no spiritually-minded reader can stand

before his portrait of "Jesus—Man of Genius" without a bowed head and a kindled heart; in Murry's own vivid phrase, "If a man have a spark of understanding, it will be made a flame." Bundy's *Our Recovery of Jesus* leaves the question open whether Jesus held himself to be the Messiah; but it also plants deep in the soul of the thoughtful reader quickening seeds sprung from Jesus' own religious life. Some of us have recently heard two famous university presidents, at different times and under very different circumstances, speaking intimately of the dominant influences in their own lives at critical periods, put the influence of Jesus first—and both of them were counted religious radicals. Our own generation has seen Albert Schweitzer, the most radical of modern critics in his sweeping reconstruction of the historical Jesus as a purely eschatological herald, leave his professor's chair and his beloved organ seat to live and work as a medical missionary "on the edge of the primeval forest" in equatorial Africa, because, in his own phrase from a bit of vivid autobiography, "It is the Lord Jesus who has told the doctor and his wife to come to Ogowe."

Continuing and creative experiences like these make one wonder whether the familiar dilemma between "the religion *of* Jesus" and "the religion *about* Jesus" can be made as sharp or pushed as far as some of our contemporary liberals drive it. The plain fact both of spiritual history and of religious experience seems somehow to be that the consistent and complete incarnation (the word is used in no esoteric or technical sense) of Jesus' teaching in his own life and personality has made a new fact

for theological evaluation, and a new force for religious experience, which neither element in the combination—the teaching or the personality—would have produced by itself alone. To use our latest lingo, this combination is an "emergent" in the historical process, with new characteristics and potentialities of its own—like hydrogen and oxygen combining to produce water; and it is a fallacy in either case to say that the new combination is "nothing but" its constituent elements, for it has its own new and distinctive properties and powers. Christian faith has sought to rationalize the significance of this new fact in a long series of successive systems of theology, each couched in the language and articulated with the forms of thought of its own day, and persisting then by the inertia of orthodoxy to hamper the fresh thinking of another day. Our own age, peculiarly impatient of such traditional heritages, is likely to overlook or ignore the fact, because it cannot accept the explanation; in proverbial phrase, "to throw out the baby with the bath."

For us also the fact remains to be faced, and explained in our own terms, that the universe has ever produced such a man upon this "wandering island in the sky"; and that having once appeared, he has had the influence that he continues to exert. The plain fact of the historical process, that he comes at the culmination of a long sequence of previous spiritual development, and has become in turn the source of a still wider and mightier spiritual movement, would seem to indicate that he is no mere "sport" in the history of humanity. It is not enough, therefore, to set him into genetic relations with his own

immediate environment alone—with late Judaism, on the one hand, and early Christianity, on the other. An adequate and comprehensive synthesis must show him where the historic process has long since placed him in relation to the spiritual history of mankind, and where religious experience still discovers him. The older theology, with its tight little philosophies of history and of the universe, did this by means of a deductive theory of Incarnation and Revelation, the presuppositions of which we can no longer take for granted; but the problem it so confidently faced—the relation between Jesus' quality of life and the process of the universe itself, the relation of values to facts, as we define it nowadays—is our problem no less, and on a far vaster scale and stage than ever before.

But it would be totally inadequate, in the light of the nature of religion and of the facts of human history as we are coming to see them both more clearly, to imply that this comprehensive synthesis is a task for our modern thinking alone. Just as the inductive methods of our modern science differentiate themselves from the deductive philosophies of earlier days as an approach to truth, so does the modern approach to religion, as a way of life, distinguish itself from earlier conceptions that regarded it as a body of doctrines to be accepted. What the inductive method is to science, moral and social and spiritual adventure is to religion. The sign that points toward rapid advance in these matters is not so much the old invitation to theological debate, "What think ye of Christ," as it is the call of Christ to follow him into new areas of life and along new paths of faith and hope and

love. Whatever else that familiar phrase of Christian piety, "the Living Christ," may or may not mean, it surely has something to do with the extraordinary and continuing power of Jesus to open men's eyes to new social and spiritual truth, to help them find both themselves and him and God in new situations, and to hearten them for new advances of courageous faith in his spirit and his God.

Looking back across the generations, we can see plainly enough some great spiritual battlefields and many long campaigns where Jesus' valuations of human life and welfare have striven with the contemporary standards of men and of nations, and, resurrected again after repeated crucifixions, have at last prevailed. It took many centuries for his estimate of the value of the individual to work like leaven in the social order until the position of women was transformed, slavery was abolished, and democracy was able to maintain itself in a spiritual climate that he had done so much to alter for the better. Generations of his sincere followers, according to their lights, have never sensed the sparks of challenge to the contemporary *status quo* that were later to kindle into flame; but even if Paul did not realize the incongruity between his gospel and the institution of slavery, he did plant the seed of that gospel far and wide in the centers of the life of his own time, where the future was being shaped—and the centuries have brought a harvest from his sowing that he could not possibly foresee. The same process is repeating itself before our own eyes, as men slowly awake to the incongruity between the valuations

of Jesus and the mechanizing influences of our modern industry, or the institution of war; as the Christian missionary enterprise scatters its social and spiritual seeds the world around, in hope and faith of a harvest greater and other than we can foresee. There have, to be sure, been plenty of crusaders and many powerful forces in every great social advance, and many more of its beneficiaries likewise, who have not realized that Jesus had anything to do with their cause or they with him; but Jesus himself rejoiced to have it so in his Parable of the Last Judgment. Even the sun, on whose light and warmth we all depend, has scanty worshipers and few observers among its many beneficiaries.

Our own generation, engulfed in a tidal wave of tragedy, followed inevitably by a prolonged ebb-tide of idealism that has gone out so far and stayed out so long as to seem to alter most of our moral coast lines, while the fog of our own groping confusions has for the time being hidden most of our spiritual stars, leaving us to look oftener toward the bared mudflats of our disillusionment than toward the hills where the sky clears first—our own generation has some special occasions for spiritual contact and understanding with Jesus. The cynicism that is always a far more serious foe to vital religion than heresy or doubt is adding new voices to the ancient chorus, "Who will show us any good?" We have learned from sad experience that progress is not automatic, that rapid and serious degeneracy is not only possible but often actual, and that if we are to get on as a human race we must find new ideals revealed before us and new energies

quickened within us. That is just what Jesus has done both for society and for individuals in times past, and what he is doing in new areas of life such as our modern international, industrial, and racial relations, when he can find spirits kindred to his own. No one has yet arisen to point us higher, or hearten us more for the long climb, than he; and the heights to which he beckons us are still too high for our little faith.

Such spiritual ascents have usually been undertaken first by individuals and small groups who have caught a new glimpse of Jesus going on before them, and have risen up to follow. There are many such individuals and groups the world around today, and they are constantly finding new points of understanding and inner fellowship with him. He, too, knew what it meant to have his greatest hopes and expectations delayed and then disappointed—without losing his faith; to struggle to enlarge his own purposes so as to conform to a Greater Purpose whose scope and range were beyond his full understanding; and in a present darker far than ours, to trust in God for a future that he could not clearly foresee. Not only his words and his life, but his passion and his resurrection also, take on new and profounder meanings, and release new and mightier energies, for those who discover that the way that leads closest to him is indeed marked "Back to Christ" in the direction from which present-day Christianity has so recently emerged out of the days of theological simplification behind us—but "Forward with Christ" to the spiritual advance and adventure of the days ahead.

VII

Christianity and Redemption

By Reinhold Niebuhr

SOMETIMES religion is merely the soul's reaction to life's mystery. Even when men lack every sense of frustration in their lives and feel no conscious need of emancipation from sin and suffering, they may be religious in the sense that they may express reverence before the majesties and infinitudes of the world about them and gratitude for the beneficences of nature upon which they are nourished. But the most vital religion springs from a sense of need and culminates in an experience of redemption. The need may be defined in various terms and time and circumstance may change its character; but without an experience of need and redemption no religion will finally maintain its vitality.

Primitive man turned to the resources of religion for deliverance from every ill from which he suffered. Religion was a magic by which he might overcome the inadequacies and brutalities of the natural world; it was a crude science by which he tried to bend natural forces into the service of the human will. By faith he frustrated the cruel designs of his enemies, and religion gave the sanctity to his customs and traditions by which their

stability was insured and his social life was ordered. In the mysteries of religion man achieved union with the divine and overcame the frailties of his flesh; through its votive offerings he propitiated the anger of the gods and averted the punishment which his sin deserved. Rising to higher levels in which the perfection of his character became an end of life, he sought in religion the resource by which he might overcome the inadequacies of his nature. The quest of religion became a search for some sacramental grace by which weakness might be turned into strength and misery into happiness.

With the growth of knowledge and man's gradual conquest of the natural world the field of religion has been obviously circumscribed. At least a part of the redemptive process has been secularized. For emancipation from the limitations of the natural world men turn increasingly to science rather than religion. The frailties of the body are overcome, or the pain resulting from them alleviated, by the skill of the surgeon and the astute diagnosis of the physician. The stability of governments and societies rests not upon the sanctities of religion, but upon the reasonableness of laws and customs and the consent of the governed to their perpetuation. Of late social scientists presume to speak with the same authority as the physical scientists and insist they can discover the way by which man may be saved of his social ills. While scientific knowledge aspires in vain after the same precision in the affairs of society as in the processes of nature, there are undoubtedly many ills from which men suffer in their common life from which a higher social

intelligence will save them. In the realm of character formation educational psychology is becoming increasingly authoritative and helpful and a wise pedagogy presumes to accomplish what was once thought to be the exclusive province of divine grace. Even the business of regeneration and character reformation has been invaded by science and many men seek to overcome the chaos of conflicting passions in their inner life by consulting a competent psychiatrist rather than by asking for prayers. With the logic of thought and events so inexorably in the direction of secularization of the redemptive processes, it is a real question whether religion will continue to be regarded as sufficiently necessary in the task of saving men from sin and suffering to insure its vitality and prevent it from sinking into the status of an emotional glow upon thought and life.

There is a more reassuring answer to this question than the moderns who are obsessed with the expansion of scientific knowledge are able to realize. In as far as religion was a crude science, trying to explain and to control what was but imperfectly understood, it was bound to yield to science. But in its truest nature religion is sharply differentiated from science. Science is analysis and religion is adventure. It is adventure in both thought and action. The world in which we live is so complex that a mere analysis of its processes creates a sense of confusion rather than of purposive order. The assumptions of religion that reality is finally bound together by a central purpose, that the universe "means intensely and means well," is a sublime adventure of faith which

analysis partially justifies but never prompts. It is a poetic rather than a scientific conception, not without philosophical justification, but having its roots in man's moral imagination rather than in his analytic attitudes. Adventure in thought is complemented in the life of religion by adventure in life. However necessary an intelligent analysis of the forces which contend for mastery in the soul of man and of society may be, it is no substitute for the moral and spiritual purpose which unifies character and society by bringing the chaotic forces of individual and of social life in subjection to it and which achieves the potency demanded for such dominion only by working on the assumption that it is in accord with and may hold commerce with the central spiritual purpose of the universe itself. The redemptive power of religion lies in its ability to strengthen moral purpose in men and in society to such a degree that it may conquer the discords which exist in the soul of man, in his common life and in his relation to the cosmos. This task cannot be accomplished by the creation and cultivation of moral and spiritual purpose alone. An intelligent analysis of the forces which surround him and which determine his collective and individual conduct has become a part of the redemptive process. It may be more correct to say that men will recognize more and more explicitly what they have long since conceded implicitly—*i.e.,* that religion, like every other force in life, is most potent not when it claims to be a solitary value, but when it takes its place in the hierarchy of values by which life is disciplined and perfected. Life is most

completely developed when there is a perfect partnership between the intelligence which analyzes and directs the various forces and processes of character and nature, and the spiritual purpose which anticipates reason and dominates the lesser forces.

If Christianity has any preëminence as a redemptive religion, it must be won and held by the success with which its aid to the confused spirit of man is attended. Jesus insisted on the pragmatic test. "By their fruits ye shall know them," he said. Redemption may involve more than moral fruits, as we shall see later, but the moral test must be applied. Without it redemption sinks into magic, which, because it has no objective and historical tests to support its validity, authenticates itself by claiming magical revelation in its support. A religion which begins in a magical revelation and ends in a magical redemption has no claim upon the interest or respect of modern men.

The potency of Christianity as a redemptive religion is derived from the unerring intuition with which its central personality, Jesus, discovered and revealed the spiritual nature of reality and the perfection with which his own life illustrated and symbolized what he had discovered. With unerring instinct the church, following the greatest of his apostles, made his tragic fate upon the cross rather than either his life or his teachings the central fact in its system of belief. For the cross is the concession of faith to the darker realities of life. It is the symbol of the fact that the redemptive purpose which faith discovers at the heart of reality is not immediately

triumphant, and that the price of its victory in history is suffering and pain. It was inevitable that the imagination of faith, which is never so perfect but that it attaches magical qualities to the symbols by which its great truths are expressed, should destroy the moral power of the central fact and symbol of its revelation by reducing it to magic. But the aberrations of faith can never destroy the redemptive power of its highest revelations whenever it is purged of its superstitions.

The redemptive force of the discovery of Jesus and of the revelation in his own life and character operates in every one of the areas in which human life is subject to frustration and pain. Man feels himself lonely in a vast universe and outraged by the brutality of nature and its indifference to the values which he cherishes most. Science may indeed draw some of the fangs of nature's enmity and emancipate man from some of her caprices. But science is powerless to resolve the antinomy between man and nature. That can only be resolved by the revelation and discovery of those spiritual aspects of reality which transcend the obvious facts of nature and relate the values of human life to cosmic facts. Jesus accomplished this by regarding the universe with sufficient simplicity of heart and mind to be able to see the central fact. He saw the universe in terms of a love which was like that of a father's. Innocent of scientific and metaphysical subtleties, he was not distracted by nature's impersonal processes. Even the indifference of nature to man's good and evil could be made to reveal the love of a father who permitted the sun to shine upon the evil

and the good and sent his rain upon the just and the unjust. The sophisticated mind will never find it easy to hold to this conception of the universe, but neither will it ever be able to destroy it. Whenever philosophy, which is more interested in unities and relationships than science, comes to grips with the ultimate problem of reality, it arrives at conceptions which give varying degrees of support to Jesus' sublime assumption and faith. The fact that Jesus' own life, consistently lived by the faith that God is love and that love is God, ended on the cross, has rightfully become a symbol of the idea that the love which creates the world by reducing chaos to harmony accomplishes its purpose only through great suffering. Whenever the church has occupied itself too exclusively with metaphysics it has been tempted to deny this fact by its dogmas of divine omnipotence. But its poetic intuitions must always conquer its logical deductions in the end and maintain the faith of Jesus.

As social life progresses and becomes more complex the ills from which man suffers at the hands of his fellows become proportionately more important than those which he suffers at the hands of nature. It is inevitable, therefore, that he should seek redemption increasingly in terms of a reorganization of his society which will guarantee social cohesion without destroying individual worth. Into the brutalities of history Jesus projected the sublime assumption that mankind is a family and that men can be most potently influenced by love rather than by force, that evil can be overcome by forgiveness rather than by vengeance, and that a mutual

sacrifice of rights rather than self-assertion will lead to the highest self-realization and social peace. Obviously it is not easy to maintain such an assumption and to justify it in history. At any rate, it is quite apparent that the religion of those who profess to follow Jesus and to have caught his spirit has been less redemptive in curing the social ills from which man suffers than in any other area of life. In justice to the church it must be said that the strategy of love, difficult enough in intimate and personal relations, is greatly complicated when applied to the life and relationships of groups, racial, economic, and national. Not only the complexity of the relationships, but the difficulty of bringing group life under the dominion of any ethical ideal, complicates the task. It is not altogether to the discredit of those who profess the religion of Jesus that they have not made love triumphant and redemptive in the life of society. Nevertheless, there have been specific weaknesses in the life of organized Christianity which have destroyed its social potency to a greater degree than a charitable consideration for the difficulty of the task could excuse. The fact that the church has so frequently conceived the redemptive force which issues from the life of Jesus in magical terms has made it incapable of applying the power of love in specific situations. Nor has it realized to what high potency love must be raised before it can really overcome the brutalities of man. The assumption that men are intrinsically brothers rather than enemies cannot be justified if it is not stubbornly held even in defiance of some immediate circumstances which seem to disprove it.

Religious faith must be constantly refreshed if it is to maintain that position not only against the convictions of a sophisticated intelligence but against the too sober wisdom of what is ordinarily called "common sense." As social life becomes more complex, intelligence becomes increasingly necessary in the task of redeeming man from his social miseries. It might be argued, in fact, that the development of man's rational faculties is accomplishing more at present to emancipate him from his social ills by stripping him of his parochial prejudices and bigotries than any religious force. Society can, nevertheless, not be ordered by reason alone. Where men are imperfect, reason is always in danger of perpetuating their imperfections by prompting social policies adjusted to their present achievements rather than to their potentialities. Only a religious faith which anticipates what is not obviously a fact can save men from the mutual hatreds and conflicts which always threaten to reduce society to anarchy. There is no salvation from the ills which men suffer at one another's hands except a salvation through love. It is because organized religion has believed itself in possession of redemptive resources which could accomplish the social task at a cheaper price than that which love exacts, that the church has become socially so impotent and so disloyal to the essential faith of Jesus. The love which Jesus taught and incarnated is a redemptive magic in the sense that it is really potent; but it is not magical in the sense that it is an easy substitute for moral and spiritual forces. If religion does not function to raise the potency of the spirit of love and to

replenish its force against the attrition which it suffers in its necessary traffic with worldly wisdom and common sense, religion is not socially redemptive.

However urgent may be the problem which man's relations to the universe and to his fellow men create, he has, at least since the dawn of the Christian religion, conceived the problem of his inner life as the most pressing and urgent one. Redemption has meant first of all peace with God and himself, gained by victory over, or release from, his sins. The person of Christ, rather than any element in his teachings, has been particularly potent in this redemption because Christ was at once the effective symbol of the spiritual ideal by which the conflicting passions of the inner life were harmonized, and of the divine grace which extended fellowship to the soul even when its inner harmony was not complete and sin still marred its life.

For the Apostle Paul, who is really the author of Christianity as a religion of personal redemption, Christ was both a revelation of the divine will and plan, in obedience to which man would achieve a new moral life and new spiritual power, and a revelation of the divine grace which knew how to overcome the misery caused by our perpetual inadequacies and frustrations. On the one hand, Paul could rejoice that if any man be in Christ he is a new creature, and that the fruits of the Spirit are love, joy, and peace and other tangible and observable assets in the character of man; on the other hand, he could insist that salvation had nothing to do with "works of the law," but was solely a transaction between the err-

ing soul and divine grace. To Paul, as to all true mystics, salvation was peace through power, on the one hand, and peace through pardon, on the other. On the one side of his doctrine Christ was the symbol of the moral and spiritual ideal which, if man would give himself to it in absolute devotion, would so dominate his life that all inner divisions and confusions would be harmonized and man would achieve that harmony and peace which comes through victory. In this mood the cross became to Paul a living principle. It was the price which victory cost. He could, therefore, rejoice that he was called upon to complete the suffering of Christ. Here the Christ-mysticism of Paul is a truly moral force. On the other side of his doctrine, the law, as symbolizing moral endeavor, is the instrument of death; and Christ is the force by which the soul is released from the curse of the law. The cross becomes an instrument by which the eternal conflict between love and justice is resolved in favor of love and grace. Paul is not entirely responsible for all the artificial, commercial, and juridical doctrines of atonement which theologians have fashioned through the ages. Nevertheless he did lay the foundations for, and some word or other of his gives plausibility to, most of these theories. For this reason some thinkers, particularly in late generations, want to avoid the dangers which inhere in these theories by disavowing Paul in favor of Jesus. They do not realize that Paul was not the author, but only an effective champion and expounder, of the religious experience of grace, and that this experience is a necessary element in vital religion. Religion must in some of its

aspects be supramoral, however dangerous its supramoral elements may be to the moral life. Jesus, for that matter, preached of divine forgiveness and grace in a way that shocked the strict moralists of his day and caused them to fear for their moral standards.

If religion is successful in sensitizing the conscience, it is bound to make men conscious of their inability to reach the goals set by devout imagination. "Man," said Robert Louis Stevenson, "was not destined to succeed. Failure is the fate allotted to all men." True religion redeems men, partly by helping them to be victorious over sin and partly by reassuring them in their inevitable failure to gain victory. Vital religion brings men closer to God, partly by perfecting their lives and character and partly by granting them, in the mystical experience, a fellowship with God which they have not earned and do not deserve by their moral achievements. Religion is, on the one hand, a moral adventure, a climb of "the steep ascent to heaven," and on the other hand a dispensation of grace by which heaven descends to those who can never reach it. Christianity becomes a morally redemptive religion not by an exclusion of those mystical, supramoral elements which are dangerous to moral energy, but by a realization of the moral dangers which lurk in this necessary mysticism. The more mechanical and artificial the doctrine of the atonement becomes in the thought of the church, the greater is the danger of the religious experience which it prompts, to the moral life. It is necessary, therefore, to be critical toward doctrines of grace

and mystical experiences of redemption. But if they are excluded from our theology and suppressed in our religious life, we do violence to the true instincts of religion and encourage those periodic reactions which completely destroy the moral energy of religion.

VIII

Prayer

By Albert Edward Day

THE contemporary mind turns to the laboratory when it seeks the truth. When bent on achievement, its reliance is upon bench and tools and all those industrial and social activities of which they are symbols. In neither quest is there likely to be a widespread or wholehearted resort to the altar.

The man who is modern in habits of thought as well as in modes of dress is persuaded that reality is rational. Whatever happens seems to him to be the result of ascertainable causes. Or, if he is "touchy" about the assumption of causality, he is sure that any event is at least a term in a discoverable and uniform sequence. Wishing to get along with reality, to live with it, to command it for his purposes, he is convinced that he must discover cause-and-effect relationships or what he may perhaps describe as the regular sequence of events. He turns, therefore, with increasing confidence to theoretical and applied science.

That his trust has not been in vain, the amazing chronicle of scientific achievement is dazzling evidence. Not with irrational dependence upon mysterious charms, but

with confident reliance upon proved instruments and methods the modern man confronts the diseases which slew his helpless ancestors, the forces of nature which terrified and destroyed them, the distances which hopelessly separated them, and he conquers disease, makes the forces of nature his obedient and trusty servant, and binds the earth into one gigantic though often quarrelsome neighborhood. In the presence of these magnificent achievements it is not surprising that the way of science seems to an increasing number the one road which leads to whatever conquest of reality is open to the sons of men and that the way of religion, epitomized in the resort to prayer, is in eclipse. There are many, in fact, who would reduce religion to an awe in the presence of unsolved mysteries and to a humble acceptance of whatever meanings the progress of science seems to discover in the universe. Even those who think of God as our Father in heaven are compelled to recognize that in his self-expression in the order of nature there is a regularity which he does not abandon—a regularity which is a part of his fatherly concern for his creatures, because only in such a regular order could there be on our part either assured knowledge or hopeful plan. Every prayer to such a Father must reckon with this uniformity of his will summarized in these laws of nature, and experience has proven that there will not be among thoughtful people a daily practice of prayer unless the use of prayer can be articulated with the presence of law in nature and in the mind of man.

In this paper an attempt will be made to suggest at least

some of the more important reasons why many of us, who share the viewpoint of science and the conclusions of common experience in regard to law, are convinced that prayer has a permanent place, not merely as the expression of the soul's attitude in the presence of the *"tremendum mysterium,"* but as a means of effecting a harmonious and satisfying adjustment between man and the rest of reality about him.

The fundamental assumption of science, Bertrand Russell to the contrary notwithstanding, is that reality is rational, that it can be understood, and that by obedience it can be mastered. True prayer is nothing more or less than an effective method of exploring reality and of mastering it through obedience to its laws. Jesus summed it all up in that majestic prayer of his, "Our Father—thy kingdom come—thy will be done." The comprehending soul who utters that is not idly summoning a divine Santa Claus to help him escape or outwit reality, but is reaching out to explore and to surrender to reality. Christian prayer is not magic, but science; it is discovery, obedience, mastery.

I

It demonstrates its value in the integration of personality—that immediate world of reality with which all of us must deal.

1. It is one of the most effective experiences of that utter, unrestrained, unembarrassed outpouring of the soul which every psychologist knows to be an indispensable condition of health and sometimes of sanity itself. To

put it in the very simplest terms, we all need some one to whom we can go and into whose sympathetic and understanding mind we can pour out the pent-up floods of disappointment and anger, of jealousy and ambition, of shame and desire. To confess such things to the world or to the truest friend, even, would be impossible. We have not enough confidence in them, in their capacity for understanding and charity, to beget in us that frankness, that freedom from restraint, which are necessary to let loose our pent feelings, our painful memories, our bitter anticipations. There is always something held in reserve, something which we cannot reveal. We are not able to rid our souls of their most tragic burden. Our human pride or shame seals our lips at the most crucial moment. The Roman Catholic Church has endeavored to answer this demand for utter self-expression by the confessional. That such provision has not been entirely in vain our psychology as well as our candor compels us to admit. Many a heavy laden and distraught soul has found relief from what would have been an intolerable and suffocating experience within the portals of this ecclesiastical but very human institution. How complete such an experience is it would be impossible for a Protestant to say. With our natural reticence about the intimacies of life, it seems that in the presence even of a priest there would be a reluctance sufficient to choke back some of the words which we need on certain occasions to utter. I could not say to the noblest man some of the things which I have needed to say to God.

Such a meaning in prayer implies a confidence on our

part that God is there. One cannot be real and complete in his self-revelation without a sense of Another to whom the revelation is being made. Redemptive confession cannot be uttered into empty space. It does not wait upon the crude anthropomorphisms which the scientific mind repudiates, but it does demand a faith in that divine capacity for a sympathetic understanding of our human plight which is inseparable from a theistic conception of the universe and to which later paragraphs will give a more reasoned expression. With such a faith, men and women who have found themselves in desperate plight, their hearts torn between strong desires which they could not escape and shame that such desires could possess them, their fears battling with their hopes, their pride smarting under the humiliations of life have told God all about it and in the very telling have found relief. Confession has lanced the inflammation and drained away the poison. It has tapped the pent-up reservoirs of bitterness and emptied them completely. It has revealed the unreasonableness of fears and irritations and has restored courage and poise. If prayer did nothing else for us, set no other forces in motion, summoned no external allies to our aid, its function as a cleansing agency through the antiseptic power of unrestrained confession would be sufficient to justify its claim upon our time.

2. Prayer operates powerfully as a discipline of the self. That is not true of just any kind of prayer. Some prayer is mere habit, the repetition of phrases which have become so familiar that by and by they are spoken when utterly unrelated to the immediate need of the life

and make as little impression upon the repeater as the recital of eeny-meeny-miny-mo. Real prayer involves the concentration of mind upon a present concrete situation, and its happy result is to tone up the mind to a new ability to deal with that situation. That is especially true of two universal aspects of prayer.

(a) When filial souls come to God about any matter, the first and most helpful thing they do is to give thanks —thanks that he is and that they are not alone with their problems; thanks for all the divine help they have experienced in the past; thanks for every encouraging, comforting, gladdening element in the situation before them. Thus there comes to them a remembrance of glorious experiences of yesterday and a recognition of the hopeful elements in the problems of today, and, out of it all, a buoyancy of mood which marshals in splendid array all their abilities and sends them out to meet with confidence the fears and forces which await conquest.

(b) Real prayer involves analytical thought of the highest type. It is not a mere obedience to impulse— an impassioned and hurried begging for something that seems good, trusting God to grant or deny in accordance with his inscrutable wisdom. One might just as well repeat the alphabet and rely on God to interpret the letters according to his knowledge of our needs as to blindly frame a request in terms of the first impulse or of persistent but unexamined desire. Genuine prayer is a lifting of each situation up into the light of all that we believe to be God's will, and a scrutiny of every element present that we may ask ourselves not only what we may

expect God to do about it, but what we ourselves ought to do about it. It involves the application of our very highest capacities for thought to all the events of our life and to all our relationships with our fellows. The result is not merely a clarification of the situation, a discovery of some values worth dying for, a disclosure of methods that promise to conserve all other values involved, but a clarification of mind, a dismissal of some desires as deceptive, a unification of the inner life about the ends which in our creative prayer have discovered themselves as good.

3. Prayer is an effective agency in the creation of *interests*. "The history of any life is the history of its interests rather than ideas," according to Ogden. If there is one dominant interest, the life will move rather steadily in the direction which that interest demands. If the soul is an anarchy of conflicting interests, there will be confused thinking and chaotic action, a stormy career whose deeds are incalculable and whose course is as unpredictable as that of a ship blown upon by shifting winds and uncontrolled by a helm in the hand of a wise and steady pilot. One of the main problems of life, therefore, is the development of healthy and harmonious interests.

There is not sufficient space allotted to this chapter to make possible a discussion of the process by which such a development is achieved. It must suffice here to say that interests seem to arise out of a modification and a combination and a realization of the larger significance of the simple wants with which we begin life. The salvation of life, therefore, depends upon the intelligent

transformation of its native wants into healthful and holy interests.

(a) Prayer functions most helpfully here. The man who thinks of prayer as a means of harmonious adjustment to reality begins with a consciousness of two things: first, of certain desires and fears which possess him; second, of a reality which must be reckoned with if those desires are to be realized or those fears abated. He, therefore, gives himself to the intense and earnest examination of those desires and fears in the light of the best revelation of reality he knows. If he is a Christian his mind immediately turns to Jesus and he meditates upon everything in the life and teaching of Jesus which has any bearing upon the subject of his prayer. The result of that meditation, if intelligently carried through, is a revolution in the whole system of interests. Paul brought his "thorn" to God and he became aware that both fear and desire were in vain; that reality, being what it was, would not permit the expulsion of the thorn from his life; but also, that, reality being what it was, that thorn need not be feared. And so he turned from the impossible to the possible, from the riddance of the thorn to the revelation of the power of reality to transform that thorn into a blessing. His story is typical. Men have come into the experience of real prayer with tumultuous desires which lashed their spirits to frenzy or with paralyzing fears which urged desperate remedies. Lonely women denied the joys of motherhood, men unhappily mated and tormented with a vision of true comradeship, aspiring spirits doomed by seniority

rules or by nepotism to exclusion from positions they are amply capable of filling, able minds cooped up in a hopeless task by the iron bars of limiting and unyielding circumstances—all these have exposed their fears and desires to the clear light reflected from reality in the face of Jesus Christ. The impossibility of achieving their desires with honor and self-respect, in a universe whose deepest reality is like Jesus, has dawned upon them. Other resources and other means of self-expression have appeared. Their old clamorous wants have been redirected, new interests have developed, and their lives have been saved to goodness and service.

(b) In making the self what it ought to be we have not merely the problem of a triumphant dealing with crises brought on by specific desires and fears, but the larger task of developing out of our native wants a harmonious and serviceable body of constant interests. Here, again, true prayer offers invaluable aid.

It is not a blanket request, "Make me a better man." Nor is it an abstract yearning toward one type of manhood, "Make me like Jesus." It is always the contemplation of the *concrete* moral and spiritual beauty of Jesus. And there is about him, thus contemplated, a strange power to take over the lawless wants of the body and transform them into refined, harmonious, ethical interests. "He is just like a work of art" (confesses the author of "De Profundis"). "He does not teach one anything, but by being brought into his presence one becomes something." All that enters into such a process we do not pretend to understand any more than John Watson un-

derstands the behavior-modifications of which he is so sure, or than Ogden comprehends the disturbed equilibrium which, he is confident, gives rise to "interest." There are many "short-circuits" and hidden processes which psychology has not explained, but whose results it must confess. And this *we* know to be true: that the man who in sanctuary hours, as he searches for Ultimate Reality, fixes his mind upon the total ethical and spiritual beauty of Jesus and permits that beauty to make its appeal to him, will find something happening within; his old primitive *wants* are transformed into *interests* which will pull him steadily in the direction of words and deeds which seem harmonious to the Spirit of the Nazarene.

(c) The Christian practice of prayer has always incorporated the attitude of faith. That is to say, when the Christian prays, he not only exposes himself to the interest-evoking power of Jesus, but he is urged to believe that his life may become like Christ's. Prayer, therefore, has a direct relationship to the process which psychology has isolated and described as auto-suggestion. The conditions of successful auto-suggestion are, chiefly, the saturation of the mind with the thought of the result desired and the abandonment of voluntary effort. One can see immediately that here is a scientific parallel to certain aspects of prayer; the reiteration of desire and the cessation of struggle as one flings himself upon Everlasting Arms. But prayer is not *mere* auto-suggestion.. It does not encourage selfish and inadequate desires, but corrects desire by the highest values known. It substitutes for auto-suggestion's abandonment of all voluntary effort

that attitude of religion which involves the paradox of complete dependence upon God and of commitment to vigorous voluntary effort. Prayer, therefore, employs certain laws at work in auto-suggestion, but redeems those laws from employment in the attainment of "miserable aims that end with self." It escapes that submergence of the active personal will beneath the flood of rising suggestibility, with which indulgence in mere auto-suggestion is apt to deluge the self. And it does steadily incorporate in the life those attitudes and interests which cannot be enthroned by the most painful self-exertion.

4. There can be no question that people who seemed to be sick in mind and in body have after prayer seemed to find health again. Other people just as devout and earnest have prayed and nothing has happened. This wide disparity in the operation of prayer for healing has given rise to utter skepticism, on the one hand, and to the most childish credulity, on the other. Some, taking into account the vast number for whom prayers have been offered in vain, have said scornfully: "There is nothing in it. The people who were said to have been healed were not really sick; they only thought they were. When they believed they were made well, they were, because all that ailed them was their sick belief. Or if they were sick, nature simply took its course. The disease had reached its term. They would have recovered, prayer or no prayer." Others leap to the conclusion that the concomitance of prayer and recovery in some cases means that anybody who puts up a petition in proper form, accompanying it with the kind of an inner tension which

they name faith, may be cured of any disease which afflicts the race. Between these two extremes are a multitude who confess bewilderment. Sometimes prayer seems to have therapeutic value; sometimes it does not. They do not know why, and despair of ever knowing. Most of the time they abandon prayer, save when, in excruciating pain or in the presence of death, it is wrung from almost involuntary lips.

Thanks to psychology and to scientific medicine, the situation is clearing. We know that many folks are ill in mind and body, not because of any germ invasion or of any primary organic failure. They may be blind or deaf or paralyzed; vital organs may be in a state of terrible disorder; exhaustion, extreme nervousness, obsessions, neuralgia, migraine, dyspepsia, consumption, epilepsy, may make day and night hideous and turn life itself into an almost intolerable burden. But while their pains and paralyses are apparently like any other, science has discovered that their ills have root, not in a germ infection or organic breakdown, but in some kind of moral failure —*i.e.,* in a failure to attain a proper adjustment to a perplexing situation, domestic, economic, professional, social. Somewhere there was or is a disastrous conflict between desires or fears awakened by one element in their environment and other desires or fears which for the time were or are in control. The Freudians would say that they are suffering from repressions; the machinist, that a normal manual or verbal response was denied and diverted to the viscera and that is where bedlam begins. One explanation rests upon a philosophy of the subcon-

scious; the other upon a theory of nervous response to active and powerful stimuli. But the results are the same in either case. In the presence of a situation, passing or permanent, which awakened strong desire or fear, there has not been ability to find an expression for desire or fear in harmony with the moral self, with that phase of experience which is in control. Hence, denied its primary response and not being guided into some other channel of expression, it has gone crashing about like a bull in a china shop, playing smash generally with delicate nerve centers and defenseless organs, upsetting the whole institution, producing all those horrible ills which have been named above.

Science has been arduously at work in the search for a cure. Psychology has evolved a method, known familiarly as "deep analysis," whereby the mischief-making repression is discovered and brought to light. The process is very complicated, requiring sometimes weeks of questioning, involving the principle of free association of ideas and demanding utter frankness on the part of the patient. By and by the clue is found, the unfortunate experience which was the occasion of the repression is brought to light, and if completely revealed, the cure is immediate and amazing both to victim and to the casual observer.

The relation of all this to the function of prayer is now ready to be disclosed. Again and again has prayer seemed to achieve the same healing, transforming power as deep analysis. Practically every type of cure effected by psychiatry can be matched with one which has come

about by prayer. Pages of Christian testimony witness to deliverance from the anxiety-neurosis. The familiar case of a famous modern missionary presents a striking resemblance to that of the typical sufferer from neurasthenia. And he was cured not by psychiatry, but by prayer! John Sproul of "Glory Barn" fame lost his voice during overseas service and recovered it in a religious meeting. On the basis of that experience and unaware of the forces which came into play in his recovery, he is trying to command them for ends which they will never serve. A night in his meetings furnishes the most pathetic spectacle imaginable. One could weep for him and for the curious and needy folk who make up his following. But there can be no doubt that he was healed. Nor does there seem to be any doubt that what was wrong with him was shell-shock paralysis—a characteristic hysteria-neurosis. The interesting element in his cure is that it was achieved, not in a psychiatric clinic, but in a "place where prayers are wont to be made."

These are merely sample pages from the record of prayer achievement. Beginning with the gospel story and continuing down through the centuries, in Catholicism and Protestantism alike, lepers have been cleansed, the blind have seen, the lame have walked, the dumb have recovered speech. Over against many, many failures prayer records many successes. It is impossible, of course, to dogmatize, but this seems to at least one man to be true: success has come where illness has been the result of maladjustment to one's environment and where, taught

or untaught, the sufferer has made of prayer a means of thorough analysis of self and of the situation.

Why prayer is able to function in the place of deep analysis no one knows, because no one knows how deep analysis functions. The behaviorist would not for a moment accept the Freudian description of the process. And the Freudian, who declares that when a troublesome complex is lifted up into consciousness it disappears, cannot tell you why. He knows only that it does. All of these processes remain a mystery except to the psychological dogmatist, and no one pays any attention to him. It is nothing against the value of prayer that we do not know all the forces it sets in motion or all the methods of their operation. The important thing is that it works.

We are not in total darkness, however. Psychiatry depends upon utter frankness on the part of the sufferer, and upon the free association of ideas in the discovery of the troublesome experience. And that is characteristic of all true prayer—utter frankness with God. There is no place where the free association of ideas can operate so effectively.

Then the psychiatrist, having brought the unhappy complex to light, proceeds to build a healthy self by the reassociation of sound ideas with healthy emotions and the sublimation of the unhealthy emotions for ends in harmony with the dominant behavior-patterns. There is peculiar power in the prayer which is a contemplation of Jesus, to do just that. When men expose their inner lives to the influences that stream from his life, he does change their emotional attitudes in respect to those ideas

which so often are associated with unhealthy emotions, and he does wed the emotional life to supreme tasks. Everyone who masters the art of prayer knows that what happens in the room of prayer is just what psychology wants to have happen in order to deliver us from those mental and bodily ills which arise out of failure to attain a satisfactory adjustment to the perplexing situations of life. Some of us are convinced that intelligent prayer in such matters is a method of the utilization of psychic laws whose significance we are just beginning to understand and whose profounder exploration and clearer exegesis will bring back to us our lost faith in prayer as an effective agency for the redemption of the body.

II

Does prayer achieve anything save a correction in the life of the one who prays? Does it set in motion forces outside the limits of the personality as usually conceived? Does it in any way change the world of reality about one, affect other persons near or remote? My immediate and unhesitating answer is that it does. I cannot get away from the fact that Jesus, the greatest spiritual genius in history, prayed confidently for others: "Simon, I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not." John portrays him as offering prayer not merely for his contemporaries, but for all those who should believe on him to the end of time. The question of the objective value of prayer is the most puzzling of all the many problems connected with the subject, but, in the presence of that praying figure of Galilee, doubt retreats into the background and,

in spite of the difficulty of any attempt at a rationale, confidence in the significance of prayer for others comes surging back into the soul. Experience confirms that confidence. Those who pray most believe most. And finally, reason attempting to build a philosophy that will include all such experiences in one's own life as well as in the life of Jesus and a multitude of others, arrives at a philosophical conviction about the nature of the universe, God's relationship to it and our relation to both.

The chief difficulty in our attempt to satisfy our minds about prayer is a false picture of the whole scene in which prayer is uttered. That picture has in it three main figures who are presented as separate and mutually exclusive entities: God, out yonder somewhere, mighty, mysterious, all-wise, all-good; nature, the whole whirling mass of electrons, ether, solar systems, vegetable and animal life with which we are surrounded, operating in uniform ways, each moment of its existence determined by the previous moment, evidencing nowhere any interference from the outside; man, a new point of departure in nature's processes, seeming to possess initiative and freedom, using nature only as he obeys her, affecting his fellow men only through touch, sight, sound, and instrumental extensions of the same, never having seen God nor having had any of that kind of evidence for God's presence which he demands as proof of any other fact. That is the picture of reality which lies in the background of much of our thinking! And, of course, it practically rules prayer out of consideration. Prayer could not instruct or persuade an all-wise, all-good God, nor bring

him into the circle of nature's events whence he is excluded, as a matter of fact, whether by necessity or by his own self-limitation. Nor could prayer ever be proved to have moved God to take action in any human life if God has never been known to act in a human life in such a way that his presence was recognized. Grant the truth of the picture, and the conclusion is inevitable—prayer is the response of the child who cries for the moon; it relieves the child but it does not secure the moon. As soon as we become men we put away childish things. We get our telescope and study the moon. We calculate its effects upon the tides and harness them. But we stop babbling monosyllabic cries and stretching out plaintive but futile hands.

But that is a false picture of the scene in which prayer operates. In the place of three separate and mutually exclusive entities—God, nature, man—the true picture presents one living, throbbing whole, which includes within itself many degrees or grades of individual being from the electron up to rational persons and presumably beyond. That living whole is God. Nothing exists outside of him. Nature is in him, one continuous, orderly expression of his life and power. Man is in him, a higher expression of his life, higher in meaning, individuality, and value. Neither nature nor man exhaust God's reality. They manifest him, but he is more than all they. As Leighton has magnificently expressed it, "Beyond the fragment of the cosmos whose characteristics and laws we know by perception, inference, and imagination, and beyond his highest and loveliest revelation in the beauty

and nobility of human personalities, beyond all human culture, there live still further undreamt of riches in the infinite plentitudes of his being." This, then, is the picture. Nature and man do not exhaust God, but they are in God, a part of his life. Between nature and man and God there are no separating walls. That is good science, for science refuses to see nature split up into segments, but treats it as one dynamic unity. And it is good religion, for the New Testament sings again and again the refrain of Paul, "In Him we live and move and have our being." Is it hard to find a place for prayer in such a picture?

(a) Would not prayer, in fact, be inevitable? If God is in all and through all, a creative life ever seeking fuller expression in us, would there not be in us that steady urge of the spirit toward the highest and best, which is the very essence of prayer, an urge of which in our saner moments we are all conscious and which sends us to our knees with an upreach of soul which pours itself out in the words of noble collects and of passionate individual petitions, not merely for ourselves that we might realize in us a fuller life, but that all our brethren might share such a life.

(b) In the presence of such a conception, we no longer think of prayer as a means of persuading a God utterly external to us to change his mind and break into a natural order external to us and to him and rearrange its events to suit our convenience. But this we know can happen; if we discover the nature of things, which science describes as the laws of their operation, but which we now describe

as the uniform will of God, we can by the proper combination of these laws, and by the effective adjustment of ourselves to them, achieve results which would not otherwise have taken place. In a word, man, the higher expression of God's life, may react upon nature, the lower expression of God's life, to help God to a fuller realization of his own good purposes in and toward us. And man does it by discovery and obedience. In making such discovery the mood of prayer is most fertile. For genuine prayer is a brooding of soul, in which man seeks to put himself in tune with the rest of Infinite Life from which he is so often artificially and relatively separated by the distractions of the moment. It is a turning away from one's particular will to the Universal will, from his own little kingdom to the Kingdom Universal—the most favorable condition for the Universal Life to rush in and enlarge the range of his understanding as it communicates itself to him. Prayer is one key to insight into the nature of things and of men and of God, and into those adaptations which are necessary if we are to use nature, redemptively serve our fellow men and share the abundant life of God.

(c) But I do not think philosophy requires nor human experience permits us to stop with such a summary of the function of prayer. It does not exhaust itself in the illumination of the one who prays. Anyone who leads a life of prayer by and by accumulates incidents of a character and number to convince him that because he has prayed things have happened outside the limits of personality as usually conceived. Again, that does not imply

that he has won an external Omniscience to his way of thinking and that such Omniscience has broken out of the closed circle of his own life and invaded another life, to influence or command that life to ends otherwise unknown or rejected. But this is what I mean: Prayer as a real fact in a real and unitary world is often the final factor necessary to complete a causal series. That series operates not in the realm of identical or statistical laws. It does not affect the weather or the crops or any other result of so-called natural law, though the career of Jesus seems to indicate that we are unwise in denying the effect of prayer upon the realm of nature. But prayer *certainly* affects human life. Prayer for anything that is in harmony with the Eternal Will is the final term in a formula which releases the divine life upon the souls of those for whom prayer is offered. It is not a violation of law, but a fulfillment of law. In a word, I conceive this universe to be so one in its ultimate character, and my own life such an integral part of it, that whatever my best thought, corrected by the highest social consciousness of the race conceives to be good, I feel obligated to support not merely with hand and voice and pen, but with the spiritual forces which operate in earnest prayer, believing that such forces are often the final elements in a series which is not otherwise complete and which cannot otherwise fulfill its humanly needed and divinely desired result. And in the presence of him who with prayer challenged the wild storm on Galilee and the inexorable grip of death in Bethany, there is an abiding impulse to "carry everything to God in prayer"!

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IX

The Sacramental View of Life

By Gaius Glenn Atkins

SOME review of the meanings which "sacramental" has taken on in the long strange descent of it, is necessary if a paper like this is not to get out of hand altogether. A sacrament was, to begin with, a pledge deposited by the parties in a suit at law, deposited with the understanding that the loser should forfeit it. Such forfeited pledges were used for religious purposes—which gave them their sacred character or else they were hallowed by being deposited in some sacred place. At any rate, the word gradually associated with itself the sense of high obligation and became in time the technical term for the Roman military oath of allegiance. There seems little doubt that its first and most inclusive Christian use was just to express the binding force of the Christian vows upon the Christian brotherhood. They also had enlisted for a war in which they had no weapons save their terrible meekness, and their power to endure.

The outward and evident sign of their brotherhood was initiation through baptism. I should think the more theological uses of the word sacrament to have begun at the baptismal font, or else at some pool or running water

long before the church had any fonts at all. They included, next, the table laid with bread and wine which the Brotherhood shared together in commemoration of their Lord. The baptismal water stayed just water, but the bread and wine suffered many changes and became in time, if only the right words were said over them by the properly empowered, though they seemed still to be bread and wine, the actual broken body and shed blood of Jesus Christ. Those who believed, and believe this, believe also that the elements have the power to secure the salvation of the recipients if taken in due faith and repentance, which is Sacramentarian as the Roman and Greek churches hold it, and the High Anglican also.

The Greek church began by calling so difficult a matter a "mystery," which indeed it is, and the whole course of Christian thinking has found hard going because the word "sacrament" was chosen as the medium to carry to the Western mind an aspect of religion which, less than any other, can be word-bound at all.

Sacramentarianism is, then, in the freest way, the association of the reality of religion with hallowed form and substance, a persuasion that the material may not only serve the profoundest needs of the soul, but that without such sustenance the soul is unfed. Theologically, it is "the regular use of sensible objects, agents, and acts as being the means or instruments of divine energies, the vehicles of saving and sanctifying power."

I

All this is far older than Christianity. It is coëval with religion itself, although one has no right to read back

more than the dimmest sacramental content into those meals which the devotee and his god shared together. The devout spread that table with the very naïve confidence that, although he himself ate the food, the god fed upon the spirit of it and, being hungry, profited thereby; or else by a logic all his own he believed that, since the god lived in the animal sacrificed, there was no better way to feed upon the divine than to eat it. He was, moreover, freed from all that difficulty about symbolism in which we have involved ourselves, for the best of reasons: the symbol was not a symbol at all, it was real.

But for all that, some awe possessed him, some persuasion of commerce with the unseen associated itself with smoky altars and ritual touched with wonder. He had begun to lay the first steps of those "great world's altar stairs which slope through darkness up to God." The steps were laid in things of sense; he could not climb without them. By the time Christianity took over the spiritual guidance of the West this association of religion with sacramental support and suggestion was definite enough to become a contributive element—I do not think a creative element—in the development of Christian Sacramentarianism. "The worshipers at the sacrificial banquets looked beyond the mere feast and had a good hope and belief that God was present with them and that he accepted their service graciously."

Christianity took its own line, being persuaded that it had ample authority therefore, and developed Sacramentarianism to a degree beyond any other religion. It created theologies and philosophies to support what no theology can explain and no philosophy rationalize. It

created a priesthood to administer its sacraments and churches whose fretted towers cast their long shadows over low cities, to house a worship whose prayer and praise and penitence looked up upon an altar upon which daily the piteous drama of the crucifixion was repeated, which the real presence of God made sacred. Those who worshiped before these altars may have known but dimly where else God was; they knew that he was there.

Art bloomed as a lovely flower from the altar itself: the art of the cathedral which sheltered it, of the pictured windows whose crimson made it sanguine; the art of the painter whose altar pieces are now the treasures of our museums; the art of the gold- and silver-smith; the art of the musician, and very greatly the art to which the centuries themselves contributed; the art of so ordering the movement of high liturgies as to play upon every chord of emotional and mystical human response.

All this has never belonged to the realm of pure reason. It breaks down directly you make a theology of it.

I should think it, more than anything else, the most pregnant system of suggestion ever in action to wing the mind with imagination, direct the will toward the great obediences and enfranchise our time and sense-bound natures in the direction of realities to which sense is only tributary. There was always the chance, of course, that the worshiper would never get beyond the symbol and the ceremony, or else that he would invest them with a magical power, as though he should be saved by a wafer placed upon his lips in the hour and event of death, or

stop at the altar without coming to God—which is the mortal peril of any Sacramentarian system.

How all this happened and how the Protestant Reformation sought to correct it and what was thereby gained and lost are another story. The vital thing is this: the life of the spirit had been taught in one region, excessively ecclesiastical if you please, to find support, reality, enfranchisement, in taking things and making them sacred and then using them, because they were sacred, for its own separate and higher ends, and it had gained a word to say it all and more.

For the soldier's courage, the saint's obligation, the martyr's comradeship, the gleam of the unseen though simple elements, the persuasion that bread may satisfy the hunger of the spirit if only it be consecrated bread, and, above all, the awesome and assuming suggestion of a way of taking and using things to make them the servants of transformed personality and the "binder" between God and man, all combine to make "sacramental" the most significant of adjectives.

It is ready now for larger uses and the time demands it. All great words are commonly shaped to general use in some specific region. They are for a while the peculiar property of the craftsman, the farmer, the priest, or the scientist. Then we find them rich enough to be taken over by the general interests of life. Religion has of late taken many words from science and used them to give body to its interpretation of life. It is time that some of its own greatest words should be humanized, and

here is "sacramental" waiting to be taken from the altar to become at once the minister and the master of the entire range of life. How would life itself be sin if we took the sacramental view of it?

II

It would first of all get us out of an impossible dualism. Science and religion are at odds because each is insisting upon the exclusive reality of its own subject matter. They have met in the past only through their skirmish lines, though the outposts have been bitterly contested. Religion began by asserting its right to control every range of human thought—which might indeed be considered a strategic position. It was beaten and suffered great losses of pride, but no real loss of reality. It fell back upon authorities—the authority of the church, or the divine right of the Book of Genesis to say the last word about creation and date the process. There, too, it has lost.

But through the dust of it all we are beginning to see with arresting clearness what is really involved as the contestants close in—*the nature of reality*. Is anything real but a flux of force which takes protean forms from a nebula to a poet's song, seeming to be free yet inexorably controlled, dissolving every form in which it reveals itself, denying all our own persuasions of freedom and moral responsibility, leaving us only curious chemical combinations going through our appointed series of reactions and saved from despair only by illusion? This is the line science has been taking. There is nothing, the

more extreme contend, but what an ion may become or atomic combination produce.

Faith has inherited and used words which assert another range of reality. There is an old, old belief that a man's soul was the ghostly tenant of his body, himself and not himself, dismissed at death to an imponderable existence, kin and comrade of other souls. We refined matter to a wind and a breath, a mist and a shadow, to get something for imagination to lay hold of and steady itself by in conceiving such an existence, but we held to the reality of the spiritual order. The gods to begin with, God to end with, belong to that range of reality—and so in our essential natures do we.

We should be strangely blind to ignore, strangely foolish to deny, the gravity of the issue thus raised. The dualism in which the older systems involved us was difficult enough; I think the whole drive of modern thought, whether mechanistic or idealistic, is to escape it. And yet the entire victory of either contestant would be fatal if it were possible. A world order of mere stuff and energy in which we are wholly included is the end of religion. An order in which matter and force have no spiritual service to perform takes the body from religion. In one event it is a corpse; in the other a ghost. What has the sacramental view of life to say about that?

Only to say to thought what it has long said to worship —that the spiritual cannot here and now be disassociated from the material or be sent bodiless abroad. The spiritual is a *quality* of life, a way of living, thinking, and being real as hunger and pain, in which what we are—

whatever we are—finds its perfect expression. We discover this way of living only through our use of something material in ourselves or about ourselves. Worship needs words and a voice. A word becomes sacramental when it is honestly used for the honest purposes of the mind. The great words of devotion flower in attitudes of faith and hope and assuring dependence—and an attitude is at least as real as an atom. Music has always brought its own realities with it, citizenship in an order of harmony and transfigured emotion as though there were nothing at all but music and our power to hear—and yet music needs wood and reeds and catgut and steel.

Worship has always been sustained by such helps as these. It can teach us in our present perplexity that we can only recover the sense of the spiritual through finding in the whole order of which we are a part a power to quicken us to a kind of life which rises out of them, as the whole sun-drenched beauty of the June day on which this is being written comes out of processes for which the chemist may find a formula, but which are, in the alembic of our souls, not chemistry or physics at all.

III

How could we ever know the spiritual save as against the backgrounds which sense discovers, which the material supplies. It is a goal to be reached, something shining through, an always emerging quality. The sacramental view of life may teach us that we do not live in a divided order. It does not see in sense the enemy of spirit—rather its servant. It does not demand of us an embattled de-

tachment from the order out of which we have issued, by which we are now supported, to which in the end the physical part of us shall return. It does assert our mastery over that order, our power to take and use it for ends which are nothing else than the perfect expression of the last hidden possibility of personality. We do have a power to invest its realities with some quality of the divine and enduring, and once we have done that they are no longer our masters, holding us to their levels, less than our best; they are steps to climb by.

I do not believe that the words of any priest have the power to make bread and wine anything but bread and wine, but I do believe that when devotion lays hold of the elements of the sacrament and says in its own mystic way, "I shall find the Real Presence of God in the suggestions of love and sacrifice and stainless goodness with which through the centuries these elements have been charged," God is there. How could he not be there? I would surrender, if need be, to an insistent science everything it asks, let it define a June day in terms of chemistry, reduce music to periodic vibration, make me a process of metabolism controlled by the ductless gland, and still reply:

"Well, but something has come out of all this which is not anything you say. It is the power to do what you are doing, to stand apart and alive, to weigh the stars from whose womb, you say, we have sprung, to define the processes which, you say, make us what we are, to live greatly and dream a little and through our very dreams to live graciously and beautifully, and to become either

for a few swift years, or maybe forever, a reality true as your ions and immeasurably greater."

"If we had never been part of the order you offer as the only real, how could we have ever known that contrast to it, that way of living and being which we call spiritual? It served our needs before we ever knew them; it serves them now. Your order has been sometimes, I confess, a creative antagonist. In our very struggle to escape it we have developed the powers and qualities which are themselves the escape. It has been sometimes a creative friend. It has taught us patience and the recompense of toil. It has fed us with beauty and supplied the material of all our art, with its haunting suggestion of

'Something still more deeply interfused.'

It has led us from quest to quest till we have dared reach through it to the Power which hides—and does not hide—behind its veil. We are woven into the warp of it—and yet not quite. It is the common mother of us all, and yet it has mothered something greater than itself."

IV

The sacramental view of life then does not demand to be wholly alien to the world of science. It only transcends it. It does not ask that a man should be a body with a soul in it. It is quite content to have him flesh and blood, with his music played upon the five-stringed harp of the senses. It knows that otherwise he might be a figment of the devout imagination, but never a man. It knows that he would never have the spiritual grace of

living above any of his appetites if he had not them to live above; it knows that hunger and thirst and all elemental desires may, in their own right way, become the instruments of some quality finer than themselves. The sacramental view of life knows bread may feed friendship and that marriage is a sacrament not only before the altar, but in the hidden intimacies of wedded life.

It knows that there is a way of taking and using every aspect of sense and stuff so as to make it the conveyor of values for perfected humanity which would be impossible without them. It does not ask an incorporeal spirituality—and it would not get it if it did. It knows that what we must always call "the spiritual" is only a way of now meeting, now using, now obeying and again denying, the urge and contribution of what our whole material existence supplied. It knows spirits must have a vehicle —that the whole material order is the mediator between two ranges of reality—God and man.

Our humanity found its first dim sense of the divine through nature, feeling in trees and running water and every movement of what we call the inanimate the presence of an awesome power. The entire development of religion has done nothing more than refine and perfect this insight. There are still only two roads to God—one through the world without, the other through our own personalities—and each is incomplete without the other. Religion which has no source nor control save an inner brooding and questing becomes mystic, vague, sterile. Religion with no source or control save stars and sun and storm, the ebb and flow of seasonal life, and

now the impersonal vastness of a universe whose distances are measured by light-years, becomes pantheistic or unpersonal when it ceases to be fearsome and superstitious. It is only when we interpret nature by our own best natures that God shines through. Then the very universe becomes sacramental. It is no longer a rigidity of mechanism in whose gears we are caught; it is plastic to the mind and will of men, the comrade of our most exalted moments, ripening its harvests for the soul as for the sense, and all agleam with the glory of God.

Our own bravest and most far-seeing have always believed this. Listen to Carlyle's gusty music:

". . . or what is Nature? Ha! why do I not name thee *God?* Art thou not the living garment of God? O Heavens, is it in very deed, *He,* then that ever speaks through thee; that lives and loves in thee, that lives and loves in me? The universe is not dead . . . charnal house with spectres; but godlike, and my Fathers!"

"The material world," says Dr. J. S. Haldane, "which has been taken for a world of blind mechanism is in reality the spiritual world seen very partially."

"There are," says L. P. Jacks, "in the last resort only two doctrines possible as to the nature of the universe—one holding it to be dead, lifeless, a mechanism going by a kind of clock work, and the other holding it to be essentially alive . . . conscious of itself as a unitary whole and knowing what it is about. . . . The saying of the Gospel 'God is not a God of the dead but of the living,' I take as covering everything in space and time, all that the astronomer can tell us of what goes on in the unimaginable depths of space, all that the historian can tell us of what has gone on in the unimaginable depths

of time'; all is alive, and it is *one life* . . . that animates the whole."

The poets to a degree beyond possible quotation have found in nature the suggestion of values and meanings upon which the soul is fed as upon sacramental bread. The more far- and deep-seeing scientists are increasingly reluctant to close their system and leave no room for something beyond their forces and their laws. The sacramental system, says Canon Paget, means that in worship sensible objects, agents, and acts may become the means or instruments of Divine Energies. It means no more, and no less, in the sacramental view of nature. It makes the whole external order a medium for the contact of spirit with spirit, a carrier of those realities which we know in ourselves as love and life and purpose. It is still as of old, God's way of kindling his fire upon our altars and revealing himself to us until "the Universe thus becomes a living manifestation of Himself; no mere machine, or book, or picture, but a perpetually sounding voice" and a spiritually creative power.

V

I have dwelt thus at length upon this sacramental view of the world without because I take it to include everything else. We are mortally entangled now because we are in danger of losing our confidence in the reality of anything but sense-known things scientifically interpreted. The sense of an imponderable order to which love and goodness and moral freedom really belong is slowly fading from among us. It was a great light while

it shone, but it is now darkening into twilight and, if we do not take care, the dark which follows will be dark indeed.

Here is, indeed, a situation in which the light lingers in the valleys while it dies from the heights. The generality of us go on, believe, worship, hope, and try to be good as if nothing were changed or challenged, but there are enough who feel the cold winds of doubt drawing down from those unsunned heights. Religion cannot permanently endure for them, nor can it hold its own anywhere if the old sanctities be lost and no new sanctities discovered.

But if the light is not on the heights at all—I mean in the grandiose assumptions of scientific thought and the philosophies founded thereupon—but is about us everywhere, shining through every near and dear way of the world and its attendant stars, if love and goodness and the known peace of God beyond all our dreams are as real as a dissected gland or the reflection of a fourth-dimension star in a hundred-inch concave mirror, then religion, which has always been the quest to touch and rest in the power which manifests itself through all sensible objects, can go on.

What follows is more simple and can be more simply said. The sacramental view of life will touch every aspect of conduct with sanctity. I had a mind to put in a paragraph or two here about the sense of obligation so created, but there is something finer than obligation. If there is a priestlike quality in all our doings and we are always serving some altar or other, we shall instinc-

tively invest every deed with some high quality of the spirit. We will deal with Mother Earth and all her children as we ought to deal with those of our own household. We will not scar the ground nor make it ugly with our waste and our greed. Least of all will we make it red with the blood of our fellow men. A man does not commonly go to the altar with a gun or poison gas. If the universe is alive we ought to live with it as though what we did might hurt, or hearten, it.

The sacramental view of life will transfigure our whole industrial and economic order. When business becomes a holy enterprise and not a greedy game, it will bring with it the wealth of right human relations, the gracious restraints, the sacrificial expressions, needed not only to harmonize but to spiritualize business. That does not mean long-faced piety. Long-faced piety has often been inhumanly hard. It means the consciousness of serving the highest through plowing a field or building a wall or a motor-car, in finance, in professional activity, in statesmanship and diplomacy. There is now, I am persuaded, no region in which so rare a personality may be ripened as through the actions and reactions of the business world —if only business is a sacrament, the actual use of stuff and process for the values of the soul.

The sacramental view of life will save us from low pleasures and the gross indulgences of the senses. If any sense is a way of touching and gathering in some quality of reality to be thereafter a part of our true wealth, if any experience lives in deposit of character, why should we use the senses to be played up by unworthy players, or

stimulate them to get "a kick," when they will give us healing happiness if holily used and leave gifts which we can carry, it may well be, beyond the realm of sense.

VI

The sacramental view of life will, as it is doing now, reëstablish beauty and the devout use of the timeless symbol servants of the spirit in our worship. One great wing of the church has stripped worship too bare, made it too sheerly intellectual, when often enough it has not been soundly intellectual. The other has been perilously near making its sacraments magic, explaining them in impossible terms. One group has starved the emotions, the other imperiled the mind, when all the while the great aids to devotion, beauty-touched roads to the throne of God, have been waiting for us to use them with minds which appraise their true meanings, and a mystic sense for which they are both bread and the cup and the Real Presence of God.

Beauty will flower beneath the culture of the sacramental view of life, slowly but surely, because in beauty the material order fairly passes over into the spiritual, or at least the veil is most translucent. In beauty also our own powers of idealization and appreciation find a reality so akin to themselves that I think it would be difficult to say of any form of material beauty where the contribution of the material element ends and creative appreciation begins. Our own spirits and the Spirit which has won through the clod to the blossom and become in the blossom perfume and color so to lose itself and never

be lost, here meet and merge as though the long cycle were complete.

We have the power, too largely unused, to coöperate in all material things with the imprisoned spirit of beauty struggling to be free and, sometimes with a touch and sometimes with wearing toil, emancipate it.

Nay, "imprisoned" and "struggling" are misleading words. In the free regions of nature beauty is the inevitable ripening of all growth; it molds the contours of the everlasting hills and sculptures the Mt. Blanc. All sense of labor is lost and, if we could hear the music of it, it would be lyric. It is only where nature suffers our inept or irreverent touch that there is any sign of struggle—and the struggle is with us.

And yet we possess, and have abundantly demonstrated it, the power to add a rarer beauty to any landscape—the beauty of long and loving habitation; to take wild growths and turn them into harvests, dip the petals of a brier rose in a richer dye, turn marble into a Pieta, and make of stone the sculptured front of Amiens. If we should ever come to deal with all stuff we use as furnishing for some altar, how lovely the world might become.

The reaction of all this upon ourselves would be the most marvelous of all. We should not thereby become weak or sentimental or too mystic for life's homely uses. But we would have an assuring sense of the significance of life and labor now too largely wanting. There are moments, indeed, when some consciousness of engagements worthy of our powers releases forces we did not

know we had and touches our occupations with some light from beyond the hills of time. Such moments are at the best too rare. They might become more common if we found in what we are doing some constant sense of commerce with beauty, love, and goodness.

We should be saved from discouragement and the sense of futility in wearing routine; we should be saved from pride in unusual station or accomplishment. And there would be some deposit of all experience left in us, some way of ripening change, some accretion of those timeless qualities which we have always believed independent of sense and stuff, so compact in our personalities as really to endure even the dissolutions of death. It may be that the outer world will have served its appointed purpose when souls have ripened from it, fit for the eternal. Which is exactly what any sacrament does.

X

Religion and Morality

By Ralph W. Sockman

A DISTINGUISHED British man of letters has recently pointed out that the contemporary writers of England could be divided into two schools, pre-war and post-war. The older men whose productive period antedated the World War have been discussing such social problems as socialism and imperialism. But the younger writers are not content to consider the mere surface rearrangements of society. They are going more deeply than Wells and Shaw, than Kipling and Barrie. They are digging at the very foundation principles of the world order. They are asking such questions as: Is there a God? Is there purpose in the universe? Does the individual have any meaning in the mechanism of nature?

On both sides of the Atlantic there is a temper of inquiry which tolerates nothing short of ultimate questions. Fundamentals which our fathers took for granted are being scrutinized with searching and skeptical eyes. This mood prevails in the field of ethics as well as in religion and philosophy. Not only are the applications of moral principles being reëxamined, but the very validity of the moral sanctions is being challenged. In this brief

chapter the writer will concern himself not so much with the social superstructure of morality as with the foundation stones.

One aspect of our present situation is the popular repudiation of the supernatural sanctions of morality. Moral standards were a very simple matter to decide when codes of conduct were believed to have been issued by a Deity. To those who accepted the Ten Commandments, for example, as the stenographic record of a divine pronouncement, the point of their validity was settled. That there are multitudes who still accept such views with implicit confidence cannot be denied.

But the study of comparative religions has raised histurbing considerations. Various groups in all sections of the world have claimed direct contact with a divine source of moral information. The Iliad and Odyssey record the commands of the Greek gods in ancient times. The Book of Mormon tells of the revelation made to one Joseph Smith in our era. People of the Hebrew-Christian tradition may assert that such as these are morally inferior to the "law and the prophets" of biblical record. But by what criteria is that moral comparison to be made? Something more than the mere belief of earnest religious devotees is demanded to satisfy the contemporary critical mind. The voice today which assumes to declare the divine will must expect to be challenged with the question which was hurled at the professional ecclesiastics of Jeremiah's time: "How do ye say 'We are wise and the law of the Lord is with us'?"

The reply which the religio-moral counselor could give

in a pre-scientific age will not be acceptable today. In times when thunderstorms were thought to be the outbursts of divine anger, when devastations by locusts were interpreted as plagues sent by a provoked Deity, when a long drought was regarded as evidence that God's face and favor were turned away from the land—in such days proofs of the authority of the moral law and of the moral lawgivers were close at hand. Such credentials, however, are no longer admissible in enlightened circles. Intelligent people do not take seriously the preacher of today who proclaims that a Florida hurricane is a visitation of divine vengeance on the moral violations of Florida speculators, or that a Japanese earthquake is occasioned by a nation's godlessness. Many of the materials which once could be submitted as proof of supernatural moral sanctions are not valid in a scientific age which finds the causes of disease in germs rather than in gods and which has ferreted out the sources of earthquakes and tornadoes.

Moreover, the fiat, "Thus saith the Lord," even if its authenticity could be established, would fail to satisfy the moral consciousness of our modern age. Democratic peoples have been taught that inhuman and unjust commands are not rightfully to be obeyed even though they come from sovereign rulers. Sovereignty is subjected to the test of humanity. The edict of a Mussolini does not make a thing morally right in Italy, nor does the decision of the Supreme Court in the United States of America. Even the "will of God," if it is to receive the assent of human consciences, must coincide with men's ideas of human welfare. If godliness is tested by the larger social

concept of goodness, we must look outside the reported commands of Deity for the ultimate sources of moral standards.

In reaction against the belief that our moral laws come direct from God there has arisen the widespread view that morals are made by custom. This theory is supported by the observations that the ideas of right and wrong change from age to age and from place to place. Herodotus chronicled with cynical gusto the strangely diverse ethical standards of the various races. David Hume did a similar service for his generation. Anthropologists and sociologists are doing it for our academic world, and countless writers are putting the idea across to the public with the interpretation that nothing is right or wrong except in the sense of being the accepted code of a given community at a particular time.

Such an implication makes our moral commandments about as ephemeral as the frosted designs on our windowpanes of a winter's morning, which the rising sun will dissipate. It causes our moral precepts to seem like patterns which were etched and traced upon the windows of our minds by our parents and predecessors and which now shut us out from clearer light and richer self-realization. Into these stereotypes fashioned by the hands of our fathers in days that were different we cannot cramp the full complex life of today. So say the modern minds. Does not progress come by breaking conventions? Bernard Shaw, voicing this spirit of revolt, says, "Every step of progress means a duty repudiated and a scripture torn

up." Did not Jesus himself burst the wineskins of Old Testament moral practice with the new wine of the Sermon on the Mount? If some of the Pentateuch's prescriptions were superseded by Jesus' practice, may it not be time now for some of the New Testament standards to be replaced by twentieth-century codes? If many of the Puritan blue laws are now laughed to scorn by the lineal descendants of those Puritan churches, how are we to know that our moral restraints will not tomorrow be tossed to the discard as too narrow? If our ethical standards are merely custom-made fashions of conduct, it is our privilege to unmake them. More than that, it is our moral duty to do so.

With the serious, this line of reasoning leads to ethical perplexity; with the selfish it may lead to personal license or moral anarchy. With some it may engender a healthy iconoclasm toward repressive modes of behavior; with others it may produce an unhealthy indulgence in the eccentric and the exotic. Once we grant, however, the evolutionary theory that morals are changing "mores" and we have lifted the anchors which held our consciences to our grandfathers' snug harbors of thought and are out upon the high seas where we have to chart our course by "dead reckoning." What is the path of duty in our day under our conditions? The codes of yesterday cannot and will not be taken for granted as the answer.

In this situation it is not sufficient for the thoughtful person to say, "Let your conscience be your guide." Conscience itself has been undergoing critical analysis. Is conscience a God-guided faculty or a custom-made reac-

tion? After tracing the variations of conscience in different individuals under the same conditions and in the same individuals under different conditions, many conclude that conscience is not a compass needle pointing to a fixed pole, but rather a weather vane veering with the winds of custom. They do not accept the voice of conscience as the voice of God, but as merely the echo of the approvals and disapprovals of the community in which a man happens to live.

Out of this belief that morals are merely customs sanctified by tradition, and this disbelief in the supernatural sanctions of morality, has come a third attitude of our contemporary situation. It is a predisposition to rebel against established codes of conduct simply because they are established. The fact that a path of duty was followed yesterday creates a prejudice in the minds of many that it should not be followed today. Our aged standards have the added difficulty of having to carry the burden of proof. Not unanimous, of course, is this position. There are many "good old-fashioned" youths growing up in the midst of modernity, like flowers sheltered within the greenhouse and all unshaken by the gusty winds without. Nevertheless, the social currents are unmistakable.

It would seem that the minds of men released in the wildness of the World War are not content to settle down into the tameness of a traditional past. They are pushing out the frontiers of our mental and moral landscape in all directions. With some it is the mere uncharted desire to be different. Such minds loosened from the old moral

moorings have drifted devotedly in the wake of such latter-day saints of eccentricity as Mr. H. L. Mencken and Mr. Sinclair Lewis. With some it is the serious questioning of the adequacy of moral codes which have made such a mess of our social situation. This protest finds voice in the numerous youth conferences on college campuses wherein the ethics of war, industry, racial adjustments, and other situations are discussed. With others it is a personal revolt against supposedly narrow disciplines which have been restricting their constitutional rights of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Some of these may feel like joining in a youth movement to wrest control of society from the senile conservatives, while the rest of them are not thinking in large social terms, but are just engaged in a little local guerrilla warfare to do away with some hated private restrictions.

Another group of these moral rebels, or reformers, as one may prefer to call them, is the large company which has been drinking deeply at the fountains of the "new psychology." These have been exploring the mysterious chambers and potencies of their minds, discovering their repressed instincts, picking at the knots of their complexes, and striving to arouse and unloose their unawakened selves. In this process they have recaptured some important emphases and mental techniques. But for many the result is an undisciplined desire for self-expression, resulting in self-explosion. Closely akin to this class is another which might be called the thrill-hunters. They find life tame, conventional. The landscape seems too settled. Louis Bromfield gives expression to their mood

when he makes a young man in his book, *Possession,* say: "My grandfathers came into this wilderness to conquer and subdue it. It was a land filled with savages and adventure. I too must have my chance. I am of a race of pioneers, but I no longer have any frontier." No doubt the novelist is here defining and phrasing what is real to many, yet undefined and inarticulate. There is this yeasty feeling of restlessness stirred by the creative pioneering impulses in a world where conformity to stereotyped mold has been so standardized.

Other causes of moral revolt might be cited, but these suffice to indicate the angles from which traditional standards are being attacked.

It would be entirely too pessimistic an interpretation of our contemporary picture to give the impression that the total moral trend is iconoclastic. There is ethical confusion and uncertainty, but not anarchy. An astute English observer has described the situation in terms general enough to apply on both sides of the Atlantic:

"A modern society, then, has neither the elaborate code of law enforcing moral conduct which is characteristic of many earlier societies, nor the standard furnished by a complete vision of the good achieved by the insight of the philosopher, which was Plato's ideal; but it has nevertheless a standard of good life, much more complex and less clearly formulated, rather a common ethic than a code or a set of explicit principles, but a standard which can nevertheless be seen to inspire men's attitude to law, their demands on what the state ought

to do, the kind of life which they think the state ought to make possible for its members."[1]

In fact, at many points the modern conscience is more sensitive than its predecessors. There is a growing awareness that a man's duty is not fulfilled merely by giving expression to his good intentions. He wants to find out whether his good impulses are headed in the right direction. He feels a moral obligation to be intelligent, as John Erskine would say. He sees that good intentions without intelligence may result in upsetting rather than in uplifting the welfare of himself and those around him. He discovers that the Golden Rule, so beautiful and comprehensive in its simple lucidity, needs imagination to make it work satisfactorily in our complex social situations. If one is to do unto another as he would that the other should do unto him, he must be able to know what he would want done to him if he were in the other fellow's place. The Golden Rule practiced without this alertness of imagination often results in mere irritation. Hence the intelligent man of today in trying to find out his duty looks at results rather than at rules.

When our generation takes up the Ten Commandments, for example, we may not trace their origin so directly back to God as did our forefathers, but we trace their applications out to men more fully. We may not handle them with as much sanctity, but perhaps with more sanity. For example, we are lifting the old Commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," out of its time-honored

[1] Lindsay, A. D., *Christianity and the Present Moral Unrest*, p. 96. Oxford University Press, 1927.

individual setting and asking more insistently how it bears upon the time-honored legalized butchery of war. We are not satisfied to let the Old Testament prohibition of bearing false witness be applied merely to the matter of consciously telling lies. We are seeing that not only must our words tally with our beliefs, but that our beliefs must as nearly as possible tally with the truth. This increased insistence upon sincerity and truth is one of the most hopeful portents of moral progress. The moral ideal of justice is being steadily refined and enlarged. The traditional presentation of Justice as a blindfolded woman with a scales in her hands is recognized as inadequate. Our day demands the removal of the blindfold. Justice is not insured by the mere impartial weighing of the facts in hand. It requires making sure that we get all the facts in hand. Hence our courts of justice call to their aid psychologists and social workers in order that the hitherto unconsidered factors of the lives before them may be weighed.

The social-mindedness of our day is shifting the emphasis from the private to the public moral virtues, if such a distinction may be made. To illustrate, Walter Rauschenbusch a decade or so ago ridiculed the conventional morality of his day by relating the incident of the farmer found to be selling impure milk. Being discovered, he burst forth in a fit of profanity, whereupon his church expelled him for his profane language, but not for his adulteration of the milk. Such moral estimates are changing. Perhaps the cynic would say that the up-to-date church would not expel its members for either of the

above-mentioned moral aberrations. But the fact is that within and without the church the shadow of censure is lifting from some of the old personal shortcomings and deepening upon the new social sins. There is a lessening sense of sin against God; there is a growing concern for crimes against society. There has been an ethical awakening in American business during the last half-century. It was in 1883 that one of the old buccaneers of our business world voiced the mood of a large section of society in the words, "The public be damned." Today the slogan of merchant princes is, "The public be pleased." It is a long advance step from *"Caveat emptor"* to *"Placet venditor."* It may end with many in only enlightened selfishness, but it is on the road to justice and coöperation. The concept of neighbor is being extended. Men are coming to see that social living demands something more dynamic than mere decency, something more redemptive than mere respectability.

A few years ago Mr. H. G. Wells characterized Jesus of Nazareth in a noble figure of speech as a great moral huntsman striding across the landscape of history, digging men out of the little burrows of respectability in which they had ensconced themselves. That is a very apt description of what the spirit of Jesus has been doing during this last post-war decade. He has driven men forth from their old moral resting-places. Some are now running wildly, some blindly; some are burrowing into old conventions again; some are bending back on their tracks, as Irving Babbitt thinks, away from civilization; and some are going forward to new frontiers. Will the

totality of all this moral commotion mean progress? But what is moral progress? To answer that we must ask how to find the path of ethical duty in the world of our day.

I

In seeking to define the good we must start with the individual as the norm. That is the point at which the modern temper insists that we start, whatever theologians and moralists may say. "Man is the measure of all things," is the famous utterance of Protagoras, an older contemporary of Socrates. It voices the mood of today. The welfare of man is the test of the goodness or rightness of anything. Jesus made clear that this was his position. "The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath." There are no divinely appointed institutions to which the health of man is to be subordinated. There are no divinely declared ethical principles to which personality is to be sacrificed. Morality is made for man, and not man for morality. Kant put his stamp of approval upon this position when he said, "See that thou treat humanity in thy own person and in the person of others always as an end and never as a means only." If Kant laid too much stress on the individual as an end in himself, and some of his successors swung too far in the opposite direction by overemphasizing the community, there is need today for an ethical interpretation which will do justice to both sides of the ideal. Certainly no morality which slights the individual will be accepted as valid by

our generation with its insistence on freedom and individualism. Listen to this spokesman of the modern spirit:

"The view of morality apparently implicitly held is that it is a code pressed upon people from the outside and violating all their natural impulses. No one would be good unless he had to be. It is something forced upon people by public opinion and law. It must, therefore, have very strong sanctions to enforce it. What an indictment of morality such a view is! No teacher of ethics would for a moment indorse such a theory of morality. Morality should be rational; and to be rational it must justify itself by its actual working in human life."[1]

Beginning, then, with the individual, we see that the first ideas of goodness are the direct uncensored translations of feeling. The child bites into the apple and gurgles, "Good." The touch of the apple on the membrane of the mouth gives a pleasant feeling. In this instance, what is good is what is pleasant to a single one of the physical senses. In the Genesis account of the birth of a conscience the woman is reported to have eaten of the tree's fruit when she saw that it was "good for food" and "pleasant to the eyes." The initial step in the process of "knowing good and evil" is the satisfaction of the feelings.

If the woman and the man in that Eden experience had been merely animals, that test would have been sufficient. The animal has only to consult its instinctive feelings to know the goodness of a thing. But man discovers that a food may taste good, or a sight may look good, and a song may sound good, and yet may not prove to be good

[1] Sellars, Roy Wood, *Religion Coming of Age,* p. 259. New York, Macmillan, 1928.

for his whole nature. That is the discovery described in the figurative language of Genesis. And that choosing of the thing pleasing to a part of one's nature, but not satisfying to one's whole self, constitutes the "fall" of man. It is a fall which was taken by millions yesterday just as truly as by the so-called first man, for the date of Adam is eternity and the location of Eden, like the Kingdom of Heaven, is "within you."

The individual, therefore, in trying to find out what is good for himself—that is, for his whole self—cannot be guided solely by what seems desirable at the moment to the one or more instincts which are in the focus of consciousness at the time. The pleasant feeling produced by the indulgence of one instinct often means the suppression of others. A certain lad known to the writer finds a thrill in giving his instinct of pugnacity free scope, but when he comes in from the park with torn blouse, tear-stained cheek, and bloody nose, it is quite evident that his indulgence of that instinct does not make for permanent satisfaction or for the "peace of God which passeth all understanding." When a man gives himself over-excessively to a life of sexual pleasure, he does so only by repressing other instincts. There are pathological desires, the fulfillment of which would bring only pain, as in the case of a person who has an almost irresistible urge to jump from a high place.

Pleasure is the feeling tone attendant upon the indulgence of any one instinct, but the sum of pleasures does not make the happiness of the whole self any more than the sum of the sounds coming forth from a conservatory

of music makes a symphony concert. In each room of that conservatory a player may be getting pleasure from his exercise on his instrument. It is only, however, when the players are brought together under a leader who can co-ordinate them that harmony is produced. So is it with the self. Man must learn the orchestration of his impulses. This involved the silencing or repression of some at certain times. This means training, practice, coördination. This is the process now commonly understood as "self-realization."

But apparently it is not so commonly realized that in this process self-control is a necessary preface to self-expression. Our contemporaries are enamoured of the word self-realization. They seem to feel that new realms of experience within us have been opened, which our fathers, through fear or false modesty or blind conservation, failed to develop. Our generation must now make up for lost time. It would unleash all its impulses at once, forgetful of the fact that instincts are often mutually exclusive and that the freedom of the largest number depends upon the restraint of some and the control of all. It would see life, but it would fail to "see it steadily and see it whole."

Not by the temporary feeling tone, then, but by the harmony of the whole self does a man test the goodness and rightness of an experience. The good is that which contributes to the highest satisfaction of the entire self—that is, to true self-realization. But there is no satisfying self-realization in isolation. The Hebrew writer of the Creation story discerns that truth when he interprets Jehovah as saying, "It is not good that the man should be

alone." The Freudian might expound that line as the Hebrew recognition of the fundamental sex drive. But those early writers understood that not merely does man's physical nature need completion by the creation of woman, but that his whole nature needs the supplement of an object of love. Man's highest qualities are developed only in the climate of love—love of friend or parent, of wife or child. "One man is no man," is the Greek motto adopted by one of our American college fraternities. Fraternity is a necessity of life, not a mere luxury. If we find out something, we crave a confidant. If we play, we want a playfellow. If we laugh, we cannot forever laugh alone. "Man is not complete in himself. He is a social animal."

A man's altruistic impulses are just as much a part of his nature as his self-regarding ones. Sometimes they seem almost more ineradicable. As Professor Durant Drake well puts it:

> "When ambition has palled, when passion has faded and self-indulgence has lost its tang, sympathy and shame persist. The only hope for a lasting freedom from internal discord lies in including the interest of others with our own, instead of excluding and antagonizing them."[1]

If the individual's interests are thus inextricably interwoven with the welfare of others, his self-realization is a social matter. He attains it not by sitting in self-centered fashion, looking at himself and hearing psychoanalysts report as to which of his capacities and instincts need

[1] Drake, Durant, *The New Morality*, p. 43. New York, Macmillan, 1928.

cultivation. He finds fullness of his own life by getting out of himself and losing himself in the love and service of others, as Jesus told us nineteen centuries ago. The men who have found life most satisfying and have fashioned their powers to the highest fulfillment are not the ones who have been concerned with developing their own talents, but the ones who have forgotten themselves in their devotion to other persons or to great causes. Man, the social animal, finds that action most satisfying which gives outlet to his social impulses.

Moreover, in determining the goodness of an action, consideration must be given to the time element. A person discovers that what feels good today may make him feel bad tomorrow. There is "the morning after" feeling. There is also the year after which overtakes him. There are the third and fourth generations which come on the scene before he makes his exit and reveal to him the consequences of his own conduct. Because of this overlapping of our yesterdays and our tomorrows, society has had opportunity to observe which modes of behavior work to the largest and longest advantage.

These observations become crystallized into moral maxims and precepts. Sometimes they remain oral and are merely passed on by word of mouth. Sometimes they become codified into civil or ecclesiastical law. Thus "mores" become established. Thus is formed a body of common moral law. Just as the statute laws of English-speaking countries have grown out of the English common law which was built up of precedents, principles,

and customs, so the moral laws of social groups have developed out of a body of common moral law.

All tribes and peoples have formulated their own moral codes. But there was in the rugged hills of Palestine a hardy race of people, the Hebrews, which was eminently fitted to be a laboratory of moral progress. Holding their families together in great patriarchal groups, they conserved the past, and yet they were persistently being stirred by prophetic voices to proceed toward higher ideals. All the situations of adversity and prosperity were present to test their behavior. They suffered years of slavery in Egypt. They wandered in a wilderness. They had to establish the institutions of property and government in a new country. They rose to heights of national affluence and then were reduced to exile. They ran the whole gamut of racial experience.

Early in their history there arose among them a mighty legislative genius named Moses, who sifted, graded, and codified their laws of conduct. His moral legislation remains on record. As life grew more complex and moral perspective tended to become blurred, prophets like Amos, Hosea, and Micah appeared, calling the Hebrew conscience back to essentials. Thus the canons of conduct were continuously being revised by men of singularly lofty mind. And finally there came one greater than a prophet, Jesus of Nazareth. He revised the "law and the prophets," saying, "Ye have heard it said by them of old time . . . but I say unto you . . ." Yet his revision was in the nature of a fulfillment. "Think not that I came to destroy the law or the prophets: I came not to destroy but

to fulfill." He spoke "as one having authority," yet his was the authority of the scientist, not of the dogmatist. He submitted his principles of action for laboratory testing, saying, "If any man will do his [God's] will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God or whether I speak of myself." His principles of behavior have been tested, and the longer and more closely they have been studied, the more convincingly accurate they appear.

Thus has come down to us the general outline of the Hebrew-Christian body of common moral law. Back of the New Testament is the Old Testament, and back of the Old Testament is the "Oldest Testament," which is the very nature of things. The Ten Commandments and the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount are true not because they are contained in a so-called sacred book, but they are in that book because they have been found to be true—true to the highest nature of man. The reader who studies the Bible with an historic sense and an eye to its central personality is not disturbed by the moral contradictions and the legalistic minutiæ which appear in spots, for he easily discriminates between the principles which abide and the temporary applications which pass away. Likewise, in the nineteen centuries since Jesus taught, there have been changing interpretations and specifications, but the Galilean's spirit and principles of moral action remain unshaken to guide us.

The Bible, therefore, may be looked upon as a moral Baedeker for the traveler. Just as the asterisks of our Baedeker show us the points which previous travelers have found most worth seeing, so the Bible reveals to us

the modes of conduct which the noblest seers of history have found most worth doing. Time is too short for us to ignore the findings of our forerunners. We make progress in any realm by capitalizing the experiences of the past. The traveler saves time by using the guidebooks which give the seasoned judgment of earlier sightseers. The scientist advances to new discoveries by accepting certain approved formulæ and proceeding to new experiments based upon them. So in the realm of behavior we make moral progress by recognizing some principles of action as the established formulæ of racial experience. For example, the principle of monogamy is the result reached after long and tragic experimentation with polygamy and promiscuity, and for our generation to think that it must reëxamine that time-tested finding is about as unscientific as for a chemist to assume that he must still prove that H_2O is the formula of water. Led on by that Spirit of Truth bequeathed unto us by Christ, we proceed with our moral experiments of the present based on the experience of the past.

This means continuous moral adventure and experimentation. But it must be done in the spirit of constructive social pioneering rather than in the spirit of destructive individualistic liberalism. It means progressive evolution in morals, and only by moral evolution can we work our way through the present stage of moral revolt.

It is not within the province or space of this chapter to suggest the specific applications of these advancing ethical insights. That service is rendered by others in this symposium. The concern of this section is with the founda-

tions, not the superstructure, of Christian morality. And the validity of those foundations, we believe, can be shown to the honest critical minds of our contemporary inquirers who are not content to accept the authority of ancient dogma and custom. If we approach the science of human behavior in the tolerant spirit of truth-seekers from the standpoint of man's largest and longest welfare, we discover that amid the impulses and appetities of the self there is something

"that leaps life's narrow bars
To claim its birthright with the hosts of heaven."

A thorough-going sociology will find itself in alliance with an intelligent theology. Together, and only together, will they insure the stability of the healthy moral sanctions.

XI

The Christian and the State

By Douglas Horton

UPON one proposition the peoples of the world seem pathetically unanimous—that military warfare is a stupid, odious, and calamitous means of adjusting international disputes.

To insure peace, however, we know that something more is needed than the mere emotion of aversion. It is self-evident that a force can be held in abeyance only by opposing to it a force of equal moment; and war is a force generated by, in, and through the whole man. The whole man enlists: the whole man exposes himself to annihilation. It is not only one's emotions that are drawn into the conflict, but one's will, intelligence, and body as well. Our only hope of arresting this menace, therefore, is to throw against it the same measure of ourselves as it has shown itself able to involve—the same unleashed feelings, but also the same creative thought, the same energy, the same absoluteness of decision. Nothing, indeed, is more necessary than *thought.*

And the thinking out of peace takes one back to the basic problem which is the main consideration of this chapter. Peace being the condition of harmony which

arises between or within states when all political relationships are properly adjusted, the essential question is, What are the proper political adjustments? That is, what are the right relationships of states and their citizens? What is the ideal state? The ideal citizen? How much authority ought a state to have over its citizens? Ought a citizen to obey all the laws of his state at all times? Has a citizen any due allegiance beyond his loyalty to his state? What is the secret of a strong state's strength?

Our task is the sketching, in terms of general principles, of an answer to these questions, but we shall be saved from too abstract philosophizing and have a standard against which to verify our reasoning only if we keep in mind the specific problems of the world today; and among these the problem of peace is cardinal. Any political relationship which has a warp toward war is—we may lay it down as a hypothesis—evil.

We might begin by asking, Why the state at all, or why at least do human beings perplex themselves with theories of the state? But the fact is that we cannot help living in groups and thinking about our group life as a whole. Theories of politics are the mental accompaniment of a social instinct too deep to be eradicable; and the craving for the ideal theory is one of the qualities that make us human beings. In any practical study, the question, *whether* or not the state should exist is left to the speculator, and the question *how* it should exist becomes dominant.

The classics of political philosophy and the mind of the man on the street today are alike in supposing that in

the natural order of things there are and must always be *many* states on the earth, each enjoying its own laws and not subject to control from outside.

Plato and Aristotle, living before the national state of today had been evolved, and regarding the ancient city as the ultimate unit, took this multiplicity for granted. Greek cities might imaginably unite in a Delian League or some confederation similar, but to dream of any political union between the Greek and other civilizations—the latter being sweetly characterized by the former as "barbarian" —was tantamount to losing one's mind. The "natural enmity" between the Greeks and all others guaranteed at least one degree of plurality.

And since Plato and Aristotle were the founders of all later European thought on the subject, it is hardly strange that the premise of most of our modern political philosophies has likewise been the idea of a number of states in the world, each ultimately sovereign in fact or in design. Machiavelli envisaged a Europe perpetually racked by the principle of dog-eat-dog, sovereignty having for him no other meaning than the indefeasible right of any state to exploit any other. Hobbes, Locke, and most of the other thinkers of yesterday, though far from sharing the cynicism of Machiavelli, accepted as normal the division of humanity into wholly independent political groups. And it is fair to say that the average man today does no less.

But if peace is one of the tests of right political thinking, this theory of many sovereignties in one world, in spite of its acceptance by Plato, Hobbes, and Mr. Smith,

seems today undeniably short-sighted and inadequate. The results of the interaction of national sovereignties—and of the accompanying political theory, which we may call *nationalism*—are evident today as they have never been before.

Nationalism, as we define it, is the theory that the nation is the largest political unit one needs pragmatically to deal with: through one's own nation and that nation alone one may hope best to serve himself and his generation. But what of the facts?

Nationalism takes two forms.

The hardier type attempts to meet our criterion of true political thinking with the argument that a nation may keep the peace by being so well prepared for war that no other will attack her. That was the thought, for instance, behind President Roosevelt's ultimatum to Germany in 1902, when a German squadron was maneuvering ominously off the coast of Venezuela. He announced that Admiral Dewey would sail to that coast and destroy any European fleet he found there if these maneuvers and the demands they portended were not halted before a certain date. The German commander, at so great a distance from his base, did not dare risk the attack of the American forces, and peace was actually maintained by a nation's being prepared for war. So, it is held, peace may be maintained at any time.

But is not the argument, to say the least, uncertain? In any case it is the regular argument used by the tribes of man since the tribes of man began to be—with results that are patent to all. According to Odysse-Barot's esti-

mate, Europe had had, from 1496 B.C. to his own day, 227 years of peace—and 3,130 years of war! Human nature —European human nature, at any rate—does not seem to have been such that any one nation, or group of nations, could free itself and its world from war by making itself powerful. Arming, as a matter of fact, has never made for peace. When every gentleman carried a sword, duels were the order of the day. A well-armed Germany became in 1914 the hated and hunted nation of Europe. Lord Grey states the simple truth, "If there are armaments on one side, there must be armaments on other sides; and armaments lead inevitably to war." No one nation can, in the long run, *force* peace upon all. There is no hope to be derived from this type of nationalism.

The more benevolent type is equally disappointing. The argument here is that any nation may have peace if she will disarm. The major premise is that it is psychologically impossible to smite a man who turns to you the other cheek. It is substantiated by the illustration of China's appeal to Japan to withdraw from Shantung shortly after the World War. If the former nation had lifted up arms to reëstablish her ancient rights, it is probable that the invader, his martial honor threatened, would have remained in the disputed territory until this day, but because she made an appeal as an unarmed suppliant seeking justice alone, Japan felt it no indignity to retire. So, according to some, peace may be won by any nation at any time: she has only to convince the others that she is "unwilling, under any circumstances, to participate in war."

In face of this argument one recalls Dean Inge's celebrated epigram, "It is useless for sheep to pass resolutions in favor of vegetarianism while the wolf remains of a different opinion." Many times nations which did not wish to fight have been set upon. To governments desiring new lands where excess populations might proliferate, a weak neighbor has been eyed as fair spoil. In this wise, Africa was "colonized" by Europe. The voice of Armenia's blood crieth from the ground against the notion that the irenic nation will surely find peace. It is simply not true that any one nation might by example, if it would, *coax* the rest into peace.

Neither of these two possible types of nationalism is a finally practicable political philosophy—and for the same simple reason. The whole has a distaste for having its decisions made for it by any of its parts. It will *as* a whole make its own judgments; and no so-called theory of world politics which is innocent of any technique for the whole group of nations to act together is worthy the name. Nationalism is not a true philosophy; it is a code for single nations acting *in*dependently, whereas the first article of every true philosophy is that all parts are *inter*dependent upon one another and upon the whole. Nationalism fails to bring peace, because peace, being an international condition, is not to be effected by those who confine themselves to merely national endeavors.

If plurality of sovereignties is the last word of political science, the peoples may as well give up their hope of eventual peace; but because no sane moral mind can dis-

miss that hope, the conviction arises that a plurality of sovereignties is not the last word.

It should be noted that regional or other political groupings of a few nations fall short of the ideal of a universal sovereignty no less than the individual nations themselves, and are therefore as dangerous to the world's peace.

To what, besides and beyond his nation, should the Christian citizen give his loyalty? The answer lies before us: peace depends upon a unified community. A world community is therefore the great hope of our modern day. And it is far more than a mere hope; for those who need actualities to hang their allegiance upon, there are not a few material expressions of that hope. There is the World Court, for instance: it is not perfection, but it is a beginning. The League of Nations is far from perfection: it is the best our race, racked in travail, could bring forth—but it is still a child of promise. There was the Washington Conference on the Limitations of Armaments, and there will be similar and more effective conferences. There have been and there will be world conferences on economic rehabilitation. And there are the many postal, commercial, and even political conventions between nations, the crown of all of which is the Pact of Paris. Out of these a solid body of international law is developing. There is destiny—if we will it so—in the idea of international consultation and cooperation.

It is clear that no nation—your nation, my nation—which claims to be sovereign in the old absolute sense is anything other than a gang; and it is the worst kind of

gang because it is the largest. The nation-state, rightly conceived, is not ultimate, but is part of a world-state in process of becoming. Whether the latter should take the form of a complex of international agreements similar to those already obtaining, whether it should become more permanently organized as a confederation, or whether it should be still further unified under a single centralized government, is not now our question. The first necessity is only to see that the nation-state is not enough. Only a world-state can be ultimate. The very idea of a multiplicity of sovereignties is a contradiction in terms. There can be only one sovereign.

We state it, therefore, as a first principle that *the Christian citizen will declare for some form of sovereign world-state.*

By way of corollary we may remark that it is because our nation is part of the ultimate state that we must love it and honor its laws. We shall not arrogate to ourselves the privilege of obeying those laws which we like and disobeying the others. If we weaken the part, what hope is there of strengthening the whole? If we live so as to allow our national soul to thin away, we destroy ourselves not only as a nation, but as a section of the great human community as well.

It is at this point that the idea of national sovereignty returns to its own. The same principles that guide to a world-state sovereign to the nations guide also to nations sovereign to the classes and political divisions within them.

But sovereignty is not all.

Not all political thinkers of the past argued toward the ideal of a plurality of states. The name of Dante is memorable, if for no other reason, for his imaginative picture, in the *De Monarchia,* of a single dominant and inflexible authority, which should at once divest all lesser groups of absolute, and insure them each a relative, authority. He saw clearly that the well-being of the world depends on unification under one head. He and the like-minded publicists who followed him anticipate us by six centuries in pointing out the necessity for a world-state.

He held that the seat of final political power should be a universal state friendly to, but separated from, a universal church. Certain high-minded contemporaries believed that the church should be accorded the political as well as the spiritual supremacy, but both they and he were at one in their dream of a single ultimate sovereignty.

So far so good. But when Dante's contemporaries, Boniface VIII in the church and Philip the Fair in the empire, attempted to materialize his dream, they made the egregious error of conceiving sovereignty to be the *only* principle of politics, the be-all and end-all, the one lovely instrument. And they are not the only ones in history who have prized sovereignty too highly.

Corresponding to the two types of nationalist, there are two types of those who hold that if a sufficient centrality of authority is established in any state—world-state or nation-state—the citizens and groups of citizens in that state will lead a good and happy life. For want

of a better title we may call these people socialists, for it is society as a whole to which they give their interest. In all fairness it should be noted that such a title is purely arbitrary in this use, denoting those who in their thought for the whole tend to forget the part, as we have used the word "nationalist" for those who in their zeal for a certain part tend to forget the whole; but for all their arbitrary quality, our definitions are not wholly inappropriate, we think, to those who are known generally as nationalists and socialists. At any rate, the question is whether the theory we have called socialism will bring peace.

One type of socialist believes that the centralized government should enjoy so much power that no subsidiary group would dare create disorder.

There is no doubt whatever that Pope Innocent III, if we may choose him as an example, since he represented as close an approximation to absolute political authority as Europe has ever seen, did keep the peace to a remarkable degree. He sat as judge over France and Spain. For fear of him King John of England ate dust on more than one occasion. Innocent derived this theory of the *pax romana* from the great empire to which his church fell heir, but it was equally as much the guiding principle of the empire of Alexander, of Napoleon, and of all the other military state-makers.

But the final result of such a regimen is not peace, but war and dissolution. The ancient Greeks, it will be remembered, worked out from innumerable examples the exact order of the history of such empires: first *koros,*

then *hybris,* then, inevitably, *nemesis,* and finally *ate.* That is to say, when there is *abundance* of power, there grows up with it an *arrogance* which is insulting to the true liberties of men. This calls forth *nemesis,* the principle of *just indignation,* which finally produces the schism which brings the whole to *destruction.* What realists, those Greeks! Consider the fate of the modern empires which most emphasized the idea that the whole was all, the parts nothing. In Lord Grey's words, "Germany, to get on her feet, is receiving international help on terms that would once have seemed incredibly humiliating. The fragment of country of which Vienna is now the capital has been a suppliant to the League of Nations, happily with success, to be saved from annihilation. Russia has had years of internal bloodshed, terror, and untold misery, of which we do not yet see the end."

In all these cases, civil war was the immediate cause of the overthrow of the government. And there seems to be no reason for believing that if there were too great a degree of absoluteness in the government of the world-state the same effect would not ensue. The whole cannot, in the long last, *force* the parts to keep the peace.

In contrast to this, there is a benevolent type of socialism, the variety best known in the world today. Among the upholders of this shade of doctrine we may number the philosophical anarchists like Kropotkin, the guild socialists—who grant that the state is the supreme owner of all capital, but hold that the workers' unions should control it by charter—and all political pluralists. These hold in common the belief that in order to avoid the

abyss into which so many empires have fallen, the central government should manifest its strength by effacing itself. They challenge the state to initiate that renunciation of the claim to ultimate and absolute right which it demands of all the groups and persons within it.

They cite the illustration of the coöperative societies which are everywhere growing up in Europe and America—associations of farmers, manufacturers, butchers, bakers, all sorts of workers. These bodies are not held together and made operative by any "supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority." But the fact that they have a common purpose, and that their officials do not enforce that purpose but set the distinguished example of submitting to it, makes the groups viable.

Now, say those whom we have defined as socialists of tenderer kidney, let us apply the coöperative principle to the whole world, and make it one vast mutual-aid association. If there were no overruling central government standing on its power, there would grow up no *nemesis* of popular restiveness, and all would work happily for the common good.

But this argument, like the former one, is not favored by the realities of the situation. Poland at one time, it may be recalled, deliberately adopted a constitution whereby the state could not operate except as its members would coöperate. Any single veto in the lawmaking body was to prevent legislation. There was to be no coercion even of the smallest minority. But that the country steadily drooped under that government is too cruelly attested by the freedom with which neighboring states

carved it up and annexed it in 1772 and 1793, reducing it to a zero in 1795. This unhappy period was marked both by foreign and by internecine wars. The whole did not in this case, by pacific assent to an abrogation of its own power, succeed in *coaxing* its parts into as pacific an assent to a similar abrogation of theirs—and there is no certainty that this end could be accomplished by such a means in any state at any time.

Those who place all their hopes on centralized sovereignty, to use it as an instrument either of coercion or of precedent, are doomed to disillusionment. If the world-state, or any nation-state, should devote itself chiefly to the enforcement of its power, it might induce in its individual citizens an impulse to obedience or an impulse to revolution. Either will take shape as easily as the other, for the mature man, if he believes his rights of conscience are invaded, will die, as Emerson advised, on the first inch of his territory. If, on the other hand, the state should relinquish its authority, there is no surety but that its citizens would swing as freely to selfish and anarchic interests as to good citizenship. Mere governments, mere systems of order, cannot give the world peace, for peace is a creation of minds working and achieving according to the laws of their own nature.

To what, then, besides the sovereignty of the state, should the Christian citizen give his efforts? The answer again is already plainly implied. That citizen looks toward the goal of an intelligent, creative, ministering state, but such a goal is not reached, he knows, by sov-

ereignty as such. Intelligence, creativity, and ministry flourish in one place and in one alone—in the *individual,* or in companies of individuals, dedicated to the good life.

Philip Guedalla lets his gentle satire play upon the naïve attitude of persons who, trusting the state to protect them from all evil, call for more and more thoroughgoing laws. Borrowing his thought and some of his words, we may also suggest what all must concede to be a useful ordinance for the statute-book:

"Be it enacted that after the last day of December of the current year the citizens of this commonwealth shall be and hereby are enabled to be wise, useful, and constructive members of society."

If only it were possible! But in reality the state is powerless, either by increasing or relaxing its hold, to produce the heroically aspiring and devoted souls it needs. That can be done only by taking individuals as individuals and appealing to them on the ground of their own self-giving nature. Civilization must be willed personally; its alabaster cities rise to no other music than the contagious aspirations of souls dreaming singly. As truly as the part cannot take the place of the whole, the whole cannot take the place of the part. There is another law needed besides that of sovereignty.

We may state it, therefore, as a second principle that *the Christian citizen will declare for the protection and cultivation of the creative and ministering selfhood of individuals.*

It is not necessary to add, for this will be taken up at length elsewhere in this volume, that the one institution which, above all others, has historically furnished society with truly creative individuals, is the church, in all its branches. Said Goethe, in familiar words, "Men are only creative in poetry and art as long as they are religious. Without religion they are only imitators, lacking all originality." He was here using *religion* in its broadest sense, as we are using *church* in its broadest but none the less most characteristic sense. The church has been uniquely a mint and treasury for the human spirit. It is true that she has taken to herself, at times, many functions besides this, and sometimes opposing functions, but when she has been true to her own genius she has lived for no other purpose more than to keep the souls—that is, the selves—of her people alive.

It would be difficult to find any important mediæval or modern period in which the church has not manifested itself as the nurse of the imaginative and self-expressive impulse in men. It was the church which suggested the Magna Carta, drew it up, and had it reënacted at a critical time. She it was who to no small extent brought into being the English capacity for self-government, by giving, in the later Middle Ages, a considerable share in the power of the vestry to the laymen of the parish. The whole idea of establishing the rights of the individual as *legally* inalienable and sacred is apparently more of religious than merely political origin. The Reformation did more for it, in America at least, than the Revolution: its first apostle was not Lafayette, but Roger Williams,

in whose church it was brought through its infancy. The very Golden Rule is a prolifically originative instrument. The old *lex talionis* read, "Follow the way of thy neighbor." The new commandment, which is carved on the church's cornerstone, "Give thy neighbor a new way to follow," has time and again called forth a prophet of a better day.

The church's commission is to dispense to the people an idealistic imagery upon which feeding they may maintain themselves as creative persons in the midst of the hard milieu of social law and custom.

An organization politically healthy fosters, then, both social sovereignty and individual creativity. Sovereignty moves from the whole to the part; its contribution to the peace of the organization is unification. The creative moment is centrifugal from the integral part out toward the whole; its contribution is the will to peace. War is destructivity; peace in the active mood is creativity. Sovereignty and devoted individuality—both are necessary foci of the well-ordered society. Neither can be stressed at the expense of the other.

The state, standing for the whole, can allow no individual to impose his private will upon that whole. It must insist that its members give up any pretensions they may have to unlicensed freedom of action. In general it must control the citizens' *outward* life.

The church, on the other hand, standing for the individual, cannot tolerate any inroad upon the *inner* life of her people. If any legislature, or executive officer, or even any high court of justice, should attempt to regu-

late the belief or thought of the people, she, as a body of people acting in their capacity as individuals, would once more become a church of Covenanters, Non-jurors, resisting by sacrifice. She knows there is an inward zone of morality in the heart of the individual where compromise is naked guilt. To maintain the purity of that zone she will, if need be, go out to the cross—with perfect faith in her resurrection on the third day.

Theoretically, our task is done. On the two principles enunciated hang all the law and the prophets of political science. Ideally, there is no conflict between these principles, for the perfect state will employ its sovereignty to protect its individuals; and the perfect individual, on the other hand, will use his powers to the ends of the state.

It is only in practice that tensions develop, for it is often hard to know where a man's inner life ends and his outer life begins. Does the pacifist, for instance, have a right to his thoughts? Obviously. But is it not true that his thoughts entail an outward life which is inimical to the best interests of the state? So the state thinks. What is to be done in the face of such conflicts of jurisdiction between the state and the individual?

There is need of a third and higher principle to resolve these tensions. And that principle lies to hand. It is not part of any political philosophy. It is not an intellectual principle at all. It serves, on the contrary, to keep one intellectually humble; and that is part of its virtue, for only out of humility can the greater knowledge which is desired arise.

The principle is that of good will, a principle essentially religious. Neither the state nor you and I are omniscient, therefore our judgments may at times conflict. But if the state administers its justice and even its punishments in good will, trying as it seeks to enlighten us to discover further enlightenment for itself, and if we as individuals, on the other hand, perform in good will what we believe to be our mission in the world, in good will making even our most violent and revolutionary criticisms, Time, giving ever greater wisdom, will teach us on point after point of conflict whether the state was wrong in its interpretation or we. The state shows its good will in its genuine care for the individual, which it maintains even if it has to refuse the individual's particular claim; the individual shows his good will on his part in his devotion to the state, which does not lapse even when he cannot conscientiously and does not obey the state's mandate. But the only good will on the part of either which has any hope of success is perfect good will—the good will which is not overcome by any circumstance or set of circumstances—and that is a gift of God, given only to those who seek him.

We may therefore lay it down as a third and last principle that *the Christian citizen will as an individual devote to the state and as a member of the state devote to other individuals an unconquerable good will.*

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XII

Religion and Education

By Justin Wroe Nixon

I

ALL is not well in the relations of religion and education. The evidence of the state of tension that exists between these two great institutionalized interests of the human spirit is varied but convincing.

Students rebel against compulsory chapel in our colleges. Our children return from the university resentful at what they call their religious indoctrination by their parents, who, if they had been really up to date, would have allowed their offspring to grow up in proud detachment from all religious views of life. The most influential criticism of historic religion comes from the leaders of thought in academic circles. James H. Leuba, for instance, challenges both the validity and the permanence of religious experience, and Max Otto assures us that, though religion may remain, God must go. The enormous prestige in educational circles of John Dewey's nontheistic philosophy is both a factor in the present situation and a portent for the future. Meanwhile academic buildings are dedicated no longer with the inscription

"Ad majorem gloriam Dei," but in fact without any invocation of the Deity whatsoever, and though the clergy feel at present somewhat tremulous, they are becoming accustomed to the practice.

The leaders of religious organizations in our colleges are not unaware of the state of tension above described. They confess quite frankly that they are dealing with a difficult and precarious situation. The old programs of Bible and mission study no longer appeal. Social service has lost its thrill. Not even the prestige of the star athlete can put life into the student Y. M. C. A.

What does it all mean? Is there something irreconcilable between the outlook of modern education and that of religion? If so, what are the causes of this estrangement and can they be removed? It is difficult to conceive of questions which are more important to our contemporary world. A cleavage between the intelligence of the race as represented by education and its needs and aspirations as expressed through religion goes to the very heart of our civilization. The celebration of "the twilight of the gods" by our institutions of higher learning will not leave other areas of human life unaffected by deepening shades of gray.

II

What, then, are the reasons for the present embarrassment in the relations of religion and education?

One of the primary reasons is historical. "Religion" and "education" are of course mere verbal symbols. Each represents a vast complex of institutions and vested inter-

ests, philosophies, purposes, and methods. As we think of these two great cultural complexes historically we can go back to a time in mediæval Europe when they were practically identical. Then came the rise of nationalism in the fourteenth century, the reformation of religion in the sixteenth, the scientific achievements of Galileo, Harvey, and Newton in the seventeenth, the industrial revolution of the eighteenth, and the spread of popular government in the nineteenth. All of these changes had the effect of gradually disengaging religion and education from one another.

This process of disengagement went forward now by deliberate purpose and now by the accidents of history. Here a bit of institutionalism, as in the case of American colleges originally denominational, slipped away from the church. Here a new view of human nature hostile to religious dogma, such as the romanticism of Rousseau, found expression in educational experiments. Here the state, the rival of the church, undertook to direct an entire educational system to its own specific ends—the story of modern Germany. And in the midst of this highly complicated process of cultural evolution here were always the men of the academic world, striving at the behest of the most naïve human desires to extricate themselves and their institutions from extraneous control and rationalizing their efforts by such battle cries as "freedom of teaching," "freedom of learning," and "freedom of research."

One does not view the present relations of religion and education, in historical perspective, unless he realizes

that the church, while the foster mother of learning, has also been the chief antagonist from whom teachers have had to wrest the freedom which they sought. Their present struggle for freedom is conditioned largely by the folklore and folkways of our political and economic order. The academic tenure of an anarchist or a communist is at least as precarious as that of an atheist. But the battle against clerical interference and coercion is still on and the propaganda of the churches against evolution and sex intelligence produces in the academic world an anti-religious attitude just as capitalistic pressure induces in the professional class a sympathy with economic radicalism. The psychology of conflict is not conducive to mutual appreciation and understanding.

Another cause of the estrangement with which we are concerned in this essay lies in the increasing domination of education by the philosophy and processes of science. The popular philosophy which science has spread around the world is that of mechanistic naturalism. Science has made its way to the high position of prestige which it now enjoys because it has greatly enhanced man's power to predict and control various events. This enhancement of power is the direct result of the facility of science in measuring certain aspects of reality. Flushed with the success of these achievements, enthusiastic investigators have leaped to the conclusion that the reality which thus lends itself to measurement must be in its most significant phases mechanistic, and that the measuring process supplemented by statistical logic and the play of chance con-

stitutes the royal road to the most intimate understanding of the universe.

Religion, on the other hand, proceeds on the assumption that the ultimate nature of the reality with which we have to deal is dramatic. It is a reality which can be envisaged most adequately by man only when all the potentialities of his nature as a struggling, fighting, loving, adoring creature are held up as a mirror to the universe, and not merely his measuring propensities. It is a reality in which all of the unique qualities of man which give zest and distinction to his existence, his purposiveness, his imagination, his ideal-creating powers which constitute the driving forces of his measuring, are at home. Religion assumes that there is an inner reciprocity of experience between man as a whole and the reality in which he inheres.

To the charge that such a view of reality is anthropomorphic, religion replies that to protect the interpretation of man as a measuring animal upon the universe is just as anthropomorphic as to project the image of man as a dramatic creature. To the practical suggestion that measuring "works," religion replies that the dramatic view "works" also. If it did not work it would not be so implicit in all the higher art and literature of the world as well as in the richest experiences of the great mass of humble men and women. In fact, apart from the dramatic view of life, as Joseph Wood Krutch has recently pointed out, the highest achievements of art and literature would never have been wrought.

So the argument goes on. Both views evidently con-

tain truth, but just how the mechanistic and the dramatic aspects of reality are related no one knows. For the present these partial philosophies of life implicit in modern education and religion make these great interests appear incompatible.

Another serious ground for misunderstanding in the relations of education and religion lies in the nature of the scientific educational process as compared with the processes of religion. Education, for instance, emphasizes the intellectual approach to the problems of living, and the scientific intellect seeks ever a consistent pattern of thought in the rich complexity of life. It finds such a pattern only by reducing concrete experiences to abstractions. Religion, on the other hand, comes to the individual in institutional forms with a variegated appeal to the intellect, the emotions, and the motor impulses. It comes in unique concrete situations and through personal embodiments. It comes to the individual as a going concern and its significance is soaked up through habits, festivals, ceremonies, fellowships, atmospheres, and all sorts of unconscious appropriations and adjustments, as well as through consciously formulated beliefs.

As a consequence of the effort to reduce life to abstractions capable of logical correlation, scientific education emphasizes the detached critical approach to experience. It is the approach from the outside. Religion, on the other hand, becomes vital only to those who approach it from the inside. In this respect it is like the creative experiences of art and human love. Because of this difference in fundamental attitude education is in-

terested in the "constant" elements of experience, in "laws" of nature and human nature. Religion is interested in the unique struggle of the individual with fate. There is manifest in these various attitudes, moreover, a certain difference in motive. Education is primarily concerned with giving man mastery over the processes of life that he may adjust nature to his human desires. Religion is concerned with the discovery by man of a supreme good to which he may adjust himself.

Thus far we have found reasons for the estrangement between religion and education in the historical struggle of the latter interest to free itself from interference by the former, and in the increasing influence, within the field of education, of the philosophy and processes of modern science. There is a third factor in the present estrangement, however, more influential, probably, than either of those which we have just described. That factor is the advent of the machine.

The conquests of the machine have subtly strengthened our confidence in the manipulation of the objective environment as the road to human fulfillment at the expense of all intuitive or contemplative approaches to the meaning of life. In accordance with this tendency, Professor Harry Elmer Barnes calls upon us to extrovert our minds and Bertrand Russell asks us to permanently discard the ideal of contemplation which has been one of the most influential conceptions in human history. Thus the lure of manipulation fascinates the thinking of the sophisticated as the jazz band with its mechanical rhythm captures the fancy of the multitude.

The achievements of the machine are manifold. It has opened up in the realm of the mechanical, adventures so romantic that Paul Valery claims they are draining through new channels the springs of the imagination which once flowed out in poetry. It has vastly extended through the instruments now at the disposal of the analytical mind the possibilities of research. It has provided an economic surplus hitherto unknown in human history, and leisure for its pleasurable consumption in the novel and varied entertainments which the machine has invented. Through the disintegrating influence of our great cities upon the stability of group relations, through the isolation made possible to the individual by the automobile, and through the devices of birth control, the machine is affording new releases of primitive instincts which threaten all the conventional ethics of sex.

To vast numbers of people engulfed by this torrential movement of life (and many of them are upon the campuses of our universities) the moods of religion are irrelevant and its ethics irritating. The following comment upon the contemporary scene seems to be soundly based: "For every man alienated from the church by the study of biology there are dozens who, with no intellectual doubts whatever, have found their thoughts and feelings fully occupied with the host of new pursuits and diversions that belong to the machine age."[1]

But the influences of the machine age are just about as unfriendly to the liberal college as they are to the church. The high degree of specialization required by

[1] Randall, *Our Changing Civilization*, p. 277.

our minute division of labor, the consequent increasing pressure toward early vocational preparation, the preoccupation of the public mind with the financial rewards of standardization and mass production—all present difficulties for the liberal college which has been engaged in trying to create a balanced and unified view of life and a genuinely humane spirit sensitive to the best that has been thought and done in the world.

The situation reminds one of Mark Twain's account of how the course of the Mississippi was sometimes changed in his early days. Individuals inspired by the malicious purpose of securing a river frontage at the expense of their neighbors would cut sluiceways into the bank at a bend of the stream, when the water was low. Later on the spring freshets would come and a new torrent of water would cut the sluices deeper and deeper and often open up an entirely new channel so that the sluice-cutter would now be on the river while his neighbor who possessed the former frontage would be inland, far from the main current.

Science has cut the sluiceways for a new channel of human development in our time. But it is the flood of our machine culture pouring into those sluiceways which threatens to leave both the church and the liberal college in a backwater of the modern world.

The machine, accordingly, has had a dual result. It has created a type of mind insensitive to religious appeal, and many of these minds are engaged in higher education. On the other hand, it constitutes a common prob-

lem for both religion and liberal education and thus serves to bring them together.

History, science, and the machine have all contributed to the state of tension which characterizes the present relations of religion and education. There are, of course, important agreements of purpose and outlook between these two great institutionalized interests of the race. Both, moreover, represent functions of the same society. There are many situations where the tension we have described hardly exists at all. But in this essay we are considering the difficulties in the relations of these two interests, especially in higher education, where the tension is most acute, because, as President Henry Churchill King pointed out years ago, it is from our greatest difficulties that our most precious insights come.

III

Whenever you are dealing with a problem which arises from a profound movement of civilization, the futility of looking for panaceas is obvious. We are not expecting, accordingly, any "quick turn" in the relations of religion and education. We have tried to point out the causes of embarrassment in their relations and we are assuming that a larger understanding between them is desirable. We should now like to point out one factor in the present situation of both religion and education which may contribute toward their reconciliation. That factor is the growing prestige of a world view different from the mechanistic naturalism which has been popular in science

and from the disembodied and ineffective idealism which has characterized religion.

The view is gaining ground that at the heart of the reality to which we humans belong and with which we have congress there is a dynamic "whole"-creating tendency, and that the totality of life is a system of "wholes." According to this view the behavior of atoms, molecules, cells, complex organisms, and groups of organisms is affected by and in a sense is a function of the "whole" to which the respective units belong. Contributions to this view have been made by the *gestalt* school in psychology, by such biologists as Childs and Wheeler, by Eddington and Pupin in physics, by Moulton with his theory of the super-galaxies in astronomy, by Spengler in history in spite of his pessimism, by Cooley and Thomas in sociology, by Waldo Frank in the criticism of cultural forms, by Whitehead, Smuts, Lloyd Morgan, and Hobhouse in philosophy. These are only a few of the names of those who are developing once more in various fields of thought, a profoundly "organic" view of the world.[1]

It is possible that the effect of this view on the interrelation of the two great interests we are considering may be far-reaching. Let us look for a moment at its implications for religion.

One of the consequences of the organic view is to underscore the importance to religion of its contemporary culture. Along a thousand channels psychological and

[1] Hobhouse, *Liberalism*, p. 125. "A thing is called organic when it is made up of parts which are quite distinct from one another, but which are destroyed or vitally altered when they are removed from the whole."

social the influences of this culture flow in upon religion and the reciprocal influences of religion flow out upon the world. Now a religion always comes to some kind of terms with the existing culture. There is no doubt about that. The real question arises when we ask what kind of terms they shall be.

An historical religion carrying along with it necessarily a fairly stiff body of tradition always faces a serious issue when the complexion of the cultures, to which it has become adjusted, changes. If the new culture develops tendencies unfavorable to the beliefs and practices of the religion, the issue may be resolved in two ways. The religion may crystallize on its traditional basis and become a religion of escape from the new hostile environment. Or it may remain more or less plastic, seeking through union with the nobler tendencies of the period to become the spiritual organ of the new civilization. There is more to be said for a religion of escape than the psycho-pathologists will allow. There is in such a religion a great and salutary amount of sheer rest so much needed by a hectic era; a discontinuity of experience which is often the condition preliminary to creative insight; a different historical perspective which may remind one of values which belong to the ages rather than to the age; and for distressed souls an anodyne for mental pain, a psychic anæsthesia without which life would be intolerable. When to such values are added the offer of inward peace in a time of spiritual uncertainty a religion of escape may well seem as it does to many, the pearl of great price, worth the cost of moral quiescence and a

measure of indifference to practical affairs. It is probable that no popular religion can entirely divest itself of "escape" elements.

But no religion of escape is without serious and, it may be, fatal weaknesses. The particular weakness which we emphasize in this connection is that such a religion tends to create a sharp and irreconcilable division between the everyday interests of men and the interests of religion. It serves to make impossible any permanent organic union between the various mundane concerns which inevitably constitute a large part of our lives, and the aspirations for inner emancipation and self-dedication which belong to the spiritual history of man. Religions of escape retard the development of experience in modern civilization into a significant "whole."

If we are to find "wholeness" in our personal and social experience, our historic religion, confronted as it is by a changing culture, will have to make a different choice. It will have to search for the creative elements in the new way of living which have the greatest spiritual promise, and seek through union with those elements to mold our civilization into forms less hostile to man's deepest needs.

With what elements of our existing culture may religion unite in order to become a more adequate spiritual organ of contemporary society? One of these elements, assuredly, is science. Without science religion will never come into its own in our day. Science has demonstrated that it is the most adequate method mankind has ever devised for getting at the "how" of things. On the philosophical side in dealing with the "whys" and "where-

fores" it is still weak. In our discussion of mechanistic naturalism we have already noted its partiality. But taking science in its more restricted sense as an attack upon the problems of life by the methods of observation, analysis, hypothesis, and experiment, it is one of the great formative influences of the modern world which a growing religion ought to find congenial.

In union with science religion may accept with confidence the challenge to methodical research into the conditions of widening vision and psychic energy. It may learn to distinguish its permanently invigorating experiences from those which are merely anæsthetic. It may develop methods of spiritual discipline which will enable men to save their souls in the midst of the centrifugal forces of our time. It may help to create new ideals of sex, race, business, politics, and international life. It may explore the baffling process by which ideals are turned into habits, the disclosure of which would inaugurate a new epoch in moral and religious education. It may invent new ways of enlarging and enriching human fellowship. The possibilities open to the ancient faith of religion armed with the modern methods of science seem limitless. The slightest glance at these possibilities is sufficient to evidence the truth of Professor Whitehead's statement: "When we consider what religion is for mankind and what science is, it is no exaggeration to say that the future course of history depends upon the decision of this generation as to the relations between them."[1]

[1] Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 253.

A religion, of course, in which science had taken the place of magic would have to face a regrouping of the impulses of human nature which express themselves through it. In such a religion the ardor of thought, tolerance, and coöperative research with men of other faiths would crowd out many a sectarian bigotry. Such a religion would probably lose in dogmatic certainty. It would gain in reality. Its anæsthetic values might be less, but it would illumine all the essential experiences of men with the faith that they can be built up into a significant "whole" to which man may freely dedicate his all. Such a religion would be an unfinished religion in an unfinished world, but it would affirm the worth of that world and seek to transform it into its own vision of the best. If such a religion came to education with a humble yet a courageous spirit it could hardly be denied an adequate share in a great coöperative enterprise of developing nobler human beings.

There are other adjustments which religion has to make to our contemporary culture in the light of the organic view of the world, but as respects education it is the adjustment of religion to science which seems to be of primary importance.

IV

The view of the world which we have been discussing suggests to education that on its side it must develop a more adequate method of social intelligence for doing justice to religion as a "whole."

This development on the part of education, while diffi-

cult in its details, has a chance of being realized because it is in line with tendencies already at work in the educational field. The orientation courses instituted in recent years, the new emphasis upon the individuality of the student and the personnel service instituted by college administrations to help him find himself upon the campus, the trend in specialization to devote more attention to the contact of the specialty with other departments of study so that the specialty may become a point of vantage for surveying human problems—all are expressions of the interest of educators in coming to grips with life as a going concern in which the student ought to be prepared to play an intelligent part.

Educators, moreover, are becoming more and more conscious of the inadequacy of current methods in dealing with such subjects as art and literature which require in the student a certain taste and capacity for appreciation, and with the social sciences which require a certain background of experience in practical affairs. In other words, when education passes beyond subjects which are primarily instruments of knowledge, tools of research, or the techniques of a highly specialized vocation, it begins to feel the isolation of a school. It finds itself thrust out by sheer hunger for reality to get into contact with life as a living whole. So you have Professor Baker's attempt at Harvard and Yale to reproduce the conditions of dramatic creation, and you have in the study of groups the method of the "participant-observer" as developed by Follett and Lindeman.

Partly as a cause and partly as a result of these various

tendencies in education we are gradually gaining a more adequate conception of what social intelligence means. We are realizing that social intelligence is partly science, the search for the constant and repeated elements of a situation; partly the absorption of the ways of a society by subconscious and intuitive methods; partly art, the construction of possibilities and probabilities of human behavior out of the totality of experience; and partly practical adventure, the trying out of various policies in action.

We have emphasized the nature of social intelligence, which is certainly one type of intelligence required for dealing with religion, because the first responsibility of education in relation to religion is to be intelligent about it. In the light of our knowledge of what social intelligence requires it is clear that education cannot be intelligent concerning religion unless it learns how to approach religion in its concreteness, with its institutions, its traditions, its inwardness, its aspirations, and its habits of life. Education must find its way to religion from the inside as well as from the outside. It must sense the meaning of religion as a "whole."

Now the most significant "wholes" that we meet in religion are to be found through contact with individual persons and groups of persons. The man, for instance, who teaches the courses on religion in a college ought to contribute more to the understanding of religion as an organic "whole" than any syllabus of his lectures would indicate. From our point of view the particular type of religion he professes is not of so much consequence as

the fact that he takes his own faith seriously and can make it intelligible to his classes. From the believer, be he Catholic, Protestant, or Jew, the student will catch the spell of a great faith which has stood the weathering of the centuries, which still demonstrates its power to organize personal experience. From the so-called "open-minded" teacher, critical of all religions because indifferent to all, the student will receive, as Hocking points out, protection from error but not against starvation. Such a teacher will indoctrinate not with dogmas, but with attitudes, the attitudes of the religious connoisseur, who collects samples of the religion of others but hardly dares venture on a religion of his own. While the difficulty with the teaching of religion in our churches lies in the confusion between historic doctrines and a positive faith, the difficulty in our colleges lies in the confusion between dilettantism and intelligence.

If the first clue to the intelligent apprehension of religion lies in providing for the student contact with religious individuals, the second lies in introducing him to the experiences of a religious fellowship. Not until one becomes a member of a religious fellowship does he realize the sustaining power of a great tradition and how essential that tradition is to successful experimentation in this field. Here is the rational basis of the argument for the church college. Academic authorities, moreover, who are without any denominational obligations, evidence, through the building of chapels, the fostering of churches near the campus, and through hospitality to various religious movements which affect the student world, their

conviction that intelligence in religion gains through fellowship.

The difficulty here is that sectarian ambitions and propaganda complicate the problem for the college. But the problem is not a simple one in any case. Religious fellowship is a precious and hardly-won achievement. The real test of the new academic humanism, a religion without God, will come on the question of its capacity to create a fellowship. If it cannot develop a form of worship, a discipline of conduct, a solidarity of feeling in the deepest concerns of the human spirit, it will prove that it is not a religion but only an intellectual attack upon existing religions by highly individualistic souls who have found in it a way of escape from orthodoxy. We would encourage the humanists to move on as rapidly as possible toward a fellowship. Only thus can we discover whether there is in such a faith the promise of "wholeness." For in religion, as in other aspects of our experience, fellowship is life and the lack of fellowship is death.

It is on the frontier of fellowship, moreover, that the new insights of religion are beginning to emerge. In the common councils of Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, in the interpenetration of races and nations, in the deeper sharing of experience by the sexes, in the mingling of intellectual and industrial groups, we have the growing points of our contemporary spiritual life. Our academic institutions are in a peculiarly favorable position to foster such enlarging fellowships because they constitute the meeting-place of many differing group traditions. Every-

thing depends upon whether our educators grasp the possibilities of these movements, whether they will accept the challenge to build up the traditional spiritual experiences of men and the precious but fragmentary knowledge we have won in our era into a new positive "whole" which will give meaning to our existence.

Between a religion which appreciates the search for truth and the objective methods implicit in modern science and an education which seeks to understand the "whole" of religious experience through exposure to rich personalities and the enlargement of spiritual fellowship, there ought not to be permanent estrangement. The problem of their reconciliation, however, is more vast than we have indicated. The attack upon it is a campaign and not a sortie. It requires adequate equipment, selected personnel, wise staff-work, ingenious tactics, the quick seizure of opportunities, high morale, and heroic leadership in the field. All that we have hoped to indicate in this paper is the nature of the struggle and the direction in which we believe the attack ought to move. It is a campaign not for a day or a year, but perhaps for several generations. Upon the reconciliation of these two great interests which we have been discussing depends the success of man's efforts to harness the wild forces of his machine culture which at present threatens the future of both religion and education.

To those of us who are working at this problem it constitutes the large-scale adventure of our day. Children of our own generation, sharing its educational interest and outlook, we are lured to this adventure by a conviction

concerning religion. It is one of the convictions which William James says inspired him to write his Gifford lectures on "The Varieties of Religious Experience," the conviction that, "although all the special manifestations of religion may have been absurd . . . yet the life of it as a whole is mankind's most important function." [1]

[1] *Letters of William James*, vol. ii, p. 127.

XIII

The World Christian Movement and the New Day

By A. W. Beaven

WE ARE passing through a period of confusion in regard to the foreign missionary enterprise. Its enemies criticize it. Its friends defend it. Its leaders are busy reconstructing it. The rest stand by and are puzzled.

The confusion has at least three bad effects. Youth hesitates to invest life in this enterprise when disturbed by the many contradictory things being said. Older people, who were only partially convinced of the necessity for sacrifice in its support, find in the confusion a sufficient excuse to decrease their giving. In the third place the hesitation and questioning on this side affect the morale on the other side, both among our missionaries and among the nationals. In view of these effects, it is essential that we attempt to understand why the confusion exists, what it means for the present and future, and what steps can be taken to clear it up.

THE PAST IS GLORIOUS

Before we attempt, however, to look into the situation today, let us take a brief look backward. The past is

secure and, in this case, it is glorious. The foreign-missionary movement of the Christian church has been the greatest invasion of one hemisphere by people of another, for purposes of service and blessing and not for exploitation.

The world Christian movement stands as one of the most splendid crusades undertaken on earth; driven by a more unselfish idealism; carried through by people who average a higher per capita of ability, and have achieved more of value with less of equipment, than any other group in the Christian church. The movement has made a monumental contribution to education, and has tended to carry such great ideals as democracy and service into ever-increasing areas. It is the greatest humanitarian enterprise the world has known, and its institutions for the blessing of the mind and the body and the soul dot the known globe. It has lifted up womanhood and childhood, put cheer where despondency was chronic, and opened the doors to new hope in country after country.

We do not claim that the past has seen no mistakes. It has. That may be admitted frankly. No enterprise of that size is free from them. Jesus' own disciples made them; in spite of his influence, one-twelfth of that group went completely wrong. But regardless of those faults, that company turned the world upside down. There have been mistakes made in the world Christian movement, but after admitting them all, the past is still glorious. Any who have put their money or their thought or their prayers into it can thank God for having had an opportunity to invest in so far-reaching a program.

THE PRESENT IS CONFUSED

Today, however, the situation does not appear to be so clear. The movement is now under attack. Once it was practically free from criticism. Up to fifteen years ago it was looked upon as almost too sacred to criticize. A person who entered upon it as a life work, was set apart by that fact as upon a higher plane than others. The whole enterprise and those engaged in it carried a halo. Today, however, we have passed into a period when the critics of the movement are vociferous and attacks upon it have been given wide circulation.

Its premises are questioned. One hears the man on the street ask such questions as these, when the missions are discussed: "Is there any further need for the foreign-missionary enterprise?" "Haven't we enough reforming to do at home without spending our strength upon the heathen?" "Haven't they religions of their own with which they are satisfied? Then why force ours upon them?" "Why should we assume that we are good enough to teach them when things are so bad here?" "Isn't China one of our best mission fields, and yet haven't things collapsed there?" This attitude of criticism and questioning indicates the difference in the mood of our time toward this effort to bring Christ to the non-Christian world. Even to its friends it is obvious that extensive changes are being found necessary by those who are leading in the movement. Conferences are being held, new plans are being laid. Some of the old and time-honored methods are being discarded; familiar words are

no longer used and figures of speech so familiar are not now always utilized in its appeal.

However secure the past, some people are raising the question about the present and the future. How are we to interpret these things? Do they mean that the enterprise is facing impending dissolution, that there is some elemental upheaval taking place that spells ruin? Or is there some other interpretation that is nearer the truth?

A PERIOD OF CHANGE

The first answer to the above questions grows out of the fact that we are all living in a period of flux. The sections of the globe, however, in which the foreign-missionary program is being carried out are being subjected to almost volcanic changes—changes in the attitude of the Orient toward the Occident; revolutionary changes in educational, social, and philosophical ideas; and changes almost too great to be grasped in governmental and racial relations.

Note, for instance, the list made by the members of one group who recently sat down to catalogue what had happened in the last twenty years to affect the missionary cause. They called attention to the World War, which was accompanied by the projection of explosive ideas, such as the self-determination of nations, into the midst of the backward populations of the world, ideas which have proved to be dynamite indeed. The explosions that have occurred since that time have been simply indications of the surprising power of the charges that were thus

planted. They listed, also, the disillusionment that followed the War, the reaction that came among the Oriental peoples when they found nations that they had called Christian, teaching so-called heathen nations the art of hellish destruction. They catalogued the elemental changes in national psychology which have made such movements as Bolshevism and Fascism possible; also the almost unprecedented tidal wave of nationalism that has swept over all nations of the world; the advance in the emancipation of women, which has gone farther in the last twenty years than in the five hundred years preceding, and has filled the minds of one-half of the population of the world with new and sometimes disturbing conceptions. They called attention to the fact that new philosophies have attacked age-old ideas of home life and the marriage relationship, and repudiated well-established canons in such matters as absolute morality and authority.

The greatest of all the factors which they listed was the rise of "secularism," "a philosophy of life which derives its interpretation of the universe solely from natural science." In other words, the real opposition to the Christian ideal on the foreign field comes not from a frontal attack made by the so-called pagan religions, but is an attack from the rear coming out of Western civilization itself. We, here in Western lands, have been so eager to develop our material and mechanical powers that we have failed to provide for the development of spiritual forces to control these very powers. An idealistic movement like foreign missions feels this lack keenly. Its workers face a situation which is comparable to build-

ing with concrete which has not enough cement in it. This deadly secularism flowing out over the world like an advancing ice cap in the Ice Age crushes not only the superstitions of the so-called "pagan" faiths, but threatens to overwhelm the underlying idealism of every movement on earth, Christianity included.

It is perfectly evident that those who guide this enterprise must remobilize their forces and adapt their plan of campaign to the conditions as they exist today. If no adjustments were taking place in the movement itself it would be an evidence that it was antiquated and moribund.

CRITICISM RAMPANT

Changes are what we should expect. To find them should bring us joy rather than fear. However, if such adjustments are to be made it will require extensive discussion and such discussions will unquestionably bring out strong differences of opinion. This is exactly what has happened. But the foreign-missionary movement is a public and not a private matter. These discussions have not taken place in executive session. The public has heard the differences of opinion as the debate progressed. They hear the advocates of various policies speak; they hear the voices of the nationals as they have never heard them before; and, as a result, some who listen grow confused and fearful.

These accompaniments of a time of change would have accounted adequately for much of the mystification of today, but certain other things have accentuated the con-

fusion. Enemies of the movement have taken advantage of the fact that there were divisions in councils on the inside, to attack it from the outside. Some of these attacks have been venomous in the extreme. Many coming out of China, for instance, which have emanated ostensibly from Chinese, have largely reflected the propaganda of the arch enemy of all religion, the Bolshevistic movement. Under ordinary circumstances, these vehement attacks on the part of the enemies of the movement would have had but a small circulation, but during the last four or five years China's revolution has been a front-page matter. Many of these criticisms, therefore, that would otherwise have died where they were born have been attached to news copy that has covered the globe, with the result that this bitter criticism has gone much farther and been given larger weight than it would under ordinary circumstances.

There is another factor that we should not forget. We have just been passing through a period that has been marked by a receding tide of idealism when destructive criticisms have been popular and good copy. An age that could have been given such backing to the prophets of the so-called "debunking" school of today as to give them rank as popular writers, could be depended upon not to overlook so large and idealistic an enterprise as the one of which we here speak. Some of the criticism, therefore, which one hears can be wiped off the slate as comparatively valueless. It has added to the confusion. We should not dignify it, however, by supposing that it has created the difficulties.

THE DELICATE TASK OF LEADERSHIP

With a realization, therefore, of the changing situations on the fields in which they work and the mood of the time in which we live, let us look still further into the delicate and complex nature of the task which the leaders of the foreign-missionary movement are facing just at this time. They must steer the ship which they control between Scylla and Charybdis. If they go too far one way they will wreck it on one headland; if they allow it to go too far the other way, it will be wrecked there. Let me point out to you certain impressions of the difficulties of their work which have come to me in the midst of conferences on the mission fields and in board groups here at home.

SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS

Notice the rocks on both sides of the channel in the matter of the relationship of Western churches to the younger churches in the Orient. Our leaders must place enough responsibility upon native leadership to satisfy their needs and to expand their powers, yet must not withdraw Western leadership so fast that the new national churches will not have the result of our experience, spiritual maturity, and financial backing. They must furnish enough aid so as not to cripple the movement and yet not so much as to make the native church dependent and sycophant. They must not allow themselves in the Occident to exercise such dictatorship over the newer churches

as will cause them to rebel, yet they must not be so indifferent to their own responsibilities that they will allow the enterprise already built up to disintegrate for lack of proper supervision.

They face the same alternatives in theology. They must have a theology forward-looking enough to represent the spirit of the living Christ and appeal to the thinking of the future leaders in the Orient. On the other hand, they must not have so arid an intellectualism as will have no heart or drive or cutting edge and will lose the message of the Gospel of Christ. Again, they must not put such emphasis on evangelism that they will sow seed so widely that we will have neither leaders nor institutions to culture it. Neither must they concentrate so greatly on affording education for leadership that they fail to develop a sufficient constituency to be led and allow the leaders, when trained, to drift off into other forms of work because the Christian churches are not strongly enough developed to offer them a field for their ability. They must not place so great an emphasis on the social and educational work of the Gospel as to lose the actual propagating power of Christianity. On the other hand, they must not put so little emphasis upon it as to fail to represent the mind of Christ or the serving opportunity of the Christian movement, which is the one argument for our being there that any national can understand.

They face further the same alternatives in finances. They must not adopt a policy that invests so much of our

money in property and institutions as to get us involved because of increasing government control of material things. On the other hand, they must not put so little into property and institutions as to give us practically no permanent foothold for the movement. They must avoid transfer of authority to the nationals so much faster than our contributing constituency here can be educated to understand it that it will cut the sources of income coming from the supporting churches. Per contra, they must avoid such inelastic control from this side as will practically ruin the developing sense of initiative and independence growing there.

We have taken time to emphasize at such length the difficulties and problems which face the leaders of the foreign-missionary enterprise today because we want to make an appeal for patience and for intelligent coöperation with them if and as they attempt to solve the problems.

The point to be noted is that the changes in foreign missions are not in the elemental things, but in the secondary things, such as methods, machinery, organization, points of approach, etc. A ship might sail the sea when the sky was brilliant with a storm of meteors, but the captain does not steer it by watching the meteors; he looks past them to the unchanging stars and decides his course by his position in relation to the things that do not change. In a period of confusion, then, it would seem natural for us to go back and get our bearings by remembering the things that have not changed.

FUNDAMENTALS NOT CHANGED

Why did we begin the Christian world movement, anyway, and what is the underlying motive that drives it? It is not, as some aver, that we have Western civilization and want to expand it, or that we have products and want markets for them, or because we think we are so good and they are so bad, or that we are cultured and they are savages, or that we are wise and they are ignorant. We did not start it and we do not keep it up, because it is easy to do, nor because non-Christian people invited us, nor because they are conscious of the insufficiency of their faith. It was started and it has continued because people have great eternal, universal, spiritual needs. These needs are met most fully in Christ. We have Christ, and having him puts the compulsion on us to share him with those who do not have him. It started for the same reason that those who had food and who had a spirit of brotherhood felt under compulsion to share it with their brothers who were hungry.

But have these elemental reasons ceased? Quite the contrary. The reasons that started it in the beginning are even greater now. The need is increased rather than decreased because the forces of our modern life, that require spiritual control to prevent their issuing in destruction, are everywhere under expansion.

The ability of Christ to meet those needs becomes clearer rather than less clear. The attacks of modern skepticism upon the superstition and sacred myths of many faiths have left them demolished and millions spir-

itually homeless. These same attacks on Christianity have, to be sure, chipped away some outer accretions, but the attackers have soon come to an indestructible factual core in the person of Christ. Their efforts have had the result of an unveiling rather than a demolition, and Jesus stands out, in new and solitary grandeur, as the increasingly clear answer to the world's spiritual need in a generation where millions are turning from ancient faiths with a poignant sense of disillusionment.

Our ability to meet the needs is greater now. Then the Christians were few and those who did not have him were many. Today Christians are numbered by the millions, they live in lands immensely wealthy, are grouped in churches which have accumulated equipment and comforts that reflect untold prosperity, and have members who can and do go to other lands easily and safely for any purpose which seems wise.

They need him—we have him—we must give him. That is the essence of it.

But have they religions that are sufficient? Here we face the situation as disclosed at the Jerusalem Conference. With our modern study of comparative religions we have developed a growing tolerance and a perfectly normal desire to be fair to all the spiritual values inherent in other religions. Christian writers in Western lands have written some splendid appreciations of those faiths. No one needs to doubt that such eulogies can be written, but no one can really estimate the comparative value of Christianity and another faith by sitting in a study. No one can do it as well as one who has lived under condi-

tions produced by them both. And when Christians, who had never lived as non-Christians in a land without Christianity, came to lift their voices in praise of pagan faiths in the presence of those Christians of Oriental countries who have been living under both circumstances, they met quickly—particularly among the women—the hard, stubborn facts of which the women were conscious—namely, that, however one, who looks on from a distance, may select various sayings from the different non-Christian religions that indicate beautiful conceptions, still in life as it is lived, it is through Jesus Christ and him alone, that womanhood, childhood, or even manhood can come to any sort of a real, full, rounded approach to God. No other religion offers God as the Christian sees him; no other faith can offer a character like Jesus of Nazareth or his living spiritual presence today; nowhere else do we have the same appreciation of personality, and in no other faith do we hear the good news of the Gospel of God's loving grace as shown by Christ's sacrificial life and death or the possibility of redemption from sin to service as it was incarnated in and heralded by the matchless personality who is at the heart of the Christian movement. To have him is to feel an irresistible compulsion, not to ignore what others have, but to share the best.

INCIDENTAL CHANGES, IMPERATIVE

The needs being as great and greater, the ability of Christ to meet those needs as clear and clearer, and our resources for coöperation with God in Christ being as

strong and stronger, it would seem that the fundamental, unchanging elements in the situation all point to an advance rather than a retreat. If the fundamental reasons for beginning and continuing the enterprise are as urgent today as ever, we should then rise above the confusion, make whatever incidental adjustments are necessary, and go ahead with the task. The ship captain who finds the sun covered when he tries to make his calculations, does not stop his ship; he goes ahead, using the observations made the last time he did see the sun. We can and should do the same. The sun hasn't been demolished even though we cannot see it.

In making these adjustments, we who are onlookers will have to largely trust our leadership, both here and in the Orient, but we must be patient and give courageous backing to them as they take the various steps that are necessary to put the changes into operation. In general, they are far ahead of us in their realization of the need of progressive programs of action.

There is no question that they are going to be forced to increasingly shift the management of the enterprise from the shoulders of foreign workers to the Oriental leaders. If this is disturbing to some and produces the feeling that we are asked to give money while they spend it without our control, let us remember that a self-guiding church in those countries has been the objective toward which we have labored all these years; that such an indigenous church is in itself the only hope for the Christianization of those countries; and that this will never be accomplished so long as Christianity is looked

upon as a foreign religion. Let us not forget that far-sighted leaders in the missionary movement have been constantly advocating this and pushing the nationals to undertake it, through years past. To have the spirit of nationalism rise at this time to forward this, is sheer gain rather than loss.

There is no question, either, that our denominationalism is likely to have little appeal in these newer fields. If some, who have always given primarily to denominational enterprises are disturbed by this, let them remember that whatever historical justification for denominational differences may exist here among the Western churches, this does not exist there and our divisions frequently seem artificial to them and are weakening in the extreme. The task is too great in those countries for Christianity, weak as it is, to be split into our various Western sections. If we are asked to watch our groups which we have started, consolidate with other groups as they are likely to do for purposes of the work, we shall have to be patient and try to understand the situation. If we, in this country, cannot disentangle ourselves so as to avoid the weaknesses that come out of our competition, let us pray that they may be led to save the real values and avoid some of the deadly overlapping into which we have fallen.

We shall undoubtedly have to change our attitudes and abandon such phraseology, psychology, and methods as are predicated on our supposed white superiority. We must eliminate from our vocabulary and minds all things that assume the supremacy of Western civilization, Western methods, Western ecclesiastical machinery, etc., and

be perfectly willing that the Gospel of Jesus Christ shall be returned to the Orient in its simplicity and on its merits, and they of the Orient be allowed to discover the values in Christ for themselves. In our dealings with those churches we must move quickly now from "paternalism to partnership," from patronage to coöperation.

CONFUSION CLEARED BY ADVANCE

These and other changes will undoubtedly be necessary. We should enthusiastically coöperate to secure them, rather than sullenly refuse to help, if they are made. It is a time to set our faces toward the future and march on. If we will do so the confusion will soon be left behind.

The movement itself is challenged to an even greater advance than before. As one student of the situation put it lately, "The Christian enterprise in those lands is just getting under way. There are necessary tasks that are not only unaccomplished but as yet unattempted." Moreover, we are stewards of the achievements now in existence. The church that is there has been built up by the sacrifice of thousands of our best lives. We dare not, in fairness to them, let it lapse. The Christian nationals who are rising so heroically to take up the task today are facing almost insuperable odds; they are trying to back the Christian movement in countries where there may be four hundred non-Christians to every one who is even a nominal Christian. They ought to be able to look without question to us, who work in a country where

there are three nominal Christians to every one who is not.

The only answer which Christians of the West can normally give to the present confusion in the world Christian movement is to plan largely for a most courageous advance and carry it through.

WE NEED IT

We can make the changes and undertake the advance with better grace when we realize that it is as good for us to do it as it is for them to have it done. The more we do it the better we are, the less we do it the more we deteriorate. That it is a natural process for the Christian church is shown by the fact that historically it has proved a healthy process. When we passed our blessings on we were like the brook that keeps pure. When we have withheld them we became like the pool that stagnates.

We can undertake this also more whole-heartedly because such a program is simply a matter of common fairness. We are placed in the midst of a world family of which these countries are members. We are going to ship the *things* of our civilization to them. These things, such as automobiles, machinery, oil, etc., will unquestionably increase their power as they have ours, but if we are to export the instruments of power can we, in common fairness, fail to export those spiritual ideals which alone can make power a blessing and not a curse? Can we introduce our methods of industry to Africa, Japan, and China, and not also teach those ideals of social justice

which have helped in a large part to make machinery our servant and not our master?

BOTH OCCIDENT AND ORIENT NEED IT

Still further, the Occident needs to face the implications of the decisions that we make at this time in the light of the situation these decisions will create for those who follow us in generations to come. Roosevelt once said something to this effect, Keep your eye on the Pacific basin. It will be the center of the world's interest for five hundred years. Let us not forget that the Orient has one-half the world's population. As yet it represents raw man power, for the most part unexpanded by the addition of machinery. In America the strength of each man is increased thirty-two times by the use of machines. This increase of power is bound to come more and more in the Orient. As it comes they are going to do something with it. Some people feel that this will go so far as to shift the balance of power to their hands in the future. Whether or not this is true, we may not doubt that it will change many things.

The Occident will have certain relations with that new Orient. There are two trails we can follow in those contacts. One is the trail of exploitation, using our present strength to get concessions and unfair advantages. This policy may appeal to our selfishness, but must of necessity be increasingly backed up by force. We have pursued it far enough to see where it leads. The recent wave of anti-foreign feeling and bitterness is evidence that along that path we will face resentment, ill will, and the

possibility of war. Down that trail one can see hate and greed, armed camps and the wastage of resources, of both Occident and Orient, in destructive militarism. That trail has no hope. It leads on toward the darkness. If we follow it our descendants will pay a price in blood and treasure that will impoverish them and break the back of future generations with the load.

The other trail we can follow is one marked by fair dealing, good will and coöperation; one that looks upon our present power as the measure of our opportunity to establish confidence between Occident and Orient. The missionary enterprise is now, and has been, the greatest single influence pushing the two groups down this trail. Its institutions of service are scattered over the Orient; its representatives have gone out to serve, not to exploit. "They constitute one group," as Mr. Seldon puts it, "which is a credit to the West." They are investments in good will and understanding. They build constructively and their efforts will make foundations upon which the larger structure of future coöperation can rest.

If there is any group in Western lands who should feel called upon today to go ahead and not back, advance and not retreat, it is the people who comprise the Western churches, who hold the heritage of the message of Jesus Christ, and who are intrusted with the custody of this already tremendous adventure in good will.

"LO, I AM WITH YOU"

But finally we can undertake this advance most hopefully because it is entirely in line with the spirit of the

Master in whose name we serve. To go backward is to repudiate our Christian traditions. It was to those who were "to go into all the world" to preach that Gospel that he gave his promise that he would be "with them all the way." If we go ahead we shall find, as Paul did, a new sense of partnership with the living Christ that we shall never find if we are timorous and hesitant in a day when the needs are as great as they are.

SEEMING DEFEAT MAY BECOME VICTORY

Indeed, if we go ahead we shall find time after time that situations that look to involve certain defeat shall open into new opportunities.

One of the most amazing things in Christian history is the way in which experiences like the Boxer Rebellion, which looked like defeat, turn out at last to be opportunities in disguise.

We have already gone far enough, for instance, with the Chinese revolution to see that what some people at first called a *débâcle* may yet prove to be filled with assets of untold value. The very revolution itself is, in large part, a triumph for ideals for which Christians have stood. The tide of nationalism which has risen so high has set the indigenous church forward by twenty-five years. It has made the Chinese willing to ask for responsibility and also willing to accept it. It has created situations where it was natural to try national leadership, situations that we could not have invented and which would not have come naturally for many years. It has forced many a missionary who would not have had the faith to at-

tempt trusting the nationals, to give them the chance, only to find to his amazement that they had far more ability than he had thought. It has set forward the cause of interdenominational coöperation by fifty years. In countries like India, as is evidenced by Dr. Stanley Jones's experience, the very criticism of Western ways has forced us back to the heart of the message that we would bring. It has made us stop, as Dr. Jones has put it, "trying to defend the long line from Genesis clear through to Western civilization," and made us realize that the one great thing which we go to give is Jesus and his Gospel and the personality of God which is made so clear through him.

The Christian world movement is in an age of confusion. It needs to pass out of it. It will pass out of it when we as Christian people see clearly again the vastness of the need, see again our resources as they are in God as revealed in Jesus Christ, and advance, regardless of the Gethsemanes and Calvarys that may be involved, to a new crusade for world service. To such an end any thoughtful Christian may well bend his energies.

XIV

The Unity of Believers

By George Pidgeon

First Moderator of the United Church of Canada

PAUL'S Epistle to the Ephesians is the charter of the church's unity. It is at once the interpretation of an experience and the exposition of an ideal. It emphasizes both the spiritual unity of the children of God and the obligation to realize that unity in outward form. Its key-thought is that our membership in the body of Christ means that we are members of one another. If we are in him we are by that fact vitally joined together. To all believers their union and communion with their fellow believers in the congregation is a blessed reality, and its maintenance a sacred obligation. To some in these days of church union the experience of a wider fellowship has only sharpened their desire for the recognition of their kinship with all members of the family of God, but to many churches the prophecy of this Epistle is still a dream remote in its origin and still more remote in its fulfillment.

It is difficult to understand how followers of Christ can be content in separate and mutually exclusive church organizations in the face of this Word of God. Only

the history of our divisions can account for it. Perhaps a study of the way by which Paul reached this conception of the church may help us to understand how these differences arose and why they are being perpetuated.

In the Epistle to the Galatians and the controversy out of which it sprang Paul maintained the doctrine of the immediacy of the soul's relations with God. Jewish-Christians had been insisting on external rites as one of the conditions of salvation, and had therefore, Paul affirmed, been putting circumcision and the observances of the law between the soul and its Saviour. Paul held that the directness of Christ's entry to the soul and his sufficiency as a Saviour was the corner stone of Christianity and must be maintained no matter what the cost. He fought fiercely for this position at the Council of Jerusalem and won a complete victory. A little later, he found that the Jewish-Christian element had perverted the faith of his unsuspecting Galatian converts, and he wrote a letter to his churches in Galatia in which he tore to pieces the position of his opponents and presented his doctrine of the immediacy of the soul's relations with God with a tempestuous fury which swept their arguments from the field. Paul had no regard for the consequences when in the heat of this struggle; if keeping the door into Christ's heart wide open to all men divided him from his Jewish-Christian brethren, he would regretfully have to accept it; the fulfillment of Christ's purpose and the salvation of men depended upon the proclamation of the

free grace of God and nothing must be allowed to hold it back.

Here is a position of the first importance in any church's faith and policy. Union with God is the first condition of spiritual life and no price is too great to pay for it; union with our fellow believers is the natural effect of union with God, and the effect is to be maintained in every way consistent with its cause. If in the course of history our union with men becomes inconsistent with our union with God, we must sacrifice our union with men for the sake of maintaining our union with God. This is precisely what Luther did. He believed that the church of his day was upholding doctrines and practices which separated the soul from its Saviour, and when he found the church determined to maintain them he renounced his allegiance and built up Evangelical Protestantism on the basis of salvation by faith in Christ alone. John Wesley never wanted to leave the Church of England, and handicapped his own movement for decades to prevent a schism, but there is this note in his diary under date of August 1763:

"I was more convinced than ever that the preaching like an Apostle without joining together those that are awakened and training them up in the ways of God is only begetting children for the murderer. How much preaching has there been for these twenty years all over Pembrokeshire! but no regular societies, no discipline, no order or connection; and the consequence is that nine in ten of the once-awakened are faster asleep than ever."

He abhorred schism, but he had to form these societies

that his converts might live. At a time when the reunion of the Scottish churches is about to be consummated, it is well to remember that the Disruption of 1843 took place because state interference in church affairs subordinated the spiritual to other considerations and no other remedy was available. Union with God is the first condition of spiritual life and no relationship with men must be allowed to interfere with it.

Everyone knows what happens after a brain storm like Paul's when he wrote the Galatians. He had been contending for a principle essential to the very life of Christianity, but after the heat of the argument passed he awakened to what his victory had cost. He saw, on reflection, that his insistence on this necessary principle had deepened the suspicion and sharpened the antagonism between Jewish and Gentile Christians. There had always been difficulty in bringing them together, and this controversy had intensified the feeling to the point of rupture. So he set himself to close the breach. First, by the collection taken up in the Gentile churches for the Jerusalem poor he reëstablished the old communion of the glorious Pentecostal days, in which, through the community of goods, the possessions of each became the assets of all. By this he sought to convince the Jews that their Gentile fellow believers were one with them in all the interests of life, material as well as spiritual. Second, as he had been the man in whom the difficulty centered, he insisted on presenting this offering in person, even though predictions were multiplied of the bonds and imprisonment which awaited him in Jerusalem. Then,

when the offering was made and accepted, and the making of it landed Paul in prison, he set forth in the Epistle to the Ephesians his great doctrine of the unity of all believers in Christ. Being born of God means being born into the family of God and into the brotherhood of believers; being rooted in Christ means sharing the common life of the branches; being builded into God's spiritual temple means being builded together on the one foundation. Paul did not change the position of those early years; immediacy of access to God was still the fundamental truth of the Gospel; but, with this established, any sacrifice was worth while which would maintain the Church's unity.

The trouble with our modern evangelical Christianity is that we have never followed Paul beyond Galatians. We have never risen high enough to apprehend the mystical union of all believers in Christ. Paul's position in this later Epistle is that the union in Christ of all believers is already a reality. The spirit to whom we owe the life in God binds all whom he possesses together. To refuse to recognize this fact is to repudiate what God has done and to make impossible our growth unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ.

In the course of his thought Paul indicates the grounds of Christian unity. This is brought out with peculiar force in Ephesians 4:4-6:

"There is one body, and one Spirit, even as also ye were

called in one hope of your calling; one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is over all, and through all, and in all."

Here Paul goes behind the fact of unity to its source in God. The one God and Father is over us all—that is, he stands to us in the relation of transcendence or sovereignty; we cannot think of absolute Godhead and Fatherhood as other than supreme. This authority of God over the children determines their relation to each other, and ought so to fill their world that other considerations such as race and class and outward condition shrink into insignificance beside it. The one God is through us all—that is, he is "immanent in all being, pervading, animating, controlling." This one God and Father dwells in us all. Paul describes this element in his own experience thus: "It is no longer I that live, but Christ liveth in me" (Galatians 2:20), and he prays for his people "that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith" (Ephesians 3:17). The conclusion is unavoidable that men whose higher life originates in, and is dependent on, such a union with the one God cannot be opposed to one another, or even apart from one another; whether they know it or not they are one in him.

The foundation of all unity is therefore the oneness of God. Centuries before Paul wrote, seekers after truth had risen to the conception that there was but one God over all creation. "Jehovah thy God, Jehovah is one" is the highest point reached in the theology of the Old Testament. The background of the thought of this Epistle

regarding the church is the writer's idea of the purposes of God in his universe as revealed in Christ. His good pleasure which he purposed in Christ for his own outworkings in the fullness of time was "to sum up all things in Christ, the things in the heavens and the things upon the earth" (Ephesians 1:10). In Christ, Paul writes in Colossians 1:17, "all things consist"; that is, in him they have their principle of "cohesion and unity." Now this law of unity so long hidden from men because of their ignorance is to be made manifest in Christ, in whose will and power all things stand together. So that the oneness of the church is, according to Paul, but the culmination of God's purpose to bring all things to a head in the Eternal Word by whom all things were made that have been made.

We note in passing how fully this accords with the progress of human thought. Our age prides itself on the triumphs of science; every new fact laid bare makes clearer the unity of all things. The struggle of thought is toward a statement of truth in which all knowledge can be harmonized. To accept a divided universe is as impossible for the human mind as to accept a disordered universe. There is disorder and there is division, as we know to our cost, but it is no part of the original plan or of the ultimate goal. God is working his purposes out as year succeeds to year toward summing up all things in Christ.

If this be evident in creation as a whole, it is much more clear in God's spiritual realm, where his spirit moves upon the living. The governing idea of the Epistle to

the Ephesians is that the church of God is the product of the action of the divine grace on the souls of men. All who are transformed by the grace of God are thereby constituted a divine society. It is not that they are expected to join such a society when they become Christians; rather, by being linked with Christ they become members of one another, and when their natures are quickened by the power which raised Christ from the dead, they are spiritually akin to all who have been similarly renewed and cannot separate themselves from the others in whom Christ dwells without a corresponding separation from him who is the life of all.

The agency and instrument of that unity is Christ and his channels of blessing which are the same for all. There is only one Lord, through whom salvation comes to every man, whether Jew or Gentile, whether bound or free. There is only one faith—that is, one form of personal acceptance of the Divine Redeemer. There is only one baptism—that is, one divine response to our repentance and trust cleansing us from our sins.

The realization of that unity is the one body in which the one spirit expresses itself. It is the spirit which produces the body. In nature it is never the organism which creates the life; it is always the life which builds up the organism. When the life in the grain of wheat awakens from the sleep of winter and starts to grow, it begins the process of embodying itself in an organism which will express its nature and serve the ends of its existence. Similarly, the spirit of Christ in man embodies itself in

the church. It manifests its nature and fulfills the purposes of God through the church, so that neither can be a factor in the world without the other. The relation of the spirit to the church is, therefore, that of life to the organism in which it has its being and through which it reproduces itself, rather than that of a policy to the organization by which it is put into effect. The whole idea here is the energy of a new spirit divinely quickened, pulsing through the church which it produces. The relation of believers to one another is not mechanical; it is vital. They are brought into one body not by an authority imposed on them from without, but by a spirit which recreates and abides in them.

This analogy will illustrate Paul's object in connecting the one church with the one spirit which produces it. Clearly we cannot represent a first-century thinker as clothing his ideas in a thought-form peculiar to the twentieth century, yet it is clear that Paul thought of the one spirit as requiring one church as its embodiment. Dr. Armitage Robinson states this truth as follows: "By a mischievous carelessness of expression, 'unity of spirit' is commonly spoken of in contrast to 'corporate unity,' and as though it might be a substitute for it. Such language would have been unintelligible to St. Paul. . . . No separation of 'body' and 'spirit' is contemplated; and the notion that there could be several 'bodies' with a 'unity of spirit' is entirely alien to the thought of St. Paul."

What do divisions in the church mean in the light of this doctrine? They are a refusal to recognize what God has done. They deny to the Christ in me the opportunity

to join spirit to spirit with the Christ in my believing brother. They split kindred asunder and deny to each the blessings which only the other is able to convey. More—they rend living tissue. The union between my fellow believer and myself is a vital one; the one Christ "who is our life" possesses both; and "what God has joined together" man presumes to "put asunder," and that in the name of religion. These divisions give the sectarian spirit with its petty animosities and prejudices authority over our relationships with our brethren in Christ. Archbishop Soderblom of Upsala said, on his return home from America, that while he found Evangelical Christianity here divided into many sects, he saw underlying their differences a real spiritual solidarity. Yet our denominations provide no adequate expression for this solidarity. They serve the same ends, but they are apart in serving them. They act together in certain moral and social expressions of their Christianity, but they shut one another out from the vitalizing exercises of the Christian faith. This means that while they join forces in their dealings with the world, they keep apart in their dealings with God. The world is struck by their separateness and by the carnal feelings which separateness generates, while to claim that there is anything in their unity which convinces the world that the Father sent his son to save it is simply absurd. Yet it is the one Lord who abides in them and rules over them, and the one Spirit who sustains the divine life in them, and spirit calls to spirit whenever men will listen to his voice.

The task of ecclesiastics today is to break down the

barriers which ecclesiasticism has erected between those who are possessed by the Spirit of God. We need not worry about the demands of the Papal See; Protestantism has need to set its own house in order before it lays responsibility for our divisions on other shoulders. The evangelical is on a sound foundation when he stresses the soul's right of direct approach to God in Christ. "Through him we have access by one Spirit unto the Father." But he is building on shifting sand when he fails to see that those in whom Christ dwells belong to one another and that it is a sin against Christ to keep them apart. It has been well said that he has thus "emphasized the divine grace at the expense of the divine society." The members of the church of the first-born are drawn from all tribes and conditions of men, but they are drawn into a living unity in Christ. The unity is none the less real because vital and spiritual; only, it needs outward recognition and provision for the fellowship which it implies by bringing together all those churches which are agreed on the fundamentals of Christian faith and practice.

The means for the realization of Christian unity is the variety of gifts and graces with which Christ has endowed his people. The Christ who descended to the depths for our sake has now ascended to his throne, from which he gives gifts to men.

"And he gave some to be apostles; and some, prophets; and some, evangelists; and some, pastors and teachers; for the

perfecting of the saints, unto the work of ministering, unto the building up of the body of Christ" (Ephesians 4:11-12). Here the apostle is dealing, not with offices or officers in the church organization, but with organs and their functions in the body of Christ. We are back among the ideas of I Corinthians 12 and Romans 12:4-8. The members of the body differ from one another. Each is fitted for a type of service peculiarly its own. Each is essential to the welfare of all the others. If they were the same they would have to separate in service, because one body would not require and could not stand a number of organs with the same function. When they are different they minister to the one body, each rendering the service which its nature fits it to render and which these others need. So it is in the church. Some have the gift of prophecy, others of teaching; some lay the church's foundation, others build its superstructure; some have power with God in prayer, others have power with men in practical leadership; some organize and direct the large movements of the Christian society, others minister with tenderness and skill to human need and suffering. These gifts are designedly different; each member of Christ's body is thus prepared for a purpose peculiarly his own, and through his gifts Christ meets some need of the other members or of the world which could not be met without him.

Sometimes the difference in their experience and genius is urged as a reason why Christians should be organized into separate bodies. The idea is that those of the same temperament, tastes, and ideals should form

groups by themselves, and worship in the way adapted to their own necessities and render the peculiar service for which their abilities fit them. But why should not a church be catholic enough in spirit to include in its membership such differences as these? Does not each type need the testimony and experience of the others to broaden its own sympathies and enlarge its usefulness? A church can never meet the varied needs about her unless she has men of different types in her membership. It is an utter fallacy to think that families of a certain tradition can be grouped together as belonging to only one spiritual type with their needs met by only one form of worship and their souls open to only one kind of experience. Everyone knows of sons of Presbyterian and Methodist families who have been won to God by the Salvation Army when their own church failed to reach them. Anglican worship has touched hearts which were closed against the more direct evangelical appeal, and the children of Anglicans have been converted by evangelists whom their ancestors despised. Is it not evident that these different types are but the different members of the one body and that each is necessary to the vigor and effectiveness of the whole? The church brings to each what it cannot gain by itself and is in turn enriched by what her sons discover.

The object of all this is that we "should all attain the unity of the faith and knowledge of God's Son, reaching maturity, reaching the full measure of development which belongs to the fullness of Christ" (Ephesians 4:13). The new human unity is, in Paul's language, "one new

man" (Ephesians 2:15). All the diverse elements of which the Christian Church is composed grow together by one spirit into "one new man." The idea here is not the growth of the individual toward maturity—the fully-developed believer over against the babe in Christ; it is the growth of all individuals into the living unity which constitutes the body of Christ. "Out of the maturity of individualism we are to reach the predestined unity of the one full-grown man" (Robinson).

There are in the churches many instances of arrested spiritual development. Many believers never get beyond the stage of the "babe in Christ." Those who are infants spiritually are individualists and separatists. This is due, Paul says, to the fact that as a child is dependent on his parents for guidance and support, so they are dependent on their spiritual leaders, and these leaders have often filled them with the spirit of faction. Hence the divisions and threats of divisions which harass the church (I Corinthians 3).

The ideal which the Apostle opposes to this is magnificent. We grow into Christ and together become his body through which he fulfills his will. As the writer above quoted continues: "What St. Paul desires to say is that the children are to grow up, not each into a separate man, but all into One, 'the perfect man,' who is none other than the Christ. The law of growth for the individual is this: that he should learn more and more to live as a part of a great whole; that he should consciously realize the life of membership, and contribute his appropriate share towards the completeness of the

corporate unity; and that thus his expanding faculties should find their full play in the large and ever-enlarging life of the One Man. It is to this that St. Paul points when he says, 'that we be no longer children, but grow up into him every whit.'"

Tennyson caught this conception in his poem, "The Making of Man":

"Man as yet is being made, and ere the crowning Age of ages,
Shall not æon after æon pass and touch him into shape?
All about him shadow still, but, while the races flower and fade,
Prophet eyes may catch a glory slowly gaining on the shade,
Till the peoples all are one, and all their voices blend in choric
Hallelujah to the Maker, 'It is finished. Man is made.'"

Steps toward Christian reunion are no longer optional for a church which would follow Christ; they are a sacred obligation. Negotiations toward breaking down the barriers built by the errors and prejudices of the past between followers of the same Lord ought to be a part of the policy of every church of God, and they should be opened up particularly between those denominations which agree on the essentials of the Christian faith. Whenever such negotiations are opened up in a sincere and prayerful spirit, everyone involved is astonished at the way in which difficulties disappear. "It is the will of God" was the response of the crusaders to Pope Urban's appeal; "It is the will of God" is the answer of everyone

who experiments honestly with Christ's doctrine of the union of believers in him. It is not that such union should be brought about; it is rather that the union of all in himself which Christ has formed should be recognized and artificial barriers burned away. When a union of churches is consummated we enter a wider fellowship amazing in its depth and richness, and discover experimentally what it means to "grow into the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ" in our union with the "church which is His Body, the fullness of him who all in all is being fulfilled" (Ephesians 1:73).

(The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness in the above study to the late Dean Armitage Robinson's Commentary on Ephesians.)

XV

The New Psychology and Religious Belief

By Joel B. Hayden

IF "WHIRL is king" in *general,* as Walter Lippmann asserts so vividly in his new book, *A Preface to Morals,* it is also doing the same royal service, in *particular.* The fields of psychological research and theory are crossed and recrossed with skirmish lines eager to do battle for their own particular tenets. The communions of Christendom are divided against each other and among themselves, liberals and modernists in one camp, fundamentalists and ultra-Catholics in the other. The last pronouncements in mathematical physics reveal the same tendency. Professor Eddington, in his Gifford lectures of last year, portrays a universe composed of protons and electrons, "building blocks" deluxe, all seemingly reckless and nonconformist. They elude "fixation," "stability," "certainty," even in the realm of pure mathematical reasoning. They usher in the perilous principle of "indeterminism." Causation, as men have used it since Cro-Magnon days, seems to have vanished. A speedy electron cannot be "placed"; an electron "located" has a speed no researcher can discover! "Whirl is king!"

It is no wonder, then, that the Christian faith is suffer-

ing from too much defense, on the one hand, and too much introspection, on the other. But it has always been thus. In no age has the Faith had much chance to discover and enjoy the ease that is supposed to be in Zion. Christianity is a dynamic force, a developing philosophy of life, tending inevitably toward abundance, inclusive in its determination to throw its comprehension around about all experience. It is no wonder that it finds itself today, as Lippmann again suggests, trying to compose a struggle between a philosophy of theocratic government, on the one hand, with all its history and implications, and a philosophy of humanism, experimentalism, "high religion," on the other. We can expect nothing else in this kind of world, with its movement, its flux, its progression and regression. Barriers are down, populations are in movement, intercourse is universal, ideas are sweeping madly, with little or no relation to their origin and significance, through bewildered minds—"whirl is king." Amid the whirl, men are busy seeking certainty, some unshakable principle of thought and action. Religion craves such certainties. Psychology is, by definition, eager to find out *how* we think, *how* stability in behavior is arrived at, if at all. As a consequence, every movement in the field of psychology affects religious certainties. Every assertion of religious faith raises queries from eager inquirers in the psychological field.

A contrast out of current life will make this clear. The gorgeous pomp and ceremony of the Pope's exit from self-imprisonment is significant. It is not symbolism; it is realism, at heart. The Holy Father sums up the ma-

jestic defensive aspect of a faith two thousand years old. More than that, he represents Christian interpretations of pre-Christian religious development, purporting to go back to the very creation of this world out of nothing. He is the supreme living culmination of a system of forms, ceremonies, liturgies, philosophies, cultures, and the practical ways and means of making and remaking the average man. His action in coming forth with the Body of God, the sacrament borne in adoration in his own hands, also summarizes the interpretation of two thousand years. Sacrifice, cosmic revelation, theories of sin and salvation, Greek philosophy, theories of the Person of Christ and of Atonement—all is caught up in this gesture, this "bearing forth" of the visible witness of that which is eternally invisible. It is a pageantry of deliverance, yes, but deliverance primarily from the tortures of human uncertainty. It is the assertion of the supreme claims of the Catholic cross-section of Christian experience. It is the visible embodiment of external authority, authority of, and for, a way of knowledge, a way of life. It is also a way of steady, accommodating interpretation, vindicating those elements in all authority as set forth by Professor William P. Montague, of Columbia University, in *Ways of Knowing,* Chapter I. Seeking the bases of the "way of authority," Montague says that three points characterize all authoritative systems: first, prestige; second, numbers; third, age. Here in a world of whirl and change, *is* stability, certainty, a determined immobility, tremendous and really moving to the last degree.

The other element in the experience of the modern

man, an element which opposes this bit of current news, is suggested by the lines of Lanier, lines referring to the *experience* of *Jesus* in *history,* the experience upon which the pomp and power of Catholic Christianity is built, through the authoritarian interpretation.

"Into the woods my Master went,
Clean forspent, forspent.
Into the woods my Master came,
Forspent with love and shame.
But the olives, they were not blind to Him,
The little gray leaves were kind to Him,
The thorn tree had a mind to Him
When into the woods He came.

"Out of the woods my Master went,
And He was well content.
Out of the woods my Master came,
Content with death and shame.
When death and shame would woo Him last,
From under the trees they drew Him last,
'Twas on a tree they slew Him—last
When out of the woods He came."

This is indeed a different preparation, a different processional, from out the temple of the trees. No question of temporal power fretted this creative soul. Unchanging divine decree here takes on the atmosphere of perpetual mystery, discovery without ceasing, the finding of secret places in the most casual haunts. This redemptive Son of God suffers the limitations of humanity, and in communion with nature seems to grip the inevitable with

all that power that sweeps in upon a soul that accepts limitations. Here adventure, uncertainty, seem to take on aspects of divinity. Here is an utter discouragement of whatever partakes of visible pomp. One is reminded of Jesus' quiet rebuke to one of his intimate friends, "Have I been so long time with you, and you know me not?"

These contrasting moods within the ranks of Christian experience make clear the vivid struggle which is the essence of all growth. Each emphasis springs from some deeply comprehended value. Yet the contrasts seem so complete that one would be foolish to indicate the final outcome. Whither goest thou, O Christian?

No Christian today can overlook the fact that the advance of biology and experimental psychology has given him real cause for searching of heart. His heart is not only the seat of what he calls his mystical communion, the shrine of his faith, but what has been reduced, by some scientific theorists, to an elaborate mechanism. And nothing but a mechanism. His "mind" has been put on the dock, as well. It has undergone cross-examination; whatever of veracity, dependability, even existence it mistakenly supposed it had has been ruthlessly denied it. Naturally it is somewhat confusing to follow a reasonable argument to the end that all reason is no reason at all. One's suspicions are roused. The end seems to be an absurdity, involving the interesting but inevitable collapse of all science and philosophy. But aside from such extreme claims, the main results have been quickening to all thinkers, and especially to those who

still cling to the belief that man is somewhere in the center of the significant things of the universe.

Christians must open the works of modern psychology —for that is our reasonable task—and wrestle with the methods and interpretations found therein. When we speak of the soul of a man, or the soul of a culture, we must scrutinize our terms. The soul used to be a spiritual, but substantial (!) residuum, separate from the body of man. This conception has little meaning now, since the unity of mind and body has been established by the psychologies of the past forty years. Today, soul as *consciousness* is under fire and one school of the moderns, the behaviorists, deny the existence of consciousness itself; personality is a fiction, but "the end product of a habit system," an "activity stream." Consequent on this, God is the creation of persons, and since persons have vanished along with consciousness, God vanishes as well, leaving naught but the behaviorist researcher in all his solitary grandeur. Behind these extreme conclusions are to be found procedures perfectly trustworthy. For the technique of modern psychology is thoroughly scientific. And whatever is scientific enjoys in this day the favor of both the élite and the populace!

Scientific method is the heart of the problem. The method of science is observation, measurement, controlled experiment, classification, analysis, and interpretation. Objectivity, frankness, ingenuity in experiment, and untiring patience characterize the individual workers and the schools into which they group themselves. They move from rats, apes, dogs, infants right through

to the ranks of human adult specimens, and their findings are recorded with pains, with clarity, and with real fidelity to what is for them the obvious truth of the matter. This method has been justified by practical results in the world of invention, *i.e.* power development; it has worked wonders in the skies, and in the dust of the earth, and in the formulæ of trained mathematicians. It is only to be expected that it should be tried in the field of mind, brain, instinct, seeking out the springs of all behavior, and seeking to explain and control the future of the human elements in this total scheme of things. The method of science the psychologist has grasped. The philosophy of some scientists many psychologists have taken for granted. Often they have not seen the difference between the behavior of a meteor and the behavior of a mystic. The power they exert over obvious facts is commendable and to be expected. The power of inadequate and unimaginative philosophies over them is not so commendable, and entirely unexpected. It is therefore very clear that the modern Christian needs to know *just what* the leaders in the schools of psychology are doing, what they represent. Then, and then only, can he relate their real achievement to his total experience. Then only can he mark them down as fellow laborers in the greatest field of all research and experiment—that of character formation, the realm of mind, the place of value, which, like the electron of Eddington, eludes all merely scientific measurement and fixation.

The thoughtful Christian should not be too much disturbed by the assertions of any one, or even a group, of

psychologists. All is not agreement among them. They have their schools, their prophets, their dogmas, their anathemas. John Watson, behaviorist, scorns the works and ways of the introspectionists. The psychoanalysts and psychiatrists pursue their research largely in the field of pathological cases. The introspectionists devise subtle experiments to show that the ordinary man is always letting "meaning" slip into his sensations of the external world, and is therefore full of really prejudiced impressions and ideas about what the external world is like. Watson and his friends charge the older schools of being dualist, thereby damning them. The idealistic critics of behaviorism charge them in turn of monism. The *Gestalt*-psychology school, under the leadership of Wolfgang Köhler of Berlin, sets forth the strength and weakness of both introspectionists and behaviorists, and the battle goes merrily forward. Yet through it all runs the thesis: "We are probing the springs of brain, the secrets of mind, the patterns of the nervous mechanism which keeps us in touch with the outer world. And our probing is profound in its implications. We are learning daily the secret of habit-building—habits of muscular controls, habits of thought, habits which use various intricate means of escaping the realities of a given situation—and all these discoveries are open, tested, can be rechecked by any intelligent observer, and have become part of the total body of useful information for the race." The Christian, therefore, should not be too much concerned with the interpretations of any one school of psychologists; he should be deeply concerned with the findings

themselves, and should take pains to follow the professional "checking up by others" which accompanies any new pronouncement. A case in point: The advanced behaviorist makes certain tests on rats and on infants. At the end of a long series of experiments he announces his results. He traces out the paths of nerve excitation, the reflex responses, the later responses, which gradually condition each new and repeated stimulus, and at the end, in summing up the case and drawing conclusions, the opinion is expressed that consciousness does not, cannot, exist, for the reason that it cannot be *observed* at any point in the series. This is a very serious matter. With the disappearance of consciousness all thought vanishes, all that is distinctive in life has become zero. But assertion is not proof. The research man in the field of the ductless glands questions the conclusion in toto. He says: "These pronouncements of evolutionary behaviorism may be flatly contradicted. For they are all at bottom unproven assumptions, dogmatic presuppositions. Genuine science, self-conscious science, science which knows what it is about, puts forward no such claims. While it may be true that evolution proceeds by addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division of parts, or by their rearrangement, the important principle is involved, that every division or rearrangement (or transformation) means a change that is radical throughout the organism" (Louis Berman, *The Religion Called Behaviorism,* pp. 143, 144). Pushing the logic of the behaviorist still further, Professor Troland of Harvard goes to the universal aspect of consciousness, and, countering the argument

which banished consciousness, insists that without positing consciousness there can be no experience of any kind. He puts it very strongly when he writes: "It is possible—and even very likely—that all of these seemingly impersonal things of the external world are actually created within consciousness and have no existence apart from consciousness. Just as consciousness *seems* to be the product of sensation, so it *seems* to produce behavior. We have good reason, however, for asserting that the incoming nerve currents are not the real causes of consciousness and that our behavior is not *causally dependent* upon it. These are the paradoxes which form portions of the mystery of mind" (Leonard Troland, *The Mystery of Mind,* Harvard University, D. Van Nostrand Co., 1926). Such is the case in point. The psychologists themselves cannot agree. They are as far apart as the poles. Their facts are verified, so far as they can be verified by check and measurement, but the philosophies of origins, meanings, and destinies which they erect on these facts are refreshingly varied. They give the religious man, who is seeking truth and hoping to use his full powers as a thoughtful person in the process, new courage to go forward. The last word has by no means been said.

Just as we have schools and divisions in religion, so we have schools and divisions in the field of experimental and theoretical psychology. Just as the "ways of knowing," the problem of "what is thought," concern us in religious experience and its interpretation, so we have the same questions arising in religion, and the same variations springing up. Observable behavior is one thing.

Its mechanism is another. Its meaning for the subject behaving, is still another. Its relation to the social setting has its implications, too. Oversimplification is very dangerous here. The casual Pilate, looking upon the strange behavior of Jesus, could make little of it. Intimate friends did not understand. It required new experience added to quickened memories to stir up the heart of the crucifixion fact, and for centuries since, men have vainly tried to entirely comprehend it as a piece of "behavior." In fact, the point seems to be, was it the way a mere man behaved under certain conditions, or was it the way the cosmos behaved in relation to a great plan?

And yet, some reckoning we must make. Psychology is making great claims. John Watson says: "We can observe behavior, what the organism does or says. . . . Behaviorism is then a natural science that takes the whole field of human adjustments as its own—it is the business of behavioristic psychology to be able to predict and to control human destiny." It is almost the language of any infallible organization, whether church or state! "The whole field of human adjustments is its own," "to predict and control human destiny"—the secret of such sweeping claims is the faith that the modern psychologist has in his method. And that method is the method of science, which has swept to such victories by measurement, classification, analysis, and interpretation.

The heart of the problem before us as modern Christians is this: can we follow the findings and conclusions of modern psychology and retain our Christian faith? Our Christian faith sets final store by the fact of per-

sonality, freedom of choice with attendant responsibility, the reality of conscience, and the cosmic importance of all human behavior, especially the behavior which is social, mental, and what, for a better term, we call spiritual. The Christian feels very deeply about these things. They are not matters which can be treated lightly, or lightly dismissed. Why? Because, setting final store by them, he feels that they vindicate his age-long hypothesis concerning God—God, the sufficient ground to create, explain, guide, and justify personality, with all its consequences. This means that God must be *at least* sufficiently rich and objective to account for all persons, to fulfill *finally* their potential powers, to conserve and dignify and love their values. The Christian really assumes that man's mind is a sure clue to something *final* in the cosmos. That finality is certainly *like* mind. It is a sure instinct of Paul which prompts us to have in us the mind which was in Christ, that central mystery which we experience but cannot fully describe. Only *in mind* does the Christian find the final explanation of his own conscious experience. All reality must be finally related to mind. Mind must be of the essence of reality, for every objective fact of the universe seems to him to anchor back in the perceiving, conceiving, relating, reasoning mind.

Again, the Christian has a profound sense of history, a sense of the great importance of sequence in time. He feels that some facts are important enough in the natural history of human *satisfactions,* both personal and social, to be what he calls *revealing.* Thus he has *some* theory of revelation, based on the values of persons, of certain

minds, and ways of behaving, in history, which appeal strongly to him. These revealing experiences please man, inspire him; out of them he builds standards to measure by, he sets goals to aim at, and in nearly every case he traces them to certain historical persons, or groups of persons. The outstanding person, in these respects, is Jesus of Nazareth—for the sincere Christian, the way of thought, the way of life, the way of influence, the inner sense of certitude which belonged to Jesus, are determining. All these vital matters have been referred to by all Christian churches, in all ages. Naturally, the Christian has real need to see where he stands in relation to these deep, these powerful, these *final* beliefs, after he has pondered the most advanced theories of modern psychology.

Has he any basis for continuing to believe, to have faith, to be possessed of faith? Where do religious convictions and psychological theories meet, if they meet at all? Do they, can they, must they hold common converse, possess a common ground?

There are three common interests of highest import. They lie at the root of psychological interest and religious development. First, religion and psychology are profoundly interested in the mechanism of personality, the brain and the attendant or possessing mind. Secondly, they must endeavor to understand the process of thought. The behaviorist's technique in the laboratory depends on this, and with it stands or falls; ponder what it means in the Christian program of conversion, regeneration, redemption. This is a common interest that dominates both groups, and moves from the nursery school to the

groundwork upon which a league of nations can be built, if it can be built at all. This is what Watson refers to as the "whole field of human adjustments." The process of thought, if thought is left to us after the psychologists have performed their major operations on us, this process is the basis of all intelligent, constructive, and adventurous behavior. In this field emergent evolution occurs, because here it is born. Third, both groups begin to philosophize. That, as Chesterton says, is the most important thing to know about each school. To explain previous steps, to point out origins, to set up goals, to suggest meanings, that is to them meat and drink. No matter what extremist psychologists may say about the foolishness of philosophers and all their works and ways, each extremist enjoys exemption for himself, and away he goes, letting his own philosophic joy be unconfined.

We can pass by the introspectionist and psychoanalytic schools with just a word. The first is guilty of talking too much like an idealistic philosopher; he sounds like a theologian. The second school uses too much intuition, too much everyday common sense, too much "direct experience." They are really too successful in their own subjective interpretations, their guesses, when they probe into the sick souls that come to them for cure, for "redemption and release." The two schools which *must* concern us are the robust and significant groups of behaviorists, on the one hand, the *Gestalt*-psychology folk, on the other.

First, let us appraise the behaviorists. Their great merit is their faith in, and use of, the scientific method. Their

great weakness is their inability to see and feel the natural limitations of the scientific method. They insist that there is no soul, no consciousness, no personality, no God, because they have never *seen* soul, consciousness, personality, God. They measure all manner of stimuli and responses, and call the total of what they can see and measure, behavior. They are thoroughgoing, but very self-limiting realists. Their boasted objectivity starves their capacity for *being aware* of other worlds of experience. They insist on observation, on *sight.* They quote the physicist and his successes in observation, in *seeing* his physical universe. But

"The Image on the retina must be
Telegraphed to the Brain—and lo, we *see!*
What could be simpler, more to be expected,
When once the Eye and Brain have been dissected?
Though what I never quite make out, is what
Precisely it may be my Brain has caught!
No light-rays reach my Brain, shut fast within
Its ivory cabinet where all's dark as Sin.
Beyond the retina, that living screen,
No Image travels—yet a Picture's *seen!*
How? and by whom? What—who—'s aware of it
Deep in the Intellect's unillumined pit?
No light rays enter there—yet I perceive them:
How comes it that I *see* them and *believe* them?
Some Spirit transcending Light, some timeless Being
Is *thinking light,* perhaps—and Science calls it, SEEING?
Blind Poet straitly prison'd in my skull,
Methinks your dreams are passing wonderful:

For, else condemned to oblivion,
Thanks to their splendor I salute—the SUN!" [1]

It is all very well to use the simple word sight, to talk about seeing, observation; to control your subject, your experiment; to limit your field; to say that you have gotten down to bedrock; to claim that you have no preconceptions. But the saying does not make it so. The behaviorist assumes a whole world of mysterious happenings which bridge the physical, the measurable, the obvious, and then calmly tells us that there is no mystery left, that the ego, the conscious, experiencing person is a fiction. And he does it *consciously,* too!

His patience, his ingenuity, his courage are admirable. But his *truth* cannot be spelled with a capital T.

There are two favorite sets of words which he uses—reflex, and conditioned reflex; "activity stream" and the "end product of a habit system." We can do no better in handling the first set, the reflex, and the conditioned reflex, than to quote Wolfgang Köhler.

"Behaviorism's critical attitude toward introspection and direct experience is an absolutely negative feature of the movement, at a time when *positive* ideas are needed. Witness its astounding sterility in the development of productive concepts about the functions underlying observable behavior. As an imitation of physics, it is scarcely a satisfactory achievement for the behaviorist to have taken the old concept of reflex action from physiology (including the reflexes of inner secretion) and to give us no further comprehension into the forma-

[1] Dodd, Lee Wilson, *The Great Enlightenment,* p. 34. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1928.

tion of new individual behavior than is offered by his concepts of positive and negative 'conditioning.' . . . 'Thou shalt not acknowledge direct experience in science' is the first commandment, and 'Thou shalt not conceive of other functions but reflexes and conditioned reflexes' is the second. I do not see how the behaviorist can reconcile this creed with our actual knowledge of organic processes and of behavior. Nor do I understand why, from the standpoint of 'exactness,' the organism should be conceived as such a crude and poor affair. In its effort to imitate the technical procedure of physics, behaviorism often shows a stubborn narrowness. . . . Even now, as an adult science, physics is allowed to have at least one new idea about the atom every year. Though *our* science (psychology) is so very young, most behaviorists do not even dream of any possible change in the nature of their two fundamental ideas. The truth was revealed to them in its perfection at the birth of behavioristic psychology. . . . The two behavioristic concepts in question show one remarkable property: If you compare them with the various types of processes in the inorganic world of the physicist, you will find that even simple physical systems are by far richer in the variety of their kinds of function than is the nervous system of man in the eyes of a radical behaviorist. A soap bubble does not show us reflexes, it is true; therefore we cannot expect to find conditioned reflexes in it. Nevertheless, those functional properties which the soap bubble does exhibit are decidedly superior in some respects to the monotony of reflexes and conditioned reflexes. . . . His imitation of physics excludes most of the functional possibilities given in physics itself." [1]

A lengthy, but fairly adequate statement of the case against the oversimplification of method and field among

[1] *Gestalt Psychology*, pp. 55, 56. New York, Horace Liveright, 1929.

the behaviorists. The pen of Lee Wilson Dodd has caught the situation, and dealt with it wittily:

"Rats in a maze are Watson's data. That's
Why Watson in a Maze observing rats
Strikes me as mildly comic. Not that he
Confesses to bewilderment like me,
Tho' we are trapped in the same Mystery!
No, Watson solves all mysteries with ease,
And in the face of God's infinities
Finds Life—*a Reflex sniffing round for Cheese.*
To which there is but one reply, and that's—RATS ——"[1]

In a little book, clearly and forcefully written (*Taking the Name of Science in Vain,* Macmillan), Dr. H. J. Bridges takes issue with the "logical" interpretations which the behavioristic school puts upon its findings. He calls them "ananthropists," a word formed on the analogy of "atheism, agnosticism, anæsthetic—to denote the theory that denies the existence of consciousness and mental life." He writes, "He (the behaviorist) uses logic to annihilate logic; thought, he declares, is nothing but speech, uttered or silent; all thought, therefore, is laryngeal in origin" and limited in meaning to the muscular performances and behaviors of the larynx. A strange account, indeed, of the works of Aristotle, Clerk Maxwell, Lord Kelvin, Goethe, and that slightly significant achievement which resulted in the Sinaitic Code! We can easily see why a definition of a behaviorist runs as follows: "A behaviorist

[1] Dodd, Lee Wilson, *The Great Enlightenment,* p. 32. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1928.

is a philosopher who has made up his windpipe that he has no mind."

It would seem, then, that too much observation of the obvious and external movements (observable behavior) had unbalanced the judgment (if such a word, or laryngeal expression is permitted) of good men and true. Physics and chemistry can, and have, isolated and controlled the phenomena they have worked upon; the psychologist, however, has a *different sort of phenomenon* to deal with. The human performer is a very complicated organism, a total, balanced whole, a *Life.* That living thing has an individuation which provides an unknown in each separate case. The pastor's study today is rich in evidence of this, as men and women, young people, bring their problems of adjustment to him! When you arbitrarily limit your field of observation to what you can measure with a pointer on a scale, you give your case away. The *living,* the *conscious* factor, the *vital* thing never enters the field of objective measurement. Pulse, breath, sugar in the blood, are concomitants, but they are not descriptions in detail of the 'state of mind,' the 'qualitative something' which makes up the life, the living experience of the moment, which is the individual's total reaction to a giving stimulus. When you observe a widow casting in her mite at the treasury, you can record *what you see.* But *what you don't see,* what you in the nature of the case *cannot* see, and what the Nazarene *saw,* seems to have the survival value of reality—in this case the unobserved behavior, not physical or chemical *only,* but the

physical and chemical *plus* the conscious, intentional something, *was* and *is* the final, comprehensive act.

Canon Streeter in his book *Reality* (Macmillan), p. 98, reminds us of this distinction, which the behaviorist and some biologists are prone to overlook. "In physics and in chemistry it rarely makes any practical difference if one forgets for the moment that law is a descriptive formula, and mechanism a symbol for an abstract relation, and thinks of them as if they were efficient causes of a compulsive character. In biology and psychology it is important all the time to keep these limitations in mind, and to remember that life is neither a description nor a symbol, but *something actually existent,* which, as we know it in ourselves, seems to be in some sense an originating and directing cause."

It seems, then, that the common instinct of the Christian modernist, and the Christian fundamentalist and Catholic, is a sound one. The wisdom of the past, which rested all on the fact of person, with freedom, responsibility, power to originate, possessing a real mind, this wisdom seems to have been justified of her children. The reality of life as a total, an individual, a special and responsible thing in its own right, can yield nothing to the philosophy of behaviorism. It may learn much from experiment and technique, from patience in the field of research, from the courage and the relentless and selfless pursuit of truth for its own sake. But any denial of consciousness delivers us all, including the behaviorists themselves, into the hands of absurdity, and that we see no

reason to countenance. To that extent, at least, we retain both consciousness and reason!

How can one who has inherited the glories of biography, the dignities of law in individual and social relations, the unplumbed mysteries of cross and sacrifice as power to release new, cleansing forces in every age—how can one, in the face of music, art, architecture, poetry, voicing their *facts* of experience and truth, and dreams of *possible truth,* surrender his very *self* to a technique which *assumes* its *own* reasoning powers and *denies* the rational process to *all other* techniques and to all other observing and experiencing minds?

Gestalt psychology is of another type. Wolfgang Köhler, the German leader of the school, head of the Psychological Institute of the University of Berlin, has just written in English, and published in America, the outline of his system, entitled *Gestalt Psychology.* He begins with the recognition of the *youth* of psychology as a science, its youth explaining many of the dogmatic assertions which will disappear with age and consequent ripening of experience. Whereas the introspectionist discards all observation which carries "meaning" with it, Köhler points out how bare and even artificial experience is which has all "meaning" extracted therefrom. He has already told us what he thinks of the oversimplification of the behaviorists. Then, with subtle, sustained, finely documented and illustrated exposition and argument he presents his theory of the *dynamic basis of all living experience,* as opposed to the "machine theory." For "actual life, common experience is found to be incalculably more

important than any of the introspectionists' 'true sensations.' . . . I do not see why an experience which is constituted by acquired meaning should be less interesting or important for psychology than experiences not so composed" (p. 88). "If in all the examples given we accept direct experience (*i.e.,* common-or-garden-what-the-layman-has) at its face value, our fundamental assumption about the process underlying experience and behavior must be opposite the assumption of both introspectionists and behaviorists—*i.e.,* instead of reacting to local stimuli by locally and mutually independent events, the organism reacts to an *actual constellation* of stimuli by a total process which, as a functional whole, is its response to the whole situation" (p. 106). Pushing this thesis to its conclusions, both in theory and by experiment, he arrives at the following statement of fact and principle. "Physiologically as well as in experience (that is, in the mechanism of the body as well as in the field of consciousness and conscious behavior), what happens will be no more than a natural consequence, the real development, or the evolution of *something* which, in germ, was already implicitly contained in the tendency. . . . So we are led to a more complete application of the theory of direct dynamical determination. There is no mere sequence of indifferent events, connected indirectly. Each phase of what happens grows out of its predecessors, depending upon their concrete nature. And the subject (yourself, good reader) whose experiences are an expression of this *one* developing context in the brain-field, will experience the development, along with its 'referring to,' 'depending

upon,' 'away from,' and so forth—that is, with *insight*" (pp. 390-391).

This is all admittedly hard reading and will repay careful study and re-study. But it is rewarding. It brings back the *full* as well as the *concrete* experiences of the common man, and the great man, too, and deals with *whole* situations, no longer merely with fragments. It renews one's confidence in one's own mental operations, as *real* things, not illusions. You can look again upon the person with respect, for he is real, he is there. Through all determinism there is an emergent newness, a moving power, through new fields, with new forces. And it is all going somewhere, it is all reaching forward in what he calls "the field of intelligence proper" (p. 394). And how refreshing it is, after some lean years of uncertainty, to find that "intelligence" is "proper" once more.

Professor F. C. Bartlett of Cambridge University, England, speaking before the British Association for the Advancement of Science said (July, 1929) that probably no contemporary movement in psychology . . . has more profoundly influenced psychological thought in English-speaking countries than the *Gestalt* psychology, which accepts *consciousness* as the material for study, but contends that we know only forms or wholes in consciousness, that its elements do not exist, or exist only with *valuation* to the larger wholes which dominate them.

This is undoubtedly the case. The largeness of the units of conscious life, the bewildering complexity of the motives and motivating drives within individual life—all such experiences *as real* demand more patience more

comprehensiveness, more ingenuity than either introspectionists or behaviorists seem willing to give to the problem. And less dogma. Life is indeed a strangely complicated process. It cannot be studied *really* in its parts. When you pick it to pieces it ceases to be life, it resolves itself into inorganic matter again. The same is true of consciousness—it is to be treated with respect, and in its wholeness, in its constellation of relationships, its balance of many conflicts; then, and only then, it seems, can basic principles of behavior and thought be truly discovered.

What of the wholeness, the configuration, the constellation of elements and relationships in one living cell of protoplasm? It can be reduced, operated upon, analyzed, but can its total formula be produced by experiment? Can its elements of age-long heredity, full of successful techniques of survival, be built up in a laboratory? The half-hour-old blade of grass makes chlorophyl, tying itself into the cosmic energy of soil, air, and sun. And that is still well beyond our powers. An organism, whether the commonest herb or the most uncommon scientific genius, is, through its total complexity, its constellation of balance and direction, something to be regarded as a unit in total behavior, and in total and unique meaning.

And who would be so brash as to believe that one could dismiss the actual accomplishments of religious experience in a phrase or two at the beginning of a book? This is what Watson does in his *Behaviorism* (p. 1): "No one knows just how the idea of the supernatural started. It probably had its origin in the general laziness of mankind. . . . Medicine-men have always flourished. A good

medicine-man has the best of everything and, best of all, he doesn't have to work. . . . I think an examination of the psychological history of people will show that their behavior has always been easily controlled by fear stimuli. If the fear element were dropped out of any religion, that religion could not long survive." Perhaps an examination of the religious experience of Watson would reveal no knowledge whatever of the Jesus of Nazareth. The reduction of the power of Jesus to such a formula is another case in point—an oversimplification which leads to zero.

Contrast with the above, a quotation from H. G. Wells (*The Open Conspiracy,* p. 3): "Religious ideas in the past have derived from the most diverse emotional and intellectual origins in the integrating mind of man. Speculative explanations, metaphors hardened by usage into quasi-factual statements, fantasies arising out of germinating and suppressed impulses, false analogies, parables begotten and lit by flashes of spiritual insight, traditions misconceived and distorted, dogmatic excesses in explicitness evoked by the irritation of contradictory criticism, the odd compromises of theological diplomatists, the craving for supernatural sanctions and vindications, and the nightmare creations of fear, that haunting shadow of all conscious life, have mingled inextricably in every religious fabric." What a picture of the socially-organic body of human experience called religion! This description moves in the meaningful places of the human heart, where feeling and memory contribute to the *whole* reaction of the human organism. He is simply telling the

story of an "activity stream" which can never be channeled by too simple reflexes and conditioned reflexes! When John Keats says "Beauty is truth, truth beauty, that is all ye know on earth, and all ye need to know"; when John Keats says this, just how is he to be described adequately as the "end product of a habit system"? The decisions made in Gethsemane were the "end products of a habit system" as well, but what a difference between the various habit systems in human history. And that is the heart of the matter. Yes, as Köhler says, we move from merely local situations, and local minds, to those situations and minds which are cosmic, genuine "end products of a habit system" not at all coterminous with anything in our little realm. They defy all comprehension by the mere study of pulses, knee-jerks, the "local engagements" which are interesting but of very little meaning.

In conclusion, modern psychology has given us all many valuable insights, skills, and suggestions. But it is very young. Human behavior, with its infinitely complicated patterns and drives, both objective and subjective, is very old. The dynamic view is greater than the machine theory. The modern psychologist is still the servant, not the ruler of the modern man. Psychology may well tell us that the mechanism of brain, as tool of mind and consciousness, is handable, studyable, controllable within certain limits, a physical thing. But a philosophy of mechanism, an interpretation of conscious life as *merely* mechanical, is doomed. The "wholeness," the uniqueness, the mysteriousness of conscious life defeats

any serious mechanistic theory. The mind within the mechanist turns the mechanist's flank. We do move away from mechanism, and details thereof, toward "intelligence proper."

Psychology also tells us, in the large, that the process of thinking has its definite laws; that the way we learn to think has a final bearing on the making or the breaking of the total conscious being, the character of the man. It reveals with startling clearness the importance of the period of infancy and childhood (*i.e.,* Watson's slogan, "Give me the baby!"); it shows how we build up our universe in images and words, and it lays on us all the burden of putting modern knowledge into image and language which will satisfy, inform, and inspire the oncoming generations. In its study of behavior it shows the age-long struggle of the individual and culture to move from immaturity, from childishness, and a fiction-universe, into maturity, manliness, and a factual-universe. Every mature Christian, every Christian who chooses to no longer look through glasses that are darkened, should read Walter Lippmann's pages in *A Preface to Morals* (pp. 175-193) which deal with this aspect of the world we actually live in, and the world we should all assist in creating.

The final inference is this. The individual man must pass from the realm of imposed external authority as the final reality to "high religion," to the possession of that power to move through Gethsemanes and up and across Golgothas, attaining thereby the deathless significance of

a resurrected life which is the supreme destiny of any man who glimpses what his Master called "eternal life."

We are all very young, in a very old world. Decent teachableness is something we all need very much, especially in this America of ours.

> "Mark our pert manners, morals, and one loss
> That dulls the sun and dwindles gold to dross,
> Our lack of civilized humility:
> For, sure, God laughs when fishes scorn the Sea,
> Yet Man, mad Reasoner, reasons Mind to nought,
> And, curs'd with wordy arrogance of thought,
> Overlooks a small, still flame within his breast
> Whose wordless beauty makes God manifest."[1]

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[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 44.

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XVI

Creative Passion

By Lynn Harold Hough

BRICKS do not necessarily make a building. Blocks of marble do not always combine to make a temple. You can have the materials lying all about and yet fail of the product for which the materials were gathered together. Men of disciplined and receptive reason have been busy for a long time collecting the materials for that temple of the mind where contemporary intelligence may worship. Sometimes it would almost appear that they have thought that if enough material were assembled the great temple by some fine magic would lift itself in splendid proportions from the ground. The event has justified no such naïve confidence. The materials are lying everywhere. The great shrine has not been built. And men all about us can scarcely be blamed if they find our collections of bricks and even our marble columns poor substitutes for a noble temple whose subtly integrated harmonies capture the imagination even as they satisfy the mind.

You only possess Gothic cathedrals after men of creative passion have appeared. And the new temple waits

for the men of creative passion who will change a mass of scattered and incoherent materials into a living structure of rare and radiant beauty. It is at this point that the interpreter of religion meets his most difficult task and his most splendid opportunity. He stands at the very spot where the materials of the new knowledge must be transmuted into glowing prophecy. The materials wait for the touch of creative passion. Without that nothing comes to a satisfying consummation. With its afflatus every great and noble thing becomes possible. The authors of the chapters which make up this volume have all met this problem in its full difficulty. They represent many years of experience in the endeavor whose end it is to transmute knowledge into luminous interpretation. It is almost inevitable that this matter of creative passion should occupy our attention in the final article which the book contains. For this is in the thought of a preacher the divine event toward which all his training moves. We shall consider, then, the modern preacher as a vehicle of creative passion. We shall observe him as he builds that temple of the mind where contemporary men may worship.

Professor Arthur Platt in a thoughtful essay on "Poetry and Science" wrote: "So also in poetry the spirit supplies a constant stream of ideas and words and phrases, which the intellect controls, from which it collects and arranges, and which itself only partly understands. When these two work harmoniously together and the balance between them is perfect, then we get really fine poetry, but when

one or the other predominates unduly, then there will be something wrong."[1]

The interpreter of religion, like the poet, deals on the one side with materials and principles related to cool clear intellect, and on the other with luminous apprehensions coming from the realm of the spirit. When the balance is perfect you get great preaching. In the case of the preacher the beginning of the synthesis is an experience like that described by Robert Browning in the words, "I fused my soul with the inert stuff." What is apprehended as the truth is thus warmed and indeed ignited by the fires which glow in the personal life. Thus from the beginning preaching is even more than that which Phillips Brooks expressed by the great phrase, "truth through personality." It is truth become organic in personal experience and so capable of becoming incandescent when expressed through the vehicle of speech. One is dealing with very subtle and evasive processes when he tries to describe the fashion in which this occurs. Perhaps it is possible to approach the matter in this way. The truth which a man observes in cool detachment never becomes a transforming power in his life. The truth which he puts in command of his action at once begins to exhibit surprising vitality. The truth for which he takes risks begins the astonishing process of transforming his life. A man must give up the safety of serene detachment if he would become a prophet. A truth is rather harmless when it is kept in cold storage in the intellect.

[1] Platt, Arthur, *Nine Essays.* "Poetry and Science," p. 166. Cambridge, at the University Press.

It begins to glow and palpitate when it feels the warmth of the heart. And it shows an astonishing power the moment it is brought into contact with the will.

It is very easy for the preacher to become a modern Prince Hamlet. That Danish prince was strong in respect of analysis and weak in respect of action. The very processes of training by which a man obtains the disciplined strength of the scientific mind need to be supplemented by other and subtler processes if he is to escape the attitude which is content with the mental activity which classifies facts and never moves to that higher experience where thought is charged with passion and so bursts forth in powerful action. It is particularly true that the man who has escaped from inadequate views of the world of things and the world of men is quite likely to regard this emancipation as itself an experience possessing a sort of finality. But the passion of the emancipated is a false dawn unless it is followed by a noble and fruitful use of the new freedom. And the pleasure which is given by the new knowledge is permanent only if it leads to a life in which this new knowledge is gathered up and expressed in an activity full of moral and social and spiritual meaning. At a certain stage of his career a minister is tempted to feel that because he has found a new vocabulary he is possessed of a new gospel. And with some men preaching is an astonishing series of adventures with one vocabulary after another. Occasionally in the earlier days of the critical study of the documents which make up the Bible there appeared a young minister who felt that his whole service to the community had reached an

apex of adequacy if he had given J. E. D. and P. due recognition in a series of downright sermons. The difficulty with this sort of preaching was that it was really exciting only so long as it faced a good deal of contradiction. When once everybody had accepted J. E. D. and P. it was discovered that all of this led one to truth which was significant but hardly messianic. There are some things which become almost dull unless some one denies them. There is a type of modern who is only vivid and commanding if he can persuade a group of "Fundamentalists" armed to the teeth to deny his right to say the things which he feels that he must utter. The new knowledge must be bent to the purpose of something greater than itself if it is to be made the vehicle of creative passion.

So the modern preacher who is indeed eager to become a prophet approaches the whole body of contemporary scientific knowledge quite without hostility. Indeed, he comes in an attitude of very great friendliness. But he is quite aware that he will find raw materials and not a completed edifice. He does not believe that science is at all dangerous to religion if the men of religion master its materials with keen and critical intelligence. But he quite understands that religion must give a soul to science.

The physical sciences deal with things which can be measured. There are an immense number of such things within the reach of man's experience. To the preacher this means something very important, indeed something very splendid. It means that we do not live in a haphazard world. The physical order of the scientist has the

closest relations with the moral order of the preacher. A lawless universe would be an impossible universe for moral and spiritual values. A world where measurement is possible is a universe which you can make your servant and even your friend. The very soundness of life rests at last upon one's right to be sure that some things can be counted upon. A dependable world is exactly the sort of world the prophet must live in if his prophecy is to have any sort of assured quality. The laws of nature are like so many friendly hands reached out to assure us of the kindness of a God who has given us a world which does not tell us lies.

The scientific mind has carried on no more fascinating adventures than those associated with mathematics. Here we find the scientist studying relationships quite apart from the objects which have these relationships. Here we have the most amazing illustration of the essentially rational quality of the human mind. For mathematics is a sort of secretion of pure rationality. Here again is something ready for the hand of the interpreter. A universe in which all the complicated history of the development of mathematics is possible is a universe in whose very bone and fiber it would seem that a certain deep, logical consistency must be written. And when scientists daringly apply these mathematical insights to the actual world and find that they fit its operations in the most unbelievably varied way you seem to be looking through the door at the very nature of reality itself. It is not strange to think of Plato coming to regard God as the supreme mathematician. One comes through this sort of

investigation to have a sense of a vast and many-sided and far-reaching harmony which is the very nature of the universe itself. And one is not surprised that in a poet like William Blake such conception became a kind of intellectual conflagration out of whose fires came glowing words of prophecy.

The world which we experience, however, offers more than an experience of things and of relationships. It is also a world of developing life. And the whole tale of the advancing biological process is one which captures the imagination of the preacher and kindles that creative passion in which he is able to do his own work. For as Professor J. S. S. Haldane has so well said, biology is more than bio-physics and bio-chemistry. The moment you come upon organic life you find a capacity on the part of the organism to act as a whole which transcends the mathematical uniformities of physics and chemistry. Life is pushing its way on in the most astonishing fashion. No wonder Professor Bergson could find no lesser word for it than creative evolution. Here you have a quality immanent in all the physical uniformities which uses them in the happiest fashion and yet transcends them. From the time life emerged from water to the vast adventure of living upon the land you have the sense of a quest and a quest astonishingly guided from within. You see the first face upon which a gleam of intelligence appears. Already it is looking toward some far-off goal. You see the first face upon which the sense of moral distinction lies, like the birth of conscience. It, too, is looking already, however dimly, toward some far-off goal. You

look at the first face upon which the sense of beauty glows, and in that dim beginning of the apprehension of harmony you see the vague yet masterful prophecy of the history of all the arts. So you behold the pageant of the unfolding years. You behold the growth of intelligence. You watch the evolution of science. You look upon the sharpening and increasing sense of moral values. You stand spellbound as the love of beauty turns into the making of all sorts of beautiful things. You watch the advancement of all the arts. You sense a wistful outreach after the unseen which becomes the great adventure of all the religions of the world. You behold that untutored clod called man uttering great words like destiny and God. Always there is the restless forward push. Always the astonishing development. Always from within this mighty urge leading to such manifold achievement. What is the universe? you ask yourself. And back there comes with a kind of thundering intensity a reply which fairly seems to become a voice. And that voice says, "The universe is a purpose which is alive." So biology and all that astonishing fecundity of life which comes out of the biological process gives potency to that creative passion without which the preacher does not even have a name in the world. Of course the biological process and all the many-sided splendor of the evolutionary process do not exist to give a message to the preacher. But he is a good deal of a fool if he does not see what splendid materials they offer lying ready for his hand.

The conception of the universe as a living purpose has of course the most far-reaching implications. And as the

religious thinker rises to that conception from the very materials of biological study, he enters upon a profound experience whose materials science and religion jointly supply. It is at the very moment when the sense of evolving purpose has given a kind of winged splendor to life that he is ready for a new apprehension of the meaning of Jesus. He allows the figure which walks through the Gospels to speak quite simply and directly to his life and it is as if from the very beginning of the forward thrust of the biological process every voice has been saying with quiet insistence, "I am on the way to him." So biology itself begins to furnish the materials for mystical experience. As Professor Simpson of Edinburgh has put it, "Jesus is the goal of the evolutionary process."

The more one apprehends the significance of the quality of life which expresses itself in Jesus, the more tremendously significant does it seem that such a figure was ever a part of the experience of men. It becomes increasingly clear that we reach the very summit of thought about goodness and moral truth and spiritual beauty as we confront him. Then comes the commanding thought that in him we really discover what the universe is about. It is the Christian belief that we discover the meaning of the universe in the life of Jesus. The most daring act of the human spirit is the belief in a God who is like Jesus. Of course there are glittering moments of choice all along the way to this great consummation. We have experience of persons and we have experience of things. There is the choice involved in believing that the ultimate structure of the universe is like persons and not like things.

There is the pursuit of truth as a human experience. And there is the choice involved in the belief that a scientist's devotion to truth has its basis in some truth-loving quality in the ultimate reality of the universe. There is the vast passion for beauty among gifted men. And rising from its contemplation there is the choice involved in the belief that the love of beauty reveals something structural in the life of the universe itself. There is that deep response to goodness which is so strange and wonderful a thing in the heart of man. And the history of goodness in the world makes it possible to choose to believe that goodness is the essence of that reality which gives final meaning to the whole system of things and persons. Such choices and the heroic decision to believe in a Christ-like God capture the most notable experiences of the race and make them the basis of religion.

We have spoken of the forward push to be found in the whole biological process. But this does not exhaust the story. There is another process going on all the while. And this process finds description in the word degeneration. The world is a vast graveyard of forms which fell out of the forward movement. The process of evolution has been paralleled by this process of degeneration. And the process of evolution has won many a victory over the processes of degeneration during many a century. When man emerges you have the coming of rationality. And now there is the possibility of deliberate choice. Man can choose to go on with the evolutionary process. He can choose to go back with that process which has already had a long biological history—the

process of degeneration. From this analysis it is easy to see that from the biological point of view sin is a refusal to go on with the evolutionary process.

It is of the utmost importance to realize that alternatives arise in the biological process itself and that when intelligence arrives you have the possibility of deliberate choice. Now we stand in that world of mental and moral and æsthetic and spiritual responsibility in which life becomes the most-sided sort of adventure. It offers the very materials for every sort of creative passion. It makes inevitable the amazing experiences of morality and religion.

It is only in such a world that the choice of suffering for moral ends can have any sort of meaning. To be sure, there has been an element of sacrifice in the biological process from the beginning. Motherhood has always been self-sacrifice alive. And as Prince Kropotkin has so brilliantly pointed out, "Mutual Aid" as well as the struggle for survival has had a long and potent history in the forward movement. But with the coming of rationality all this emerges as a deliberate attitude. The great heroes and the great martyrs of the world knew what they were about. Vicarious suffering became a part of the accepted moral history of humanity. And all of this comes to perfect focus and to supreme expression in that cross which is the very symbol of the Christian faith. The most tremendous conception which has come to the mind of man is that of a friendly God deliberately choosing a way of suffering for the helping of men. And this conception is just putting into the life of God that which has already

appeared in the biological process and has been the most splendidly noble aspect of the life of man. It represents that act of daring by which man ventures to believe that the finest thing he has found in nature and in human life has supreme expression in the life of God.

But the aspect of experience which has been discussed in Prince Kropotkin's "Mutual Aid" has very far-reaching implications. It begins in the biological process. It becomes the herd instinct. It has the most manifold and glorious expression in human society in its greatest periods of achievement, and it hovers before our imagination as the haunting dream of that Great Society of Friendly Men and Women which is the consummation of the experiment of human life. Following the process from its dim beginnings, one comes to think of the social sanctions so slowly and yet so powerfully evolving as part of the structure of reality itself. Vast vistas begin to open. For if the social passion has its beginning in the very nature of reality, then we stand upon the very edge of the conception of a social God. From the composite structure of the electron to a God who is a divine society is a long journey. But there is grave question as to whether the thinker who deals with full honesty with every aspect of experience can be contented without traveling the whole way.

All that we have said represents a study of the whole evolutionary process in a mood of eager desire to follow its manifold outreaches to their ultimate fulfillment. But another question is sure to arise. Do we dare to believe in a voice from beyond the silence? The answer is great

enough if we are ready to receive it. The answer is that there is no silence. The universe is one great voice and it is all the while speaking to us of those matters which transcend the mechanical uniformities which constitute a part of our study of physics and chemistry. Professor Eddington's Gifford Lectures for 1927 bear witness to the complete bankruptcy of a view of the universe which for something like seventy-five years spoke with an increasing and sometimes with an arrogant assurance. The water-tight system with no room for the activity of a freely moving mind was a temporary obsession of able men preoccupied with one aspect of experience. Under its influence men invented instruments for dealing with certain aspects of experience and then came to the curious conclusion that the aspects which were not reflected by these instruments did not exist. The conclusion was especially curious in the light of the fact that the capacity to plan and construct these very instruments involved the presence of powers and qualities which the instruments themselves could not report. You must always include the inventor in any adequate account of the machine age. And you must always include the mind of the scientist with its freely moving activity and its capacity to distinguish between truth and error in any complete account of the world of which the physical sciences are a part.

The moment you begin to deal with the scientist you come upon a person. And since science could not exist without the scientist, you are now coming close to the heart of the matter. The scientist stands at the center of a mass of uniformities which he can analyze and

understand and in a measure control. The more you think of the scientist the more you begin to be able to think of God. And when the scientist analyzes his own methods and his own instruments with critical intelligence in the fashion which characterizes such an authority as Professor Eddington, you behold personality beginning to be actually master of its own tools and capable of emancipation from slavery to its own methods.

The new world may have its own menacing and difficult ways for the mind of man. It is at least free from the old slavery to a mechanical system of things. The amazing thing about the history of science is just its revelation of the endless ingenuity and resourcefulness of the scientist. Personality comes to its own in any full examination of the data of experience. The world of exhaustless personality is the world in which science has a future, and it is a world in which religion has a place of commanding power. Personality proves the key to unlock all the mysteries. And through the door so opened men pass into a region of the exercise of critical intelligence where it is seen that the mighty sanctions of the Christian religion stand in unimpaired strength.

It is at the moment of the supreme exercise of critical intelligence that the interpreter of religion becomes most nobly capable of creative passion. At last he sees that the universe itself is on his side. The total body of experience can only be seen in perspective which gives any sense of proportion and harmony in a universe controlled by a Christlike God. There are plenty of blind alleys.

But the main road follows the exhaustless splendors of the personal life.

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